Essays On Networks In Macroeconomics And Finance by Zhu, Wu
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 
2021 
Essays On Networks In Macroeconomics And Finance 
Wu Zhu 
University of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations 
 Part of the Ecology and Evolutionary Biology Commons, Economics Commons, and the Finance and 
Financial Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Zhu, Wu, "Essays On Networks In Macroeconomics And Finance" (2021). Publicly Accessible Penn 
Dissertations. 4082. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/4082 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/4082 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Essays On Networks In Macroeconomics And Finance 
Abstract 
This thesis consists of three essays that examine theoretically and empirically the implications of 
networks in business cycles, economic recovery, systemic risk, corporate finance and governance, and 
asset pricing. 
This first chapter emphasizes the role of networks in driving economic recovery from recessions and its 
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has recovered from recessions ranges from months to years. We propose a model incorporating the 
innovation network, the production network, and cross-sectional shocks and show that their interactions 
jointly explain large variations in the recovery speed across recessions in the US. We show that when the 
innovation network has low-rank, there exists one key direction: the impact of a shock becomes persistent 
only if the shock is parallel to this key direction; in contrast, the impact diminishes quickly if the shock 
parallels to other directions. Empirically, we estimate the model in a state-space form and document a set 
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Second, the innovation network has non-negligible overlap with the production network. Third, recessions 
with slow recovery are those witnessing sizable negative shock to sectors central to the innovation 
network. Such network structures and the time-varying sectoral distribution of the shocks can well explain 
the large variation in the recovery speed across recessions in the US. Finally, we show that the force 
driving a slow-recovery yields a small but persistent process in consumption growth, and we use this 
process to explain several puzzles in asset pricing. 
The second chapter is based on the joint work with Yiqing Xing and Rakesh Vohra where we explore the 
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reversed. Under some condition, in a fully diversified network, the aggregate effect of an idiosyncratic 
shock via propagation does not diminish. This suggests a potentially important role that corporate 
governance plays in macro fluctuations. 
The third chapter is based on the joint work with Yu Shi and Robert Townsend where we show the 
business groups can significantly change the effect of credit supply shock through the equity-holding 
networks. Using business registry data from China, we show that internal capital markets in business 
groups can play the role of a financial intermediary and propagate corporate shareholders’ credit supply 
shocks to their subsidiaries. An average of 10% local bank credit growth where corporate shareholders 
are located would increase subsidiaries' investment by 0.6% of their tangible fixed asset value, which 
accounts for 42.5% (4.3%) of the median (average) investment rateamong these firms. We argue that 
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON NETWORKS IN MACROECONOMICS AND FINANCE
Wu Zhu
Rakesh Vohra
This thesis consists of three essays that examine theoretically and empirically the implications of
networks in business cycles, economic recovery, systemic risk, corporate finance and governance,
and asset pricing.
This first chapter emphasizes the role of networks in driving economic recovery from recessions
and its role in asset pricing. It is based on a joint work with Yucheng Yang. The speed at which
the US economy has recovered from recessions ranges from months to years. We propose a model
incorporating the innovation network, the production network, and cross-sectional shocks and show
that their interactions jointly explain large variations in the recovery speed across recessions in the
US. We show that when the innovation network has low-rank, there exists one key direction: the
impact of a shock becomes persistent only if the shock is parallel to this key direction; in contrast,
the impact diminishes quickly if the shock parallels to other directions. Empirically, we estimate the
model in a state-space form and document a set of new stylized facts of the US economy. First, the
innovation network among sectors has low-rank. Second, the innovation network has non-negligible
overlap with the production network. Third, recessions with slow recovery are those witnessing
sizable negative shock to sectors central to the innovation network. Such network structures and the
time-varying sectoral distribution of the shocks can well explain the large variation in the recovery
speed across recessions in the US. Finally, we show that the force driving a slow-recovery yields
a small but persistent process in consumption growth, and we use this process to explain several
puzzles in asset pricing.
The second chapter is based on the joint work with Yiqing Xing and Rakesh Vohra where we
explore the agency conflicts in amplifying and propagating a shock in equity cross-holding networks.
Unlike the first chapter, here, we emphasize the role of financial network and agency conflicts within
the firm. We argue that firm-level agency conflicts and not just the network of interdependencies
between firms, play a crucial role in amplifying or muting the propagation of exogenous shocks.
iv
Suppose firms can make investment decisions in response to an exogenous shock. If they are subject
to default costs or limited liability, their investment decisions mitigate the spread of an initial shock.
In the face of interest conflicts or moral hazard, firm-level investment choices amplify an initial
shock. Agency conflicts counter the role of network structure in the propagation of shocks. For
example, prior work argues that more integrated networks facilitate the propagation of shocks. In the
presence of interest conflicts, this effect can be reversed. Under some condition, in a fully diversified
network, the aggregate effect of an idiosyncratic shock via propagation does not diminish. This
suggests a potentially important role that corporate governance plays in macro fluctuations.
The third chapter is based on the joint work with Yu Shi and Robert Townsend where we show the
business groups can significantly change the effect of credit supply shock through the equity-holding
networks. Using business registry data from China, we show that internal capital markets in business
groups can play the role of a financial intermediary and propagate corporate shareholders’ credit
supply shocks to their subsidiaries. An average of 10% local bank credit growth where corporate
shareholders are located would increase subsidiaries investment by 0.6% of their tangible fixed asset
value, which accounts for 42.5% (4.3%) of the median (average) investment rate among these firms.
We argue that equity exchanges is one channel through which corporate shareholders transmit bank
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Chapter 1
Networks and Business Cycles
1.1 Introduction
The speed at which the US economy has recovered from recessions varies from months to years.
Understanding the forces behind a sluggish recovery has been a focus for economists and policy-
makers (see Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Brunnermeier, Eisenbach,
and Sannikov (2012); Fernald, Hall, Stock, and Watson (2017); Bianchi, Kung, and Morales (2019);
Duval, Hong, and Timmer (2019)). This paper shows that the innovation network and its interactions
with the production network and the cross-sectional technology shock explain the large variation in
recovery speed from recessions in the US1.
Consider an interconnected economy where firms rely on each other not just to acquire inputs
through the production network but also to learn from others’ insights to improve productivity
through the innovation network. The innovation network contains the linkages between firms
through which knowledge flow (see Jaffe (1986); Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013);
Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Kerr (2016b); Ahmadpoor and Jones (2017)), plays an important role in the
dynamics of business cycles.
When a firm is exposed to a shock to the technology progress, the shock can be propagated
1. According to the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee, there are vast differences in the time that the US economy
takes to recover from the adverse shocks. Sometimes, it takes less than one year to recover, while in some episodes,
it may take several years to recover from the initial adverse shocks. The reference dates of US business cycles can be
found on this webpage.
1
along the innovation network as well as the production network. Whether the shock is significantly
amplified and becomes persistent depends on the structure of innovation network, the interactions
between the innovation and production networks, and how the shock propagates through the networks.
This chapter elucidates these channels and shows that the interactions among the cross-sectional
shock, innovation network, and production network play an important role in influencing the recovery
speed from recessions.
We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model with multiple sectors incorporating the pro-
duction network, the innovation network, and cross-sectional shocks. We derive sufficient conditions
under which the interactions among cross-sectional shocks, the innovation network, and the pro-
duction network provide a channel through which the initial shocks persist, amplify, and diffuse
throughout the economy, yielding a prolonged recovery process when the shocks are adverse. These
sufficient conditions are empirically measurable, identifiable, and alterable by policy interventions.
Formally, in an economy with  sectors, we first show that the impact of the cross-sectional
shocks on future growth can be decomposed into  components, each component including a
amplification and persistence term2. We show that the amplification can be fully captured by two
sufficient statistics - the inner product between the eigenvector centrality of the innovation network
and the cross-sectional shocks, and the inner product between sectoral eigenvector centrality of the
innovation network and sectoral Katz-centrality in the production network. The first inner product
captures how the cross-sectional shock propagates through the innovation network. It is a weighted-
average shock with the weights being the sectors’ importance in the innovation network3, suggesting
that the direction of the cross-sectional shock matters in the amplification. The second inner-product
fully captures the interactions between the innovation and production networks.
The persistence of the initial technology shocks’ impact on future growth depends on two forces.
Consider a cross-sectional shock. On the one hand, the impact of the shock declines over time due
to the depreciation effect if sectors do not learn from each other. On the other hand, sectors can
2. We say a time-dependent process {GC , C ∈ N} can be decomposed into  components with various persistence and





, where 6: and the coefficient 2: are referred to as the
persistence and the amplification terms of the : Cℎ component, respectively. Consider the case 6: ∈ (0,1), the : Cℎ
component becomes very persistent over time when 6: ≈ 1.
3. In a -sector economy, consider the cross-sectional shock & C at period C and the eigenvector centrality v = (E1, E2, ..., E )




deploy resources to learn and gain insights from the technology shock. This technology spillover
could cancel out the depreciation effect. If the spillover effect is sufficiently large, the shocks’ impact
becomes very persistent.
We show that the spillover effect’s strength depends on the sectoral distribution of the shock (i.e.,
the direction of the shock) and the eigenvalue distribution of the innovation network’s adjacency
matrix4. We first show that each sectors experience the spillover effect when the shock’s direction is
parallel to an eigenvector of the innovation network. Specifically, all sectors’ spillover effect is most
potent when the shock’s direction parallels to the leading eigenvector (i.e., the vector of eigenvector
centrality) of the innovation network. In contrast, the spillover effect is weakest when the shock’s
direction parallels the eigenvector associated with the innovation network’s smallest eigenvalue.
When the magnitude of the most potent spillover effect roughly equals the depreciation effect, the
shock’s impact becomes very persistent.
Consider the case where the strongest spillover effect can roughly cancel out the depreciation
effect. When the innovation network is low-rank such that the leading eigenvalue is much larger than
the remaining ones, the shocks’ impact becomes very persistent only if the shock parallels to the
eigenvector centrality’s direction. In contrast, the impact declines quickly if the shock follows other
directions. As a result, the shock direction reveals information on the recovery path of the economy
if the innovation network has low-rank.
Overall, the shock’s impact on future growth can be significantly amplified and persistent only
if two conditions are satisfied. First, the shock highly correlates with sectors’ importance in the
innovation network, and the sectors’ importance in the innovation network highly correlates with
sectors’ importance in the production network. Second, the innovation-network structure is such
that the most potent technology spillover effect can roughly cancel the depreciation effect. To lift
the economy out of the slow recovery, one policy implication of the theory is to bailout important
sectors in the innovation network to mitigate their exposures to the adverse shocks.
To evaluate the empirical importance of the channel documented here, we construct a US patent
dataset traced back to 1919 and an input-output dataset back to 1951. Based on the patent dataset,
4. A network can be either represented as a graph or matrix. When we talk about the eigenvalues or eigenvectors of a
network, we refer to those associated with its adjacency matrix. For details, see Section 1.2.
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we construct a proxy for technology innovation and estimate the underlying innovation network at
the three-digit NAICS level. Using sectoral input and output data, we construct production network
to proxy for sectoral input-output linkages. We estimate the remaining undetermined parameters of
the innovation network using a state-space model.
We document a set of new facts.First, the innovation network of the US has low-rank so that
the leading eigenvalue is much larger in magnitude than the rest. For example, the second-largest
eigenvalue is only 20 percent of the leading one. Second, the leading eigenvalue is large enough
that the corresponding strongest spillover effect roughly cancels out the depreciation effect. Thus,
the shock’s impact becomes very persistent when the cross-sectional shock follows the direction of
the innovation network’s eigenvector centrality. Third, there is a large time-variation in the inner
product between the shock and the eigenvector centrality of the innovation network. For example,
during the great recession of 2008, important sectors in the innovation network suffered much more
than their less important counterparts. This pattern reverses during the recessions of 1991 and 2001
when sectors in the center suffer much less than those in the periphery of the innovation network.
As another application, we examine the implications of the theory on asset prices. Bansal and
Yaron (2004) model the expected consumption growth as one with a small but persistent component
and refer to it as "long-run risk" of the consumption. They argue that the long-run risk in consumption
is the key to several puzzles in the financialmarkets - equity premium, the risk-free rate, and themarket
return volatility. However, the persistent component is a puzzle (see Bansal and Yaron (2004)). Our
theory provides a channel to endogenize a time-varying, small but persistent consumption growth
component in a networked economy. The persistent component becomes significant when the
cross-sectional shock shift to one specific direction - sectors’ importance vector.
Literature
This paper contributes to several strands of literature in macro, network economics, and asset
pricing. It first contributes to the literature exploring the source of the persistent component of
aggregate growth. There are two main narratives, one emphasizes the role of financial friction (see
Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov
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(2012)). Another accrue the persistent component to the endogenous TFP (see De Ridder and
Teulings (2017); Fernald, Hall, Stock, and Watson (2017); Queralto (2019); Bianchi, Kung, and
Morales (2019); Anzoategui, Comin, Gertler, and Martinez (2019); Duval, Hong, and Timmer
(2019)). Our theory falls in the second category. Comin and Gertler (2006) documents there is
a significant medium-term business cycle of post-WWII and attributes it to the endogeneous R&D
as a response to high-frequency shocks. Anzoategui, Comin, Gertler, and Martinez (2019) argues
that the productivity slowdown of the post-Great Recession of 2007-2009 reflects an endogenous
reduction in productivity-enhancing investment activities - the creation of new technology through
R&D and the diffusion of technologies via adoption. Bianchi, Kung, andMorales (2019) emphasizes
the difference between debt and equity financing and argues that equity (debt) financing shocks are
more important for explaining R&D (physical) investment. Thanks to the rare occurrence of sizable
adverse aggregate shocks, it is hard to evaluate the importance of the channels proposed in the
previous literature. Another main challenge is that they provide us no clues on the persistence
and amplification of the initial shock from the cross-sectional information. Unlike those papers
which model the economy as a single representative firm, our theory emphasizes the role of network
structure - the interactions between the networks and cross-sectional shocks - in amplifying shocks
and explaining persistence. The rich interactions between the network structure and the shock enable
us to test the channel’s importance directly.
In themacroeconometrics and business cycle literature, researchers usually implicitly assume that
the aggregate growth contains long-term and short-term components with various loadings without
further economic justifications (see King and Watson (1996); Hodrick and Prescott (1997); Baxter
and King (1999); Müller andWatson (2018)). Our theory rationalizes these assumptions by showing
that the interaction of cross-sectional shocks with the innovation and production networks allows
us to decompose the impact of shocks on aggregate growth into components with various levels of
persistence and loadings. The theory provides further insights on the source of the persistence - the
technology spillovers, and the source of loadings - the inner products between sectors’ importance in
innovation network and the cross-sectional shock, and the Katz centrality in the production network.
This paper also contributes to the recent literature on the innovation network. Bloom, Schanker-
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man, and Van Reenen (2013) proposes a new measure of technology spillover using patent citations
across companies. Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Kerr (2016b) describes the innovation network using
patent citation of the US since 1976, and document that the network is very stable and sparse and that
the upstream sectors can predict the patent issuance of downstream sectors very well. Ahmadpoor
and Jones (2017) shows a slow diffusion process of innovation using patents and publications. Our
paper follows Bloom et al. (2013) in the construction of the innovation network but studies the
implications of the innovation network in business cycles in the dynamic context.
Technically, our theory builds on the production network literature (see Long and Plosser (1983)).
Recent studies emphasizing the potential role of idiosyncratic shocks in networks include Horvath
et al. (1998); Horvath (2000); Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012); Acemoglu,
Akcigit, and Kerr (2016a); Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016); Atalay (2017); Baqaee (2018); Baqaee and
Farhi (2019). They argue that idiosyncratic shocks to industries’ productivities have the potential to
generate aggregate fluctuations. For example, Atalay (2017) find that the industry-specific shocks
contribute to at least half of the aggregate volatility. These papers examine the amplification effect
in the static context and only focus on the production network. Our paper provides insights into
the persistence and amplification of idiosyncratic shocks in the dynamic context by incorporating
both production and innovation networks. More importantly, we show that the cross-sectional shock
direction reveals little information on the future recovery path without the innovation network.
However, in an economy with a low-rank innovation network, the shock direction reveals essential
information on the recovery path. Thus, the innovation network is an essential element to understand
why the direction of the shock matters. Finally, several studies emphasize the role of network
structure in propagating shocks. Our contribution is to propose a new set of sufficient statistics
to fully summarize network structure’s role in amplifying and persisting shocks. Similar tools on
eigenvalue decomposition were employed in studying the optimal intervention in networks in a static
context (see Galeotti, Golub, and Goyal (2020)).
Finally, this paper provides a new channel to endogenize the long-run risk in a production
economy from a networks’ perspective. Several recent papers try to rationalize the long-run risk
based on production (see Garleanu, Panageas, and Yu (2012); Gârleanu, Kogan, and Panageas
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(2012); Kogan, Papanikolaou, and Stoffman (2013); Kung and Schmid (2015)). Kung and Schmid
(2015) argue that R&D endogenously drives a small, persistent component in productivity that
yields long-run uncertainty on economic growth. However, no paper has examined the asset pricing
implications of technology networks, while our paper naturally links the predictable components of
growth with cross-sectional shocks and asset prices.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the basic setup of the
production network, innovation network, preference, and results in general equilibrium. Section
1.3 discusses the main theoretical results, where we explore the linkage between the persistence
of shocks, innovation network, production network, and the cross-sectional shocks. Section 1.4
presents the main results on model estimation. In section 1.4.4, we document several facts about the
innovation network and its interactionswith the production network and technological shock. Section
1.5 discusses the potential applications of our theory in other puzzles. Section 1.6 concludes the
chapter. The technical details, the generalization of our results, and the proofs are in the Appendix.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Production of Intermediate and Final Products
We consider a production economy with standard input-output linkages following Long and Plosser
(1983), which has been widely used to examine the macro implications of input-output linkages (see
Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Kerr (2016a); Herskovic (2018); Baqaee (2018); Baqaee and Farhi (2019)).
In most cases, previous studies focus on a Cobb-Douglas production technology that allows for an
analytical solution, with the exception of Baqaee and Farhi (2019) that examines the non-linearity
effect of the micro shocks in a static setting using a second-order Taylor expansion.
Besides the input-output network in the production space, we also incorporate an innovation
network to capture the technology linkage between sectors. Suppose there are [] = {1,2, ...}
sectors for intermediate goods in the economy 5. Each intermediate good is used as an input for the
5. In the theory part, we use a firm or sector interchangeably. In the empirical part, we would provide evidence at both
the firm and industry level.
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final consumption good and other intermediate goods. Denote Gt = (1C , ..., C ) as a joint process
of the productivity driven by technology, and let 08C = log(8C ). Denote by .8C the output of sector 8,
8C the composite input of sector 8 to produce its products, and -8 9C the input of sector 8 from sector 9 .
At time C, sector 8 combines its own technology and the outputs of other sectors as inputs to produce
.8C = 8C 
[
8C








with [ ∈ (0,1) captures decreasing return to scale. The production of the composite input 8C
exhibits constant elasticity of substitution (CES). E8 is the elasticity of substitution for the production
technology 6. If E8 > 1, the inputs used by firm 8 are substitutes to each other. An increase in the price
of -8 9C would induce firm 8 to substitute away from input 9 and reduce the share of 8’s expenditure on
9 . When E8 < 1, the inputs of firm 8 are complements to each other. Firm 8 can not flexibly substitute
away input 9 as a response to price of -8 9C , leading to a rise in the share of 8’s expenditure on 9
when the price of -8 9C rises. When E = 1, the production technology is reduced to Cobb-Douglas





. The share of firm 8’s expenditure on input 9 at time C is constant. For the
case of E8 = 1, ∀8 ∈ [], we can obtain a closed-form solution to the whole system since the system
is log-linear with constant sector shares. For the general case, we provide an analytical solution to
the gross output.
Let VC = (%1C , ..., %C ) be the price vector at period C for the  intermediate products, with %8C


















Let _8C be the shadow price of the composite input 8C , i.e., the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint
6. Specifically, at the optimum of firm 8,
E8 = −
m log(-8 9:/-8:C )
m log(% 9/%: )
8
in Equation (1.2). The first order condition implies





-8 9C : % 9C = _8C\8 9 1/E88C -
−1/E8
8 9C





To write down 8C , -8 9C , 9 ∈ [] as functions of price and other parameters, we need to pin down




















) \8 9 , if E8 = 1.
(1.5)
Given the dividend flow 8C , The value of firm 8 ∈ [] satisfies
+8C = 8C +C"C ,C+1+8C+1 (1.6)
where "C ,C+1 is the Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF) between periods C and C + 17. For details on
"C ,C+1, see Section 1.2.3.






where 28C is the amount of good in sector 8 used to produce the final consumption good at C. The























and %8C28C = U8C . In this paper, we always normalize the price of
final consumption good to be 1.
7. In the literature, the SDF is also referred to as state price density.
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1.2.2 Innovation Network and Arrival Rate
In this section, we model the technology process GC in a reduced form so that we can quickly dive
into our main insights. In Appendix A.1, we provide a micro-founded model to justify this reduced
form. Let Δ08C = 08C − 08C−1, aC = (01C , ..., 0C ) ′, and ΔaC = (Δ01C , ...,Δ0C ). We model the process
08C as an arrival process like Aghion and Howitt (1992):
Δ08C = `8C + n 8C , (1.8)
where `8C is the arrival rate of new innovations for 8 between C −1 and C, and n 8C is the shock to the
realization of innovation, with E[n 
8C
] = 0.
The main theme of this subsection is to model the underlying arrival rate of the innovation
-C = (`1C , ..., `C ). Sector 8 can learn insights from the new technology of other sectors, promoting
the arrival rate of its own future innovation. We model the learning process as8
`8C+1 = (1− d)`8C +
∑
9
,8 9Δ0 9C + nD8C . (1.9)
In appendix A.1, we provide a heuristic micro foundation to this process with endogenous match and
search, and R&D decision. &DC = (nD1,C , ..., n
D
 ,C
) is a joint stationary process with EC&DC = 0,∀8 ∈ [],
which will be further specified later. (1− d)`8C is used to capture the depletion effect of new
ideas as in Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen, and Webb (2020). That is, in a model without learning
(,8 9 = 0,∀8, 9), the arrival rate of the new technology declines at the rate d. The term
∑
9,8 9Δ0 9C
captures the technology diffusion among sectors. Here, we assume that only the innovation of last
period,
∑
9,8 9Δ0 9C , contributes to the arrival rate of new technology. The contribution of historical
knowledge to `8,C+1 are fully captured by `8C . In appendix A.1, we extend our model to more general
8. This setup is similar to the empirical work by Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Kerr (2016b) where they use patent citation to
estimate the sector-to-sector innovation network, and document that the patent issuance in upstream sectors can well
predict the patent issuance in the downstream sectors in the innovation network in a ten-year horizon.
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cases by allowing firms to learn from the historical innovations according to
`8C+1 = (1− d)`8C +
∑
9
,8 9i(!)Δ0 9C + nD8C , (1.10)
where i(!) =∑B≥0 iB!B, with the lag-operator ! and ∑B≥0 iB = 19.
In matrix notation, we write equations 1.8 and 1.9 as
ΔaC = -C + & C
-C+1 = (1− d)-C +]ΔaC + &DC
(1.11)
Consider several special cases of the process 1.11. Suppose there is no realization shock, & C = 0,
the process is reduced to ΔaC+1 = (1− d)ΔaC +]ΔaC + &DC .,with ΔaC = -C .
1. Suppose there is no technology spillover, ,8 9 = 0,∀8, 9 ∈ []. The process is reduced to
ΔaC+1 = (1− d)ΔaC + &DC , which is a standard setup as in Onatski and Ruge-Murcia (2013);
Atalay (2017).
2. If we further assume d = 1, then the process is reduced to ΔaC+1 = &DC which is examined by
Foerster, Sarte, and Watson (2011)
Assumption 1.2.1. To guarantee the stationarity of the process -C , we assume _<0G (]) ≤ d, where
_<0G (^) is the largest eigenvalue of matrix ^.




The representative consumer chooses consumption,C , and the share-holding on 9 , q 9C , to maximize



















where X ∈ (0,1) is the discount rate of time preference. W is the coefficient of relative risk averse
and k is the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (IES). We use Epstein-Zin preference that is
standard in asset pricing literature so that the far future consumption growth can be reflected in
the current asset price. Denote \ = 1−W1−1/k , and the sign of \ is determined by the magnitude of q
and W. When W = 1
k
, the utility function is simplified to the usual time-separable preference with
constant relative risk averse (CRRA). Denote ,C =
∑
9 q 9C−1+ 9C as the wealth at the beginning of
the period, C+1 = C+1/C as the growth of consumption, and '<,C+1 = ,C+1,C−C as the return of the










with SDF "C ,C+1 = X\−\/kC+1 '
\−1
<,C+1, and the logarithm of SDF takes
<C+1 = \ log(X) − \/kΔ2C+1 + (\ −1)A<,C+1 (1.14)
with Δ2C+1 and A<,C+1 as the log of consumption growth and return of aggregate wealth.
1.2.4 General Equilibrium
Definition 1.2.1. A general equilibrium is a set of price and choice vectors - Vt = (%1C , ..., %C ),
-8 9C , 8, 9 ∈ [], .8C , q8C , 28C , 8 ∈ [],and C such that:
10. We use the general Epstein-Zin preference but not its special case, time-separable preference, so that we can explore
the asset pricing implications of our theory.
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1. Given the price VC , -8 9C and .8C , 8, 9 ∈ [], solve producers’ problem 1.2.
2. Given the price VC , 28C , 8 ∈ [] solve producers’ problem for final consumption goods 1.7.
3. Given the price VC ,+ 9C , the portfolio q 9C ,∀ 9 ∈ [], and C solve consumer’s problem 1.12.
4. All markets for intermediates clear, 28C +
∑
9∈[ ] - 98C = .8C , ∀ 8, C.
5. Stock markets clear, q 9C = 1,∀ 9 , C.
1.2.5 Equilibrium Allocation
Here, we characterize the resource allocation in equilibrium. Because there is no fixed capital and all
intermediates are perishable, prices of the spot markets, resource allocation across sectors, and final
output can be solved statically as functions of GC . Specifically, given the productivity distribution
GC = (1C , ..., C ), the intermediate price vector VC , shadow price vector ,C , input-output matrix,
output vector V_ C = (%1C.1C , ..., %C.C ), and gross output .C =
∑
9∈[ ] % 9C. 9C can be determined.
Definition 1.2.2. Define the input-output matrix in equilibrium as
̃C = (\̃8 9C )× (1.15)
with \̃8 9C =
%9C-8 9C
%8C 8C
as the input reliance of sector 8 on sector 9 .
Denote the sale share of sector 8 as B8C = %8C.8C∑
9∈[ ] %9C.9C
that is a measure of sector 8’s importance in
production space, the sale share vector as sC = (B1C , ..., BC ) ′, and " = (U1, .., U ). In the following,
all quantities are evaluated in equilibrium.
Proposition 1.2.1. In equilibrium, the sale share satisfies sC = (1 − [) [O − [̃
′
C ]−1".When the
production technology is Cobb-Douglas, i.e., E8 = 1,∀8 ∈ [], we have ̃C = , sC = s, with  =
(\8 9)× and s = (1−[) [O−[̃
′]−1".
The proof for the general case is in appendix A.2. There are two things worth mentioning. First,
the share B8C measures the importance of sector 8 in production space and is defined recursively as the
weighted average of the importance of sectors who rely on sector 8’s output as input. To make this
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point more clearly, we can write B8C = (1−[)U8 +
∑
9 B 9C \̃ 98C . sC is also called the Katz centrality (see
Katz (1953); Bonacich (1987); Bonacich and Lloyd (2001)). Second, when the nested production
function takes Cobb-Douglas, the substitution effect exactly cancels out the income effect when the
input prices change. Consequently, the expenditure share of sector 8 on its input 9 is constant, i.e.,
\̃8 9C = \8 9 , and the importance of each sector is constant over time. In general, the input-output
matrix ̃C , and share sC depends on GC . For details, please see the appendix A.2.
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8∈[ ] \ 98 log(\ 98), ∀E 9 = 1.
Intuitively, the adjusted input sparsity captures the input diversity of the sector and the extent
to which sector 9 can substitute its inputs away from each other. For the Cobb-Douglas case, the
adjusted input sparsity reduces to the usual one (see Herskovic (2018)) 11.
The following proposition shows that, even in a general nested CES production economy, the
growth of gross output can be decomposed into three components - concentration term, sparsity
term, and the Hulten term (Hulten, 1978).




1. Gowth of consumption is the same as that of output, Δ2C+1 = ΔHC+1.
2. The gross output and prices take the following form:
log(.C ) = s′C
[



















11. In Figure 1.11, we use the BEA input-output data together with sectoral gross output data to estimate the non-linear
effect of adjusted sparsity on aggregate economic growth. More specifically, we decompose the adjusted sparsity into
the component proposed by Herskovic (2018) and the remaining part, and estimate them separately.
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When E8 = 1,∀8 ∈ [], we have
log(.C ) = s′
[








log(VC ) = (O−[̃
′)−1
[




The proof for the general case is in appendix A.2. The intuition of the first part in Proposition
1.2.2 is that the consumption is equal to total dividend, which is a constant fraction of the total output.
We emphasize the new results of this proposition - the gross output can always be decomposed into
three components even with general nested CES production.
1. The first term, 11−[ s
′
C log(GC ), is the usual linear term captured by Hulten’s theorem.
2. All the non-linear effects due to technology progress can be fully captured by two sufficient
statistics - the concentration index #2C = −s′C log(sC ), and the general adjusted sparsity #BC =
s′CT
\
C . The gross output increases with the concentration and the adjusted sparsity.
3. The concentration term reflects the resource reallocation across sectors while the sparsity
term reflects the resource reallocation within sectors. Specifically, when resources are more
concentrated in one sector, the concentration #2C declines, and thus gross output drops.
Proposition 1.2.2 delivers the following corollary immediately:





















Note that both the adjusted sparsity and the concentration depends on GC . Thus, the impact of the
technology shock ΔaC+1 on gross output works through three channels - the usual Hulten channel,
s′C log(GC ), the concentration channel ,#2C = −s′C log(sC ), capturing resource reallocation across
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sectors, and the sparsity channel #BC = s′CT \C capturing the resource reallocation across inputs within
the sectors. Previous literature has mostly taken a first-order approximation by simply assuming
Cobb-Douglas technology (see Hulten (1978); Long and Plosser (1983); Acemoglu, Akcigit, and
Kerr (2016a); Herskovic (2018)). Under the Cobb-Douglas assumption, the concentration index
and the adjusted sparsity are constant, with no effect of technological shock on these two terms.
Through taking second-order log-linear approximation, Baqaee and Farhi (2019) find that the usual
first-order log-linear approximation significantly underestimates the macro effect of micro shocks,
due to missing reallocation effects. Different from them, we find that all of the non-linear terms can
be sufficiently captured by the concentration and adjusted sparsity, which can be estimated from real
data. This enables us to directly measure the relative contribution of the concentration and adjusted
sparsity terms to aggregate fluctuations (see Yang and Zhu (2020)).
1.3 Networks, Amplification, and Persistence
This section presents our main results on the interactions of cross-sectional shock, innovation
network, and production network. These interactions allow us to decompose the effect of the
initial shock on future growth into  components. Each component includes its amplification and
persistence. We further show that persistence can be captured by the eigenvalues of the innovation
network, while two sufficient statistics can characterize the amplification. This decomposition clearly
shows how the structure of the cross-sectional shocks and networks matter in amplifying the shock
and making it persistent.
1.3.1 Basic Results
We consider the Cobb-Douglas case that enables us to get a closed-form solution12. In this case,
6C+1 = ΔHC+1 =
1
1−[ s
′ΔaC+1 is the growth rate of both the gross output and the aggregate output. The






1−[EC -C+g , (1.20)
12. For the general case, we can do a similar analysis with log-linear approximation on Equation (1.18).
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where EC [·] is the expectation conditional on {B, B ≤ C}. Equation (1.20) follows from Equation
(1.11) and the condition that EC& C+g = 0,∀g ≥ 1. From Equation (1.11), we have
EC -C+g = [(1− d)O +]]EC -C+g−1 = [(1− d)O +]]g-C . (1.21)
Thus, an initial shock to -C will change the growth prospects of period C + g, the persistence of this
effect depends on the structure of the innovation network ] 13. Suppose there is an initial shock to
the arrival rate: -C → -C + & C , the associated effect of this initial shock on the growth and the arrival
rate at C + g is denoted as X6C+g and X-C+g 14.
Proposition 1.3.1.
ECX-C+g = [(1− d)O +]]g& C
Under Cobb-Douglas, the effect on the growth is
ECX6C+g =
& ′C
1−[ [(1− d)O +]
′]g sC .
Alternatively, we have that ECX6C+g = & ′C [(1− d)O +] ′]g [O−[̃
′]−1".
Symmetric Technology Diffusion Matrices
We first consider a symmetric innovation network] which has been implicitly assumed in empirical
studies (see Jaffe (1986); Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993); Bloom, Schankerman, and
Van Reenen (2013)) to deliver our main intuition. The asymmetric case is discussed in the subsection
1.3.1.
Definition 1.3.1. Denote the 8Cℎ largest eigenvalue of matrix] ′ as _8 (] ′), and the corresponding
orthonormal eigenvector as v8 , i.e. ] ′v8 = _8 (] ′)v8 such that (v8 , v 9) = X8 9 .




(O +]̃)B− 9 (f2D +f2]]
′) (O +]̃)B− 9
14. Here, X is an operator indicating a change, don’t confuse it with a scaler. This shock can be either from the realization
shock of innovation zC or zDC
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Here, (x1,x2) is the inner product of vectors x1 and x2, and X8 9 is the Kronecker delta. Note
that, in general case, we always have _8 (]) = _8 (] ′).
Lemma 1.3.1. Suppose] is symmetric, we have v1 ≥ 0, i.e., E18 ≥ 0, ∀8 ≤ .
Lemma 1.3.2. Suppose], _8 (]), and v8 are defined as in 1.3.1, then,
((1− d)O +] ′)Bv8 = (1+_8 (]) − d)Bv8
The symmetry of] implies that (v8 , 8 ∈ []) spans the whole  dimensional linear space. Thus,
we can decompose the arrival rate as a linear combination of the eigenvectors v8 .
Lemma 1.3.3. Suppose ] is symmetric, we have -C =
∑
8=1〈-C , v8〉v8 with the loadings on v8 be
〈-C , v8〉. Similarly, we have sC =
∑
8=1〈sC , v8〉v8 .




(1+_8 (]) − d)g 〈-C , v8〉v8 .
Several things are worth mentioning. First, we refer to, v1, the eigenvector associated with the
leading eigenvalue, as the eigenvector centrality of the network (see Bonacich and Lloyd (2001);
Bonacich (2007); Allen, Cai, Gu, Qian, and Zhu (2019b)). In our setting, it is intuitive to interpret
E1,8 as sector 8’s importance in creating and transmitting technology insights in technology space.
To see it clearly, we note that E1,8 = 1_1 (] )
∑
9 E1, 9, 98 . That is, sector 8 is important if sectors who
heavily learn insights from 8 are important.
Second, _8 (]) − d captures the declining rate of the shock in the innovation network if the shock
is parallel to v8 . To see that clearly, suppose the initial shock & C is proportional to v8 , the associated
effect of the initial shock on the arrival rate of next period is [1− d +_8 (])]& C . The intuition is
straightforward. On one hand, the arrival rate of innovation declines by d& C due to the depreciation
effect (see Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen, and Webb (2020)). On the other hand, the arrival rate of
innovation will be promoted by ]& = _8 (])& C due to the technology spillover from learning if the
shock is proportional to v8 . Overall, the net effect would be (_8 (]) − d)& C .
18
Third, the strength of the technology spillover depends on the shock’s direction. When the
shock follows the eigenvector centrality (the eigenvector associated with the leading eigenvalue of
the innovation network), the technology spillover is the strongest and will be promoted by _1(]).
However, when the shock follows the eigenvector associated with the smallest eigenvalue, the
spillover effect becomes the weakest. Overall, the direction of the shock matters in the strength
of the spillover effect. Finally, we have a singular value decomposition of the symmetric matrix,
] ′ =
∑
9 _ 9 (])v 9v′9 , with v′8v 9 = X8 9 .
If we decompose the initial shock into a linear combination of v8 , 8 ≤ , the effect of the initial
shock on future arrival rate can be written as a decaying linear combinations of 〈& C , v8〉v8 . The
component parallel to v1 declines at the slowest rate, d−_1(]). Proposition 1.3.2 shows that the
8Cℎ component of the initial shock declines with the rate d−_8 (]).







(1− (d−_8 (])))g 〈& C , v8〉〈v8 , sC〉. (1.22)
Asymmetric Technology Diffusion Matrices
When the matrix ] is asymmetric, we assume the matrix is diagonalizable and its eigenvectors
almost surely span the whole  dimension space. The assumption holds in empirical data as shown
in section 1.4.4. Thus, we can take eigenvector decomposition
] ′v8 = _8 (])v8 , 8 ≤  (1.23)
with d > '4(_1(])) > ... > '4(_ (])). In section 1.4.4, we document that all eigenvalues are
approximately real in the sense that the imaginary part of each eigenvalue is negligible compared to
its real part. Under the diagonalizable assumption, we have results similar to 1.3.2 and 1.3.1






(1− d +_8 (]))g 〈& C , v8〉〈v8 , sC〉. (1.24)
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In macro econometrics or finance, researchers usually think of growth as a process consisting
of several components with various frequencies (persistence) and loadings (see King and Watson
(1996); Baxter and King (1999); Müller and Watson (2018)), proposition 1.3.4 rationalizes this
decomposition by showing that we can decompose the effect of the shock on growth prospect into 
components with various levels of persistence and loadings. The main difference is that we can only
decompose the expected shock’s impact on the growth prospect into components but not the growth
itself. The proposition further shows the sources of persistence and loadings.
1.3.2 Network Structure, Persistence, and Amplification
In this subsection, we discuss in detail the importance of the innovation structure and the direction
of the cross-sectional in amplifying and persisting the effect on growth.
Proposition 1.3.5. PERSISTENCE
1. If d _1(]), the depreciation effect dominates the strongest technology spillover effect, and
the shock’s impact declines exponentially.
2. If d ≈ _1(]), consider two cases:
2.1 If the innovation network is low-rank so that _1(])  _8 (]), 8 ≥ 2, when the shock is
parallel to v1, its effect on future growth declines linearly; however, when the shock is
orthogonal to v1, its effect on future growth declines exponentially.
2.2 If the innovation network is high-rank that _1(]) ≈ _2(])... = _. The effect of the shock
always declines by d−_ no matter the direction of the shock.
We emphasize the importance of part 2 in the theorem 1.3.5, where the strongest spillover effect
roughly cancels the depreciation effect. The theorem indicates that if the innovation network is
low-rank, the shock’s direction reveals useful information on the shock’s persistence. Only when the
shock follows a specific direction (leading eigenvector), the impact of the shock become persistent.
However, when the shock follows other directions, the impact of the shock will decline quickly.
The intuition is that the spillover effect becomes most potent only when the shock following the
eigenvector centrality.
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On the contrary, when the network is not low-rank. In the extreme case, all the eigenvalues are
the same denoted as _. The spillover effect will be the same no matter the direction of the shock. As
a result, the direction of the shock reveals no information on the persistence of the impact. In fact,





as long as the initial aggregate effect of the shocks are the same, the future pathes of various shocks
will be exactly the same.
In the empirical portion of this chapter, we show that the innovation network of the US has a low-
rank structure. Besides, the strongest spillover effect roughly equals the depreciation effect. Thus,
only when the shock follows the direction of eigenvector centrality, the impact becomes persistent
empirically.
The amplification of the 8Cℎ component is captured by two inner products - the inner product
between the shock and the 8Cℎ eigenvector of the innovation network, and the inner product between
the 8Cℎ eigenvector of the innovation network and the Katz-centrality of the production network. The
first inner product captures the amplification effect when shocks are propagated in the innovation
network, while the second captures the interactions between the innovation and production networks.
Consider the technology shocks to the oil production and exploration sector and the cloud computing
sector to illustrate the idea. The oil sector is much larger and more important than the cloud sector in
the production network 15. However, few sectors learn insights from the oil sector’s innovations, but
many sectors gain insights to accelerate their technology progress from the cloud’s. These sectors
may account for a significant share in production and be important in the innovation network. As a
result, a shock to the cloud sector can have a more substantial and persistent impact on aggregate
future growth than a similar shock to the oil sector. In the production network literature, the
amplification of the technology shock can be captured by the Domar weight. In our setting, the
inner product between the Katz- centrality in the production network and the eigenvector centrality
15. In production network literature, a sector’s importance in the production network is usually measured as its sale share
Baqaee and Farhi (2019); Liu (2019). In the US, the oil sector’s sale share is much larger than the cloud sector.
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in the innovation network can be viewed as an alternative Domar weight but adjusted by the sector’s
importance in the innovation network.
1.3.3 Illustration: An Example
To emphasize the role of cross-sectional shocks in amplifying and persisting the effects of shocks,
we present a simple example. The basic insight is that the cross-sectional shock reveals useful
information on the recovery speed of the economy in the future beyond the aggregate shock. Consider
an economywith three sectors  = 3with Cobb-Douglas production technology and symmetric input-
output production network. Thus, in equilibrium, sC = (1/3,1/3,1/3). We further set the matrix







d = 0.4 and [ = 0.35. , is chose to partly reflect the pattern in real data and partly simplify
the analysis. The eigenvalues are _1(]) = 0.36,_2(]) = 0.06, and _3(]) = 0. Correspondingly,






(4,1,1), v2 = 13 (−1,2,2), v3 =
1
2 (0,1,−1). Consider two scenarios of cross-sectional shocks.
• Scenario 1: &1 = −1.5v1.
• Scenario 2: &2 = −2.1v2.
Under scenario 1, the cross-sectional shock is parallel to the eigenvector centrality v1, sectors in
the center of the innovation network (sector 1) suffer much more than those in the periphery of the
network (sectors 2 and 3). In contrast, under scenario 2, the cross-sectional shock is parallel to
v2, sectors (sectors 2 and 3) in the periphery of the innovation network suffer more than those in
the center of the innovation network (sector 1). In our setting, the aggregate effects on the current
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growth under the two scenarios are the same since
1
1−[ 〈sC , &
1〉 = 1
1−[ 〈sC , &
2〉 = −1.0.
However, the impact of the cross-sectional shock &1 is much more persistent than that of &2.
Figure 1.1 shows the effect of the shock on the growth in the next ten periods. As shown in the figure
1.1, the aggregate effects of the two shocks are the same at period 0 with a decline in aggregate
output by 1%, while the effects on future growth are very different. Under scenario 2, the negative
effect shrinks sharply to −0.2% after four periods. However, under scenario 1, the economy recovers
very slowly and exhibits a staggering −0.75% growth even after ten periods.
Figure 1.1: The Effects of Cross-sectional Shocks on Expected Future Growth














Panel A: λ1(W) = 0.36, λ2(W) = 0.04











Panel B: W= 0
Note: This figure shows the importance of cross-sectional shocks in persisting the effects of shocks on future growth.
Panel A shows the recovery paths with various shocks when innovation network takes low-rank structure. Panel B shows
the recovery paths with various shocks when there is no innovation network.
1.4 Model Estimation and Evaluation
Propositions 1.3.4 and 1.3.5 show the network structure and the sectoral distribution of the shock play
a crucial role in amplification and persistence. The persistence of the shock depends on the relative
magnitude of the technology spillover effect and the depreciation effect, while the amplification
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effect depends on 〈v8 , & C〉 and 〈v8 , s〉. In this section, we describe in detail the estimation of
parameters in the innovation process 1.11 and use different datasets to estimate the technology shock
from the model. Basically, in the data, we find the innovation network takes a low-rank structure
and the strongest spillover effect roughly cancels out the depreciation effect, that is, _1(]) ≈ d and
_1(])  _8 (]), 8 ≥ 2. This finding suggest that the direction of the shock reveals useful information
on the recovery path of the economy as discussed in Section 1.3.3. On the amplification, we find
that there is a large time-variation in 〈v1, & C〉 and stable 〈v1, s〉.
1.4.1 State Space Model
There are two main challenges in parameter estimation. First, we need some observable variables to
proxy for the technology process ΔaC . We consider three candidates - the patent, TFP, and R&D. All
are imperfect proxies for the technology progress. Patents have been widely used in the literature
to measure technology innovation. The main problem is that there is a time lag between invention
usage and patent issuance released by the USPTO. This problem becomes severe when using the
estimated shocks in equation 1.11 to approximate for & C due to lagged issuance. The problem
using TFP as a proxy is that TFP reflects not only technology progress but others like managerial
skills, measurement errors, or residuals due to model misspecification. To handle this problem,
we extend our model so that the observable TFP consists of an unobservable technology progress
component following 1.11, a latent variable that reflect others factors influencing the measured TFP
like managerial skills, and an error term. That is, we model the unobservable technology process of
the TFP as one with technology learning, and the second part of the TFP as a non-learning process.
We then estimate an extended state-space-model. As shown in appendix A.1, R&D growth is a good
proxy for the resources deployed by firms to learn from others. It is a good proxy for the technology
progress in the future. Besides, the R&D data is too short, only available after 1988. Table 1.1
shows comparisons of these three datasets.
The second challenge is that the matrix ] is of high dimension even if we only consider the
sector-to-sector innovation network at the three-digit level. Specifically, there are 87 sectors at the
three-digit NAICS level. Thus, we have 7569 parameters to be estimated if we impose no restrictions
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on]. Given our short patent dataset between 1926 and 2014, TFP dataset between 1987 and 2018,
and R&D dataset between 1988 and 2018, we need to impose additional restrictions on] to estimate
the underlying parameters. Specifically, we write ] = Ξ]̃ with  = Diag(b1, ..., b ), b8 =
∑
9,8 9 ,
and ,̃8 9 =
,8 9
b8
. We use patent citation dataset to directly estimate ]̃ as in appendix C.1.
We write 1.11 in the form of state space model, and estimate all parameters with an Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm. The problem is formulated as follows
Measurement Equation: ΔaC = -C + & C , with & C ∼ N(0,) (1.26)
State Equation: -C+1 = (1− d)-C +i(!)]CaC + &DC , with &DC ∼ N(0,D) (1.27)
with ]C = ]̃C ,  = f2O, and D = f
2
D O. Here, we write ]C to indicate that we can estimate the
time-varying ]̃C using patent citation dataset. With a little abuse of notation, we denote G = (1−d)O.
i(!) =∑ 9≥0 i 9! 9 is to capture the more general learning from history, with ! the one-period lag-
operator. The observable vector in period C is ΔaC , the unknown parameters are scalars f,fD , d,
 ×  diagonal matrix .
Under the setting 1.26, the parameters of themodel are denoted as = {d, i 9 ,,]̃C ,,D}. To
overcome the challenges from high dimensionality, we impose further restrictions on the parameters
as shown in the table 1.2. For the i(!), we suppose that i(!) = i
∑
9≥0(1−i) 9! 9 . In our state-
space-model, we set i = 0.05,0.1,0.2,and,1.0, and find our estimates are robust across various
i.
Denote Δa0:C = (Δa0, ...,ΔaC ), conditional mean and variance of -C given data until time period
g as -C |g and VC |g . Denote conditional variance of ΔaC+1 given data until time period g as LC |g , the
forecast as ΔaC+1 |g , and the Kalman gain as QC . The EM algorithm to estimate f,fD , d and  × 
diagonal matrix  proceed as follows:
EStep Given current guess/estimates16 off,fD , d and, useKalman filter andKalman smoother
to calculate the conditional mean -C |) and covariance VC |) of latent states -C given all the observed
16. We use the VAR estimates when f ≡ 0 as the initial guess in our calculation. In later iterations, we always use the
maximum likelihood estimators from the M step.
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data.
EStep (1): Kalman filter Starting from C = 0with initial guess -0 |0,V0 |0, while C < ) we calculate:
a. -C+1 |C = G-C |C +]aC
b. VC+1 |C = GVC |C G′+D
c. ΔaC+1 |C = -C+1 |C
d. LC+1 |C = VC+1 |C +
e. VC+1 |C+1 = VC+1 |C −QC+1VC+1 |C
f. -C+1 |C+1 = -C+1 |C +QC+1vC+1 with QC+1 = VC+1 |CL−1C+1.
E Step (2): Kalman Smoother Starting from C = ) with -) |) ,V) |) from the Kalman smoother,
while C >= 0:
g. RC = VC |C G′V−1C+1 |C
h. -C |) = -C |C + RC (-C+1 |) − -C+1 |C )
i. VC |) = VC |C + RC (VC+1 |) − VC+1 |C )R ′C
MStep: Given the conditional mean and covariance of latent states -C and all the observed data, we
estimate all the parameters = (f2







 () +1))A (E(
)∑
C=0






)A (E((-C+1−]ΔaC ) (-C+1−]ΔaC ) ′− (-C+1−]ΔaC )-′C G′
− G-C (-C+1−]ΔaC ) ′+ G-C -′C G′ |Δa0:) ))
(1.29)
d̂ = 1−
)A (∑) −1C=0 E[(-C+1−]ΔaC )-′C + -C (-C+1−]ΔaC ) ′ |Δa0:) ]
2
∑) −1





C=0 E[(]̃ΔaC )8 (-t+1− G-t)i |a0:Z ]∑) −1
C=0 E[((]̃ΔaC ) (]̃ΔaC ) ′)88 |Δa0:) ]
(1.31)
and ̂ = diag{b̂1, ..., b̂ }. The detailed derivation can be found in the Appendix D.1. We iterate theE
Step with new estimators of parameters, and theM Step with new conditional mean and covariance
until convergence. The proof of convergence for the EM algorithm in our problem is in Appendix
D.3.
Table 1.1: Comparison of Different Data to Measure Technology Progress
Data Source Time Range Advantage Shortcoming
Patent Issuance USPTO 1926-2019 Long time range Lag in measurement
TFP BLS/BEA 1987-2018 Sectoral levelmeasure
Short time range;
more than innovation
R&D Expenditure Compustat 1977-2018 Direct R&D measure Sample bias change over time
This table presents the comparisons among three different datasets to Measure R&D Activities: the patent issuance data,
industry level TFP data, and the Compustat R&D expenditure data.
Table 1.2: Model Setup and Restrictive Assumptions
Model description Model parameter Restrictions
Covariance of measurement noise   = f2O
Covariance of shocks to innovation D D = f2D O
Lag polynomial for learning i(!) =∑ 9≥0 i 9! 9 i(!) = i∑ 9≥0 (1−i) 9! 9with i = 0.05,0.1,0.2,1
Learning matrix ]C = ]̃C
(1)]̃C directly estimated with patent data
(2) = b O in the simplified case.
This table presents the restrictions we impose on the parameters when estimate the model. The restrictions are necessary
to overcome the challenges of high dimensionality.
27
1.4.2 Estimates with Patent Dataset
Here, we discuss in detail the parameter estimation based on equation 1.27 using patent issuance
data. For details about the estimation using TFP or R&D, see appendix B. From our model, it
is natural to interpret GC as the productivity driven by technology innovation. Denote #8C as the




(1− X)B#8C−B . (1.32)
That is, we assume that the contribution of the patent to the productivity declines over time with
depreciate rate X. In estimation, we choose X = 0.05, i.e., patents’ value on production depreciates
to zero after 20 years, which is consistent with 20 years patent protection. Similar results on estimates
are obtained for X = 0.1 or X = 0.2. Δ08C is estimated as log(8C ) − log(8C−1).
We first present estimates under a simplified case where f = 0 and  = b O. The estimates under
the simplified case will be used as an initial guess for the general case in EM algorithm. Under this
simplified assumption, the model is reduced to
ΔaC+1 = (1− d)ΔaC +_ãC + &DC (1.33)
with ΔãC = ]̃Ci(!)ΔaC capturing the network effects.
Under the simplified assumption, the state-space-model is reduced to the usual panel regression.
Table 1.3 reports the results with i = 0.05,0.1,0.2,and,1.0. Columns 1 and 2 report the results
when i = 0.05. In column 1, we make seemingly OLS regression through pooling all observations
together, while column 2 reports the estimates after controlling for the year and sector fixed effect.
As shown in column 1, d(= 0.315) is very close to b (= 0.322), indicating that the depreciation effect
will be roughly canceled out by spillover effect when the cross-sectional shock is parallel to the
eigenvector centrality of the innovation network. Column 1 shows that 1− d + b = 1.007 that is very
close to 1. Similar results are reported in column 2 where 1− d + b = 1.002. The results are quite
robust for various other i = 0.1,0.2,and1.0. In the case where i = 1.0, 1− d+b declines to 0.912
but still close to 1. One possible explanation is the spillover effect is under biased since sectors can
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only learn from the latest innovation when i = 1.0.
For the general case without restrictions on  = diag(b1, b2, ..., b ), we estimate the state-space-
model using EM algorithm. Table 1.4 reports the results. Panel A reports the EM estimates
with homogeneous learning efficiency,i.e., b8 = b,while Panel B reports the EM estimates with
heterogeneous learning efficiency. Panel A reports results for various i. Column 1 shows results
with i = 0.05, we can see 1− d + b (= 0.986) that is very close to 1. Furthermore, all results are
robust across all columns. In panel B, we present the EM estimates without restriction on. Besides
the average of b8 , 8 ∈ [], standard deviation, 25Cℎ and 75Cℎ percentiles of b8 , 8 ∈ [] are reported. In
the final row, we report the 1− d + E4(b8), where E4(b8) is the average of b8 . As shown in the
table, 1− d + E4(b8) is very close to 1 and roust across various i.
Table 1.3: Parameters of the Innovation Network
Panel Regression with assumption f = 0 and  = _O
i = 0.05 i = 0.1 i = 0.2 i = 1.0
1−d 0.685*** 0.643*** 0.678*** 0.641*** 0.671*** 0.639*** 0.668*** 0.641***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
_ 0.3218*** 0.359* 0.299*** 0.401*** 0.287*** 0.364*** 0.244*** 0.140*
(0.0224) (0.192) (0.020) (0.135) (0.0019) (0.104) (0.017) (0.072)
Sector Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
fD 0.0442 0.0441 0.0441 0.0441
R-Square 0.552 0.412 0.553 0.413 0.553 0.413 0.551 0.412
This table presents the parameter estimates under a simplified assumption thatf = 0. Under this assumption, our estimate
equation is reduced to
ΔaC+1 = (1− d)ΔaC +_]̃i(!)ΔaC + &DC
with i(!) = i
∑
9≥0 (1− i) 9! 9 . Columns 1-2 report the estimates with i = 0.05. Besides reporting the estimates
of 1− d,_, and fD based on our model, we also report the results with controlling for the sector and year fixed effects.
Columns 3-8 report similar results under various value of i. Robust standard errors in parentheses with *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.4: EM Estimates of the Innovation Network with Patent Data
Panel A: EM estimates with assumption that  = b O
i = 0.05 i = 0.1 i = 0.2 i = 1.0
1− d 0.823 0.818 0.814 0.817
b 0.163 0.149 0.140 0.130
fD 0.0322 0.0324 0.0325 0.0316
f 0.0237 0.0235 0.0234 0.0243
1− d + b 0.986 0.967 0.958 0.947
Panel B: EM estimates with general 
i = 0.05 i = 0.1 i = 0.2 i = 1.0
1− d 0.791 0.779 0.770 0.780
Mean of b 9 , 9 ∈ [] 0.198 0.187 0.182 0.162
Standard Dev of b 9 , 9 ∈ [] 0.160 0.141 0.131 0.113
25th percentile of b 9 , 9 ∈ [] 0.099 0.090 0.093 0.095
75th percentile of b 9 , 9 ∈ [] 0.298 0.264 0.266 0.238
fD 0.0332 0.0336 0.0339 0.0324
f 0.0227 0.0222 0.0220 0.0235
1− d + b (b =Mean of b 9 , 9 ∈ []) 0.989 0.966 0.952 0.942
This table presents the parameter estimates using EM algorithm (for details, please see the appendix). In Panel A, we
impose an assumption that  = b O - all sectors share the same parameter b. In Panel B, we remove this restriction and
allow for heterogeneity in b across sectors. For the general case that  = 3806(b1, ..., b ) in Panel B, we also report
the mean, standard deviation, 25th and 75th percentiles. In both panels, columns 1-4 report the results with i = 0.05,
0.1,0.2, and 1.0.
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1.4.3 Estimates with TFP Data
Since TFP not only captures the technology progress but also many others that influence firms’
productivity like managerial skills. We slightly extend our model to
ãC = aC +mC , (1.34)
with ãC = (0̃1C , ..., 0̃C ) the log of the observable TFP at the three-digit NAICS level, aC = (01C , ..., 0C )
the component driven by technology progress, and mC = (<1C , ...,<C ) the component beyond the
technology like managerial skills. We further assume mC follows AR(1), mC = d<mC−1 + &<C . That
is, different from the technology side, there is no spillover effect for the process mC . For details on
the estimation using TFP, see appendix B.
Since the TFP data is only available after 1987, much shorter than than the patent data, we
further assume that  = b O. Thus we only need to estimate d, d<, b,f2D ,f20,f2<. Using the state
space estimation algorithm in Appendix D, the estimation results are reported in Table 1.5. Similar
to the estimation results with patent data, 1− d + b is 0.976 that is very close to 1.
With the parameter estimates, we can recover the technology shock to the process &DC , and
investigate its inner product with the eigenvector centrality of the innovation network over time. In
Figure 1.9, we plot the inner product of the technology shocks and the leading eigenvector of the
innovation network over time. The grey shadow area indicate the NBER recessions. We can see
that during the Great Recession of 2008, the negative TFP shock gets mostly amplified through the
innovation network.
Overall, the estimate indicates that the strongest technology spillover effect will cancel out
the depreciation effect. Consequently, when the cross-sectional shock highly correlates with the
eigenvector centrality of the innovation network, the effect of the shock on future growth will
become very persistent and amplified. If the shock is adversary, we will expect the economy to
experience a prolonged recovery in the following years.
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Table 1.5: EM Estimates of the Innovation Network with TFP Data








1− d + b 0.9763 -
This table presents the parameter estimates using EM algorithm (for details, please see the appendix). For simplicity, we
impose an assumption that  = b O - all sectors share the same parameter b.
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1.4.4 Empirical Facts
In the previous section, we show _1(]) ≈ d - the strongest technology spillover roughly cancels out
the depreciation effect. This sectional documents several facts about the structure of the innovation
network, the coincidence between the innovation and production network, and the inner product
between the sectors’ importance in the innovation network and the cross-sectional shock.
Fact 1: The innovation network is low-rank in the sense that _1(])  _8 (]), 8 ≥ 2.
Fact 2: The innovation network has non-negligible overlapping over the production network
in the sense that 〈v1, sC〉  〈v8 , sC〉, 8 ≥ 2.
Fact 3: Across recessions in the US, recessions with slow recovery are those witnessing sizable
negative shock to sectors in the center of the innovation network.
Based on our basic results in 1.3.4, Fact 1 combined with _1(]) suggests that the shock’s impact
will be persistent only if the shock follows the eigenvector centrality of the innovation. If the shock
is orthogonal to the eigenvector centrality, the shock will decline exponentially roughly at the rate
of d (since _2(])  d).
Fact 2 suggests that the amplification 〈v1, s〉〈v1, & C〉 will be non-negligible if the shock follows
the sectoral importance in the innovation network. Fact 3 is the key that delivers the main implication
of our theory. That is, when the innovation network takes a low-rank structure, the strongest spillover
effect roughly equals the depreciation effect, and 〈v1, s〉 are non-negligible, the amplification and
persistence depends on 〈v1, & C〉.
Sparsity of the Innovation Network
This section documents the structure of the standardize innovation network ]̃, similar patterns
are observed for ] based on state-space model estimation. Figure 1.2 shows the heatmap of the
matrix ]̃ of year 2014 at the three-digit NAICS level. First, there are several industries (e.g., Sector
334: Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing; Sector 541: Professional, Scientific, and
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Technical Services17) playing a key role in providing technology insights to nearly all other sectors.
Second, most sectors digest the insights from others but providing little knowledge to others(e.g.,
sectors between 441 and 512 in NAICS code).
Fact 1.1: The innovation matrix is highly asymmetric. Some sectors play critical roles in
yielding insights to others, while others mainly digest knowledge.
Figure 1.3 shows histogram distribution on the eigenvalues of ]̃ in 2014. Note that the eigen-
values of the standardized matrix can be complex due to high asymmetry. The left panel shows the
histogram on real part of eigenvalues, while the right panel shows the corresponding imaginary part.
There are two basic facts:
Fact 1.2: On the real part of the eigenvalues, _1(]̃)  _8 (]̃), 8 ≥ 2. Furthermore, the
eigenvalues are approximately real.
As shown in the left panel of figure 1.3, the distribution of the eigenvalues is low-rank that the largest
eigenvalue is much larger than the rest in absolute value. Specifically, the second largest eigenvalue
is roughly 20% of the largest one. Second, the imaginary part of the eigenvalue is tiny compared to
its real part. As shown in the right panel of figure 1.3, the imaginary part is of the order of 10−5 that
is negligible either relative to the real part or in the magnitude itself.
To show the concentration of the eigenvalue distribution for the matrix ]̃, we define a concen-
tration measure as
>=2 9 (]̃) =
∑
8≤ 9 |_8 (]̃) |∑
8 |_8=1(]̃) |
with | · | the norm of a complex number. >=2 9 (]̃) measures the fraction of the largest 9 eigenvalues
to all eigenvalues. Figure 1.4 shows the time-varying >=2 9 (]̃), 9 ∈ 1,5,10 from 1951 to 2014.
Over years, the concentration is quite stable. The largest eigenvalue contributes to 1/3, the largest five
eigenvalues contribute to 60%, and the largest ten eigenvalues contribute to 75%, of the
∑
9 |_ 9 (]̃) |.
In summary, one only needs to focus on the first several largest eigenvalues and the projection of the
shock onto the associated eigenvectors if d and b are non-negligible.
17. The industry description correspondence to three-digit NAICS code can be found in the NAICS manual on this
webpage, last accessed on Jan 6, 2020.
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Figure 1.2: Sparsity of Technology Spillover across Technology Classes
Note: This figure illustrates the knowledge diffusion matrix ]̃ in 2014. In year 2014, there are 87 sectors at three-digit
NAICS level. X-axis represents sectors with knowledge flow out, and Y-axis represents sectors learning from others.
The color indicates the magnitude of the knowledge flow ,̃8 9 , the deeper the color at (8, 9) is, the larger the ,̃8 9 is. For
example, as shown in the figure, sector 334 (Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing, see the NAICS Manual on
this webpage for detail) and sector 541 (Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services) are very important in generating
knowledge to others since nearly all other sectors intensively learn from it.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Eigenvalues of the Standardized Innovation Network
Note: This figure illustrates the sparsity of the eigenvalue distribution of innovation diffusion matrix ]̃ in 2014. We
standardize the diffusion matrix such that the largest eigenvalue is one. In year 2014, there are 87 sectors at three-digit
NAICS level, and the matrix ]̃ is constructed at three-digit NAICS level. The left-panel of the figure shows the real parts
of the eigenvalues and the right-panel shows the imaginary parts of the eigenvalues. We can see that the largest eigenvalue
is much larger than the others in magnitude. The eigenvalues of the diffusion matrix are nearly real since the imaginary
components are much smaller in magnitude compared to the real parts.
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Figure 1.4: Concentration of the Eigenvalue Distribution for the Innovation Network
Note: This figure illustrates the sparsity on the eigenvalue distribution of innovation diffusion matrix ]̃ over years. We
construct our innovation network each year from 1951 to 2014, and then standardize the matrix such that the largest
eigenvalue of the diffusion matrix is one each year (for detail on the construction of ]̃, see the appendix C.1). Specifically,
we calculate the concentration of eigenvalues as >=28 =
∑
9≤: b 9 (]̃ )∑
9≤: _ 9 (]̃ )
, 9 ∈ {1,5,10} that measures the relative magnitude
of the largest : eigenvalues to the rest.
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1.4.5 Coincidence of Innovation and Production Networks
Proposition 1.3.4 shows that the amplification effect of the shock crucially depends on the inner
product 〈v8 , sC〉 when the shock follows v8’s direction. This subsection documents the stylized facts
on the inner product. As shown in 1.3.4 and 1.5.3, the amplification effect of the initial shock
depends on the 〈v8 , s〉, 8 ∈ []. If 〈v1, s〉 ≈ 0, the net effect will still be small due to the tiny loading
of the persistent component even though d−_1(]) ≈ 0. This section indicates that this is not the
case.
Fact 2.1: 〈v1, s〉  〈v8 , s〉, 8 ≥ 1, and this pattern is stable over time.
Fact 2.2: 〈v1, s〉 increases steadily from 0.06 in 1947 to 0.10 in 1980, and then declines to
0.08 recently.
Note that if sectors were indifferent in the innovation network in the sense that they have the same
centralities, 〈v1, s〉 would have been 1/ ≈ 0.011 0.06. Thus, overall, important sectors in the
innovation network are more likely to be important in the production network. Figure 1.5 shows
〈v8 , sC〉, 8 ∈ [], of the year 2014. It shows that 〈v1, sC〉 is much sizable than the other 〈v8 , sC〉, 8 ≠ 1.
To check the trend of 〈v8 , sC〉 over time. Figure 1.6 shows the inner product between the sector share
and the eigenvectors associated with the largest five eigenvalues from 1947 to 2017. Over the past
70 years, among all the inner products, 〈v1, sC〉 is the largest one and much sizable than the rest.
Another interesting finding is 〈v1, sC〉 increases steadily from roughly 0.06 at the beginning of the
1950s to more than 0.1 in the 1980s and then declines to roughly 0.08 recently.
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Figure 1.5: Coincidence between the Innovation and Production Networks
Note: This figure illustrates the coincidence of the eigenvectors of innovation diffusion matrices and firms’ importances
in production network - the inner product 〈v8 , s〉 - based on the knowledge diffusion matrix and production network in
2014 (for details, please see the appendix C.1). Both the innovation diffusion matrix and the output-share vector are
constructed at three-digit NAICS level. v8 is the eigenvector associated with the 8Cℎ largest eigenvalue of the knowledge
diffusion matrix. s is the vector output share (Katz Centrality in the production network). For the eigenvectors associated
with the first several largest eigenvalues, the inner product 〈v1, s〉 is much larger than the rest.
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Figure 1.6: Coincidence of the innovation and Production Network Overtime
Note: This figure examines the coincidence of the eigenvectors of knowledge diffusion matrices and firms’ importances
in production network - the inner product 〈v8 , s〉 - over years from 1947 to 2014 (for details, please see the appendix C.1).
At each year t, we construct output share of each sector at three-digit NAICS level based on the sectoral output from BEA
or BLS, and the knowledge diffusion matrices at three-digit NAICS level based on patent datasets. The figure shows the
time trend of the first five inner products (s, v8) associated with the largest five eigenvalues of the innovation diffusion
matrix each year.
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1.4.6 Coincidence between v8 and Shocks
In the previous sections, we have shown the strongest spillover effect cancels out the depreciation
effect (,1(] ≈ d), the innovation network takes a low-rank structure (_1((,))  _8 ((,)),∀8 > 1),
and large 〈v1, s〉. If the channel in the proposition 1.3.4 does work, we expect the economy to
experience a prolonged recovery if 〈v1, &t〉 experiences a large drop, that is, important sectors in the
innovation network suffer much more than those less important ones.
Figure 1.7 shows the moving average GDP growth of the US since 1955. There is a considerable
variation in the recovery period that the economy takes to move back to its average growth trend.
For example, during the great recession of 2008, it takes more than ten years for the economy to
move back to its average growth trend. However, in other episodes, the economy quickly recovers
back to the growth trend like the recessions in the 1970s triggered by the oil crises.
Figure 1.7: Moving Average of Annual Real GDP Growth

















GDP Growth: 5-Year MA
Average since WWII
Note: This figure shows the moving average of the annual real GDP growth of the US.
To show the 〈v1, &t〉 across recessions, we estimate it based on the state-space model. As dis-
cussed in 1.4.1, each measure suffers from problems when we use the patent, TFP, and R&D to proxy
for the current or future technological progress. We should be cautious about the interpretations.
Specifically, using patent as a measure of the technology progress may be subject to a severe lagging
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problem, TFP may capture too much beyond the technology progress, while the R&D is a good
proxy for the future technological progress but not now.
Figure 1.8 shows 〈v1, &t〉 across time but using the patents to proxy for technology progress
as in 1.4.2. As we expected, during the great recession of 2008, the inner-product drops sharply
but modest during other recessions. Another concern is the shock to the patent issuance is just a
reflection of resources available to the US Patent Office.
Figure 1.8: Inner Product of Eigenvector Centrality and Shock (Measured with Patent Data)
Note: This figure shows the inner product between the sectoral importance and the estimated technology shock. Here,
we use the patent issuance to proxy for the technology progress and use the state-space-model to recover the underlying
shock as discussed in section 1.4.2 .
To overcome this problem, Figure 1.9 plots the inner product between the sectoral importance
in the innovation network and the shock. The cross-sectional shock is estimated as in section
1.4.3, where we explicitly model the TFP process as a combination of technological progress and
the process beyond spillover. The shock used in figure 1.9 is the shock to technology progress.
Similarly, we find that 〈v1, &t〉 experiences a significant drop to -0.02 during the great recession.
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Figure 1.9: Inner Product of Eigenvector Centrality and Shock (Measured with TFP Data)













Note: This figure illustrates the coincidence of technological shocks and the leading eigenvector of the knowledge
diffusion matrices over time. Both the innovation diffusion matrix and the technological shocks are constructed at three-
digit NAICS level. The grey shadow area plots the NBER recessions. We can see that during the Great Recession, the
negative technological shocks get mostly amplified through the knowledge diffusion network.
Does the drop along the direction of the sectoral importance matters at the aggregate level? Let
us consider the great recession of the 2008 when 〈v1, &t〉 ≈ −0.02 and 〈v1, s〉 ≈ 0.10, and use the






(1− d +_8 (]))g 〈& C , v8〉〈v8 , sC〉 (1.35)
The parameter on the return to scale is [ = 0.35 following Herskovic (2018), and d−_ ≈ 0.02. Thus,
during the great recession of 2008, this shock leads to a nearly permanent drop in the GDP growth
by 0.3 percent, the impact of this shock declines by half after 35 years. This aggregate effect is
large compared to 3 percent of the long-run growth for the US. Another point is to compare with the
deviation from the long growth trend. As shown in figure 1.7, ten years later, the moving average of
the GDP growth is still lower by 0.4 percent relative to the growth trend. Thus, the 0.3 percent drop
accounts for roughly 75% of such deviation.
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1.4.7 Cross-Sectional Evidence across Recessions
In this subsection, we use the growth in R&D expenditure to proxy for the shock to the sector’s
arrival rate of innovation. This proxy is motivated by our micro foundation A.1, where we show
that the R&D expenditure is proportional to the potential knowledge from which firms can learn.
Intuitively, R&D expenditure is a good proxy for the arrival rate of future innovations.
Since the quarterly R&D is only available after 1988, we can only compare the cross-sectional
change in R&D expenditure in three recent recessions - 1991, 2001, and the Great Recession of
2008. We first document that sectors playing critical roles in the innovation network suffer much
worse, measured by the R&D growth, in the Great Recession than that in the recessions of 1991 and
2001. Specifically, we first calculate the R&D expense changes of sectors at the three-digit NAICS
level, we then assign each sector into one of the five groups based on its eigenvector centrality, v8 ,
of the last year. We construct dummies 864=8C3 , 3 = 1,2,3,4,5. 864=8C3 is 1 if the sector 8’s
eigenvector centrality, at the beginning of period C, falls between 20× (3 − 1) percent and 20× 3
percent, otherwise 0. To examine how sectors with various importance in the innovation network





[U3864=8C3 + V3 C=2A8B8B08 ∗864=8C3] + n8C (1.36)
where H8C is the R&D growth for sector 8 in episode C (1991, 2001 or 2008), C=2A8B8B08 is the episode
dummy which equals to 1 if the episode is the 2008 crisis and 0 for the 1991 (or 2001) recession.
Consider a comparison between the recessions of 2008 and of 2001, U3 is the average R&D growth
of sectors in 2001, while V3 measures the difference in the average R&D growth in the recession of
2008 relative to 2001 within the 3Cℎ group. For example, a negative V5 indicates that sectors in the
center of the innovation network suffer worse in 2008 relative to 2001.
Table 1.6 shows the basic regression results. Columns 1 and 2 examine the cross-sectional
difference of sectors in the exposure to the adversary shocks of 2001 and 2008. Column 1 shows the
results with equal weights across sectors, and column 2 shows the results with the previous year’s
sectoral R&D as weights. There are several things worth emphasizing. First, in 2001, sectors in
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the periphery of the innovation network (sectors with eigenvector centrality in the bottom 20%)
experienced a more significant drop in the R&D growth than those in the center of the innovation
network (with eigenvector centrality in the top 20%). However, this pattern reverses during the
Great Recession. Sectors in the center of the innovation network experienced a more significant
decline in R&D growth than their periphery counterparts. Second, compared to the recession of
2001, sectors with eigenvector centrality in the top 20% experienced a further decline in the R&D
growth by 14.8% with equal weights, or 32.8% with R&D weighted in Great Recession. On the
contrary, sectors in the bottom 20% witnessed an increase in the R& D growth by 18.7% with equal
weights or 12.3% with R& D weighted in the Great Recession.
Columns 3 and 4 show similar results when we compare the recessions of 1991 and 2008.
The Great Recession witnessed a much larger drop in R&D growth for sectors in the center of the
innovation network, relative to 1991. Specifically, during the Great Recession, sectors with centrality
in the top 20% experienced a sharp slide in the R&D growth by 24.9% with equal weights or 26.8%
with R&D weighted, relative to the recession of 1991.
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Table 1.6: Sector Centrality and R&D Expense Change over the Recessions







Bottom 20% centrality -0.225*** -0.0711*** 0.0332 0.177***
(0.0639) (0.00822) (0.110) (0.0233)
20-40% centrality -0.0979 -0.0533*** 0.360 -0.0767***
(0.0910) (0.00233) (0.365) (0.00136)
40-60% centrality 0.0993 -0.0319*** -0.0479 -0.0330
(0.143) (0.000884) (0.0979) (0.0343)
60-80% centrality -0.0805 0.00669 -0.191 -0.0205***
(0.103) (0.00448) (0.141) (0.00374)
Top 20% centrality 0.00134 0.0705*** 0.103 0.0103***
(0.0468) (0.00111) (0.0967) (0.000630)
Bottom 20% centrality
× 2008 crisis 0.187 0.123*** -0.0705 -0.124***
(0.158) (0.0136) (0.182) (0.0257)
20-40% centrality
× 2008 crisis 0.0541 0.0814*** -0.404 0.105***
(0.128) (0.00485) (0.376) (0.00446)
40-60% centrality
× 2008 crisis -0.0744 0.0364*** 0.0729 0.0375
(0.188) (0.00156) (0.157) (0.0343)
60-80% centrality
× 2008 crisis 0.0556 -0.335*** 0.166 -0.308***
(0.229) (0.00709) (0.250) (0.00665)
Top 20% centrality
× 2008 crisis -0.148** -0.328*** -0.249** -0.268***
(0.0669) (0.00116) (0.108) (0.000713)
Observations 109 152,157 98 116,380
R-squared 0.078 0.657 0.078 0.816
Note: This table compare the R&D expense changes of sectors with different levels of eigenvector centrality in recent
recessions in the 1991, 2001 recessions and the Great Recession. As is noted by the coefficients of Top 20% centrality ×
2008 crisis, the most important sectors in the innovation network suffers significantly more than other sectors in the Great
Recession, while this is not the case for the 2001 and 1991 recessions. Columns 1 and 3 are simple OLS, and Columns
2 and 4 are WLS weighted by sector R&D value. Robust standard errors in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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1.5 Networks and Asset Pricing
In this section, we explore one application of the theory in asset pricing.
1.5.1 Networks and Pricing Kernel
In this section, we consider the implications of the theory on asset pricing. Intuitively, a shock to
the arrival rate at period C affects GC at first. Through the propagation via the innovation network,
the effect will persist at periods B = C +1, C +2, ...∞. Thus, to link the asset pricing with the network
structure, the SDF "C ,C+1 must be linked to the consumption growth of periods C + B, B ≥ 2. Epstein-
Zin preference enables us to establish such linkages.
Here, wewill focus on the Cobb-Douglas production technology to obtain a closed-form solution.
For a more general case, we provide an approximation in Appendix A.2. To obtain the intuition, we
first focus on the case where companies learn only from the recent innovations as 1.11. We discuss
the general case in the next subsection. Under Cobb-Douglas, we have




ΔaC+1 = -C +fzC+1




Under the E-Z preference, the logarithm of the SDF is
<C+1 = log("C ,C+1) = \ log(X) −
\
k
Δ2C+1 + (\ −1)A<,C+1. (1.38)
To solve for the logarithm of state price density, we need to pin down the equilibria market
return A<,C+1 as a function of the state variables. Denote the logarithm of price dividend ratio for
the aggregate dividend process as IC , the market portfolio return can be written as approximately
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Campbell and Shiller (1988) 18
A<,C+1 = ^0 + ^1IC+1 +Δ2C+1− IC , (1.39)
with ^0 and ^1 are constant of log-linearization. From equation 1.37, -C are sufficient statistics for
future arrival rate -C+1 and ΔaC+1. Besides, the future growth of consumption or dividend linearly
depends on -C . Thus, -C are the state variables of the economy. Conjecture that IC is linear in the
state variables: IC = 10 + b′1-C . Substituting 1.39 and the log of SDF into the Euler equation:
C4G?(<C+1 + A<,C+1) = 1 (1.40)
The solution to the coefficients can be obtained with the method of undetermined coefficients as
below. The details of derivation are in Appendix A.3






k(1−[) [O− ^1((1− d)O +]
′)]−1s
(1.41)
Substituting the expressions for A<,C+1 and the dynamics of Δ2C+1 back to the log of the SDF in





















since, in equilibrium, we have C = C . Thus,
A<,C+1 = log(1+ 4IC+1 ) − IC +Δ2C+1
We take a linear approximation around Ī, the unconditional expectation of IC ,
A<,C+1 = ^0 + ^1IC+1 − IC +Δ2C+1




Proposition 1.5.1 (No Lagged Learning). Under the Cobb-Douglas,






1−[ [^1((1− d)O +]) − O]
−1 []& C+1 + &
D
C+1]
= − 5<,0(C+1−C )Δ2C+1− 5<,1
s′
1−[ [O− ^1((1− d)O +])]
−1 [C+1−C ]-C+1
(1.42)
with 5<,0 = 1− \ + \/k = W, and 5<,1 = ^1(1− \) (1−1/k).The first term of equation 1.42 is the one
related to CCAMP, and the second term comes from the innovation network.
When \ = 1, the preference is time separable and the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution
(IMRS) only depends on the Δ2C+1, and the second part of 1.42 disappears since 5<,1 = 0. Con-
sequently, only risks associated with the growth of consumption at period C + 1(Δ2C+1) are priced,
while risks associated with the consumption growth in the future like Δ2C+B,with B ≥ 2 are not priced.
Thanks to the lagged knowledge diffusion effects - the shock (C+1−C )-C+1 only affects consump-
tion growth in the future, i.e., Δ2C+B, B ≥ 2, the risks associated with the innovation network will not
be priced.
When \ ≠ 1, the SDF "C ,C+1 depends not only on the current consumption growth but also
on the continuation utility *C+1 which in turn depends on the continuation consumption growth
Δ2C+B, B ≥ 2. Therefore, shocks to future consumption growth are priced. A shock to -t+1 will affect
the realized at+2, which in turn changes the arrival rate in the future. Through this propagation,
the initial shock to the arrival rate will have a persistent effect on future consumption growth and its
effect on the marginal utility will be amplified significantly.
General Cases with Lagged Learning
In this section, we provide results when firms can learn from historical innovations beyond the -C .
Specifically, we model the arrival intensity as
Δ`8C+1 = −d`8C +
∑
9
,8 9i(!)Δ log( 9C+1) + nD8C+1. (1.43)
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Where i(!) =∑B≥0 iB!B and i0 = 1, with ! the lag-operator. Under this case, the state variables at
C include (-C ,ΔaB,∀B ≤ C).
Proposition 1.5.2 (Lagged Learning Process). Under the general case 1.43, the innovation to the
SDF takes the form of
<C+1−C<C+1 = −\/k(2C+1−C2C+1) + (\ −1) (A<,C+1−CA<,C+1)
















1iB. When firms only
learn from the most recent innovation, that is, iB = 0,∀B ≥ 1, then k0 = 0. The results are reduced to
the cases in equation 1.42. Allowing for more lagged learning does not change our results too much
qualitatively but make the SDF more volatile. For the proof of this general result, see the appendix
A.4.
1.5.2 Nexus of Recovery and Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing
This section shows cross sectional returns provide information on the prospect recovery of the
economy. Denote the unexpected shock to arrival rate as & C+1 = [EC+1 −EC ]-C+1 =
∑
9∈[ ] U 9 ,C+1v 9 ,
with U 9 ,C+1 = (v 9 , & C+1) the loading of the shock on v 9 , 9 ∈ [].
From 1.42, we have






[1− ^1 + ^1(d−_ 9 (]))]−1(s, v 9)U 9C+1.
(1.45)
Note that ^1 ∈ (0,1) and very close to 1 empirically. When the shock [EC+1−EC ]-C+1 is roughly
parallel to the eigenvector centrality, the volatility of the log of the state price would increase sharply.
Empirically, we find that _ 9 (S) and (s, v 9) decline sharply as 9 increases. Thus, only the first several
eigenvectors play non-negligible role in asset pricing empirically.
50
Proposition 1.5.3. If the learning process satisfies 1.9, The expected return of any asset is
C [A8C+1− A 5 ,C+1] +
1
2






[1− ^1 + ^1(d−_ 9 (]))]−1(s, v 9)>EC (A8.C+1, U 9C+1),
(1.46)
with 5<,0 = 1− \ + \/k = W, and 5<,1 = ^1(1− \) (1−1/k).
Proposition 1.5.4. For the more general learning process 1.10, the innovation of logarithm of the
SDF






[1− ^1 + ^1(d−k0_ 9 (]))]−1(&̃ C+1, v 9) (s, v 9)
(1.47)
with &̃ C+1 = &DC+1 +k0]&

C+1 and k0 =
∑
B≥0 iB. Furthermore,
C [A8C+1− A 5 ,C+1]+
1
2






[1− ^1 + ^1(d−k0_ 9 (]))]−1(s, v 9)>EC (A8.C+1, Ũ 9C+1)
(1.48)
with Ũ 9C+1 = (v 9 , &̃ C+1), 5<,0 = 1− \ + \/k = W, and 5<,1 = ^1(1− \) (1−1/k).
There are several things worth mentioning:
1. The persistent impact of the initial shock is closely related to behaviors of asset prices by
comparing Equation 1.23 and Propositions 1.5.3 or 1.5.4. When the initial shock highly
correlates with the eigenvector centrality of the innovation network, its impact on future
innovation will become very persistent, while the SDF’s conditional volatility will increase
sharply.
2. Under the decomposition of Proposition 1.5.3, there are  factors, the number of sectors in the
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1− ^1 + ^1 [d−k0_ 9 (])]
]−1
(s, v 9) (1.49)
^1 =
4Ī
1+4Ī , with Ī the unconditional expected log of aggregate price-dividend ratio. In real data,
the parameter ^1 is close to but slightly smaller than 1, ^1 ≈ 0.997 (see Campbell and Shiller
(1988); Bansal and Yaron (2004)). Empirically, we document that _ 9 (]) drops significantly,
thus
2.1 If d is non-negligible, only factors such that d ≈ k0_ 9 (]) exhibit very high risk-
premium. Combining the fact that _ 9 (]) drop sharply, we conclude that only the first
several factors are important in practice.
2.2 If d is close to zero, then d −k0_ 9 (]) ≈ 0. Under this case, only factors with large
(s, v 9) are important in practice.
3. The theory rationalize the long-run risk in a networked economy. When d ≈ k0_1(]), and
(s, v1) and (X-C+1, v1) are non-negligible, the impacts of the initial shock on future growth
are very persistent and significantly amplified. The pricing kernel becomes very volatile and
the expected market return rises sharply to compensate for the risk.
4. Besides the common preference parameter 5<,1 shared by all network factors, the magnitude
of risk premium associated with the 9 Cℎ factor depends on [1− ^1 + ^1(d−k0_ 9 (]))]−1 and
(s, v 9). The first term depends on the eigenvalue distribution of the innovation network while
the second captures the interaction between the production and innovation networks.
Empirically, remember k0 = 1, _1(]) ≈ 1, and d ≈ _1(]), thus the volatility of the pricing
kernel is proportional to (1− ^)−1 ≈ 330 when the cross-sectional shock follows the eigenvector
centrality of the innovation network. On the contrary, if there is no technology spillover, the pricing
kernel is proportional to (1− ^ + d)−1 ≈ 3 since d ≈ 0.3. As a result, due to the technology spillover
and the low rank structure of the innovation network, the volatility of the pricing kernel is amplified
to 100 folders when the shocks follows the eigenvector centrality of the innovation network. This
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amplified volatility can well explain the risk-premium and risk-free rate puzzles even for a modest
risk-averse coefficient (see Mehra and Prescott (1985); Bansal and Yaron (2004)).
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a production economy incorporating both the innovation network and
production network. We examine the dynamic interactions among the cross-sectional shock to
technology progress, innovation network, and production network. We emphasize the crucial role
of the network’s structure and shock’s sectoral distribution in the amplification and persistence of
the shock’s impact.
We first show that the technology spillover effect depends on the direction of the shock to
technology progress. The economy exhibits a stronger technology spillover effect when the shock
parallels the sectoral importance (i.e., eigenvector centrality) in the innovation network. On the
contrary, the spillover effect becomesweakest when the shock is parallel to the eigenvector associated
with the smallest eigenvalue of the innovation network.
Several facts on the structure of the innovation network and the cross-sectional shocks are
documented in this paper. The empirical evidence suggests that the US’s innovation network
has a low-rank structure so that the leading eigenvalue dominates in magnitude the remaining
ones of the innovation network. Furthermore, the most potent spillover-effect roughly cancels out
the depreciation effect of the technology shock. The unique structure implies that the shock’s
sectoral distribution reveals information on the economy’s recovery path when an adverse shock
hits the economy. Specifically, conditional on the shock’s initial aggregate effect, the economy will
experience a prolonged recovery process only if important sectors in the innovation network suffer
more than their counterparts. However, the economy will recover quickly from the recession if the
shock follows other directions. This channel indicates that the sectors’ heterogeneous exposure to the
technology shock plays a vital role in shaping the prolonged slow recovery. Thus understanding why
some crucial sectors in the innovation network suffer more during some recessions while suffering
much less during other episodes is an important research topic in the future.
Besides the persistence, we show that two sufficient statistics fully capture the shock’s ampli-
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fication effect. The first is the inner product between the cross-sectional shock and the sectoral
importance in the innovation network. This coefficient captures how shocks are propagated through
the technology innovation-network. The second coefficient is the inner product between sectors’
importance in the innovation network and their importance in the production network. This coeffi-
cient captures how the initial technology shocks are propagated from the innovation network to the
production network.
We document a stable and robust interaction between the innovation network and production
network. The shock will be amplified significantly when the shock parallels the sectoral importance
in the innovation network (i.e., the eigenvector centrality). Empirically, we document that the pivotal
sectors in the innovation network suffer muchmore than their periphery counterparts during the great
recessions of 2008. In contrast, this pattern reverses during other recessions like the recession of
1998 or 2001.
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Table 1.7: Summary Statistics for Firms in Different Centrality Quantiles





Bottom 20% 4.57 2300.10 0.931
20-40% 13.21 2920.24 0.828
40-60% 14.36 3071.22 0.824
60-80% 27.75 2893.71 0.736
Top 20% 76.26 2867.46 0.832
Note: This table reports average R&D expenses, average market value (both in million of dollars), average book-to-market
value of Compustat firms in different centrality quantiles. To construct the table, each year, we first sort all sectors (at
three-digit NAICS level) into five groups based on the eigenvector centrality of the last year. Within each group, we pool
all the firm-year observations together and report their aggregate R&D expense, the average market value, and the average
Book-to-Market ratio. The sample period is from 1952 to 2014 at an annual frequency.
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Figure 1.10: Non-linear Effect from Change in Concentration
Note: This figure illustrates the non-linear effect from the change in concentration on growth. The real blue line represent
the growth from the concentration effect(indexed by the left y-axis). The dash green line represents the detrend real
growth(indexed by the right y-axis). At year t, we calculate the concentration as #2 (C) = −∑ 9 B 9C log(B 9C ) with B 9C is the
output share of sector 9 at the three-digit NAICS level at the end of calendar year C. We construct the output share of
three-digit NAICS sector from the output table by sectors provided by the BEA and BLS. The non-linear growth effect
from change in the concentration at year is defined #2 (C) −#2 (C −1). This concentration effect reflects the contribution
of resource reallocation across sectors to the growth.
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Figure 1.11: Non-linear Effect from Change in Sparsity










































Note: This figure illustrates the non-linear effect from the change in the adjusted sparsity on growth, the resource
reallocation within the sector. We decompose the adjusted sparsity #B
8C










9 \8 9C log(\8 9C ) and #B,29C =
∑












The real blue line represents the growth from the change in first component(indexed by the left y-axis), [1−[ΔsCT
B,1
C .The
dash gray line represents the the second component (indexed by the right y-axis), [1−[ΔsCT
B,2
C .At year t, we construct the
sparsity measure is the based on the input-output table at the three-digit NAICS level at the end of calendar year C. We
follow Herskovic (2018) to choose [ = 0.35.
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Figure 1.12: Knowledge Diffusion across Firms
Note: This figure illustrates how a representative firm 8 learns from others in our empirical construction of knowledge
diffusion matrix and our model of micro foundation. Specifically, firm 8 (Walmart) put resources to establish several
research groups, each of them focusing on various technology fields. Consider the research group in technology class 2
(scientific computation), they learn knowledge and insights not only from the patents in technology class 2, but also from
patents in other fields, say class 1 (Software). The knowledge flow from class 1 to class 2 is captured byΩ21. On the other
hands, there are many companies (like Microsoft, IBM, and Uber etc) contributing to knowledge and insights in the class
1.The more the knowledge firm 9 contributes to the technology class 1, the easier the researchers in scientific computation
of firm 8 learn from class 2, and the more resources firm 8 (Walmart) puts in class 2, then the more the knowledge and
insights firm 8 will obtain from 9 through this channel.
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Chapter 2
The Network Effects of Agency Conflicts
2.1 Introduction
Interdependencies between organizations that hold each other’s shares (or other obligations) are
pervasive (see Shi, Townsend, and Zhu (2020)), for example, find that firms in equity holding
networks contribute to roughly 70% of fixed capital and 60% of employment in China.19 These
interdependencies are also a channel through which shocks to one organization can be transmitted to
others. Prior work has tried to characterize the structure of equity holding networks that encourage
the propagation of shocks. Ignored are agency conflicts within the firm. We argue that such firm-
level conflicts can have a significant effect on system-wide behavior. This implies an important role
for corporate governance in macro fluctuations.
We propose a model of equity holding networks that allows firms to make an investment decision
in response to an exogenous shock. In the model, a firm’s value depends on its initial endowment of
capital goods (e.g., machines), the risky investments it chooses to undertake, and the shares it owns
in other firms. A shock that causes a firm to suffer loss will propagate to other firms, even those not
directly related to the initially failing firm. However, if a firm chooses an investment that raises its
value as a response to the initial bad shock, it will also increase the value of any holding firm. As
a result, an initial negative shock can be dampened. Whether the firm’s manager will choose such
19. See also Duarte and Jones (2017).
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investments depends on how aligned their objectives are with those of the shareholders. 20
Our model is flexible enough to incorporate various types of frictions - default costs, limited
liability, conflict of interest, and moral hazard (hidden actions by managers). Keeping the equity
holding network fixed, we show that these frictions play a key role in propagating an initial shock. In
the presence of default costs or limited liability, firmswill take actions that limit the propagation of the
initial shock. However, in the presence of moral hazards or interest conflicts (like private benefits),
the initial shock will be amplified. The intuition is that in a default cost or limited liability regime,
managers’ interests are aligned with shareholders. In response to an adverse shock, a manager
takes actions that increase the firm’s value and reduces the net loss exposure to holding firms.
Consequently, during the propagation of an initial shock along the holding linkages, a sequence of
actions will be taken to mitigate the loss caused by the initial shock. However, under moral hazard
or interest conflicts, the action taken by managers in response to the initial bad shock is inconsistent
with shareholder interests. This induces a further loss of the holding firms, which exacerbates the
interest conflict between managers and shareholders of the holding firms. Through this channel, an
initial bad shock is amplified.
Restricting attention to the moral hazard and interest conflicts (like private benefits), we study the
role of network structure in shaping investment decisions and propagation of shocks. In our model,
the network of cross-holdings affects the propagation of a shock via three channels. The first is a
familiar one, that we call a pure network channel (see Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014); Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015)). The second is an action amplification channel characterized
by the equilibrium profile of actions chosen. The equilibrium profile also depends on the underlying
network of cross-holdings. The third is the endogenous uncertainty associated with the equilibrium
actions taken. The presence of these additional channels overturns intuitions one might draw from
the pure network channel alone. For example, if the underlying network of cross-holdings is acyclic,
Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) and Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) argue that
a more integrated network promotes the propagation of an initial shock. However, we find that the
20. In principle, firms could adjust their equity positions in other firms as a response to shocks, but this appears to be
rare. Using business registration data covering all firms in China, Allen, Cai, Gu, Qian, Zhao, and Zhu (2019a), for
example, find that it is rare for firms to exit or change their stakes in other firms, even during a financial crisis.
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latter two channels mitigate the propagation of shocks due to a reduction in the endogenous risk-
taking and action amplification multipliers when the networks become denser or more integrated.
Similarly, we also find that the latter two channels may mitigate the propagation of the shocks when
the equity-holding networks become more diversified. Under the regime of moral hazard or interest
conflicts, a general statement is that one network that induces high risk-taking would also facilitate
the propagation of shocks.
To illustrate the ‘macro’ implications of these ‘micro’ conflicts, we consider a fully diversified
holding network, in which each firm’s shares are equally distributed between all other firms. The
“diversification argument” of Lucas Jr (1977) suggests that the aggregate effect of idiosyncratic
shocks is small. In the presence of agency conflicts, we show that this is not the case. Considering
the popularity of equity holding in the economy (see Shi, Townsend, and Zhu (2020)), this suggests
a potentially important role of corporate governance in macro fluctuations.
Literature. This paper is related to the recent literature on financial networks that can be divided
into three categories.
1. Many papers ask how network structure affects the propagation of an exogenous shock but
in the absence of actions by the agents (e.g., Allen and Gale (2000); Eisenberg and Noe
(2001); Gai andKapadia (2010); Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012); Elliott, Golub, and Jackson
(2014); Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin (2005); Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015);
Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2015)). In our paper, agents can take investment actions
in response to an initial exogenous shock. In the following period, new shocks are triggered
as realizations of the investment outcomes. Thus, both actions and second-period shocks are
endogenous in our economy. In this setting, we study the role of network structure in the
propagation of shocks. We show that a denser or more integrated network needs not to amplify
the initial shock.
2. The second category endogenizes network formation in anticipation of possible shocks
(e.g.,Leitner (2005); Zawadowski (2013); Babus and Hu (2015); Babus (2016); Cabrales,
Gottardi, and Vega-Redondo (2017); Elliott, Hazell, and Georg (2018), and Erol and Vohra
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(2018)). In our paper, the network of cross-holdings is fixed exogenously. Our focus is on the
underlying frictions that influence responses to the initial shock.
3. The third category emphasizes the inefficiencies of financial networks that arise from exter-
nalities and the optimal network to mitigate them (e.g. Shu (2018); Kanik (2018); Jackson
and Pernoud (2019)). Here we are concerned with within-firm conflicts on the propagation of
shocks rather than other kinds of frictions.
Two recent papers that explore the implications of the wedge between ownership and control in
the context of financial networks are Galeotti, Ghiglinoy, and Goyal (2016) and Jackson and Pernoud
(2019). In Galeotti, Ghiglinoy, and Goyal (2016), the firm’s managers’ incentives are aligned with
the ‘outside’ shareholders only. Outside shareholders are all shareholders other than the firms in the
equity-holding networks. They correspond to households or individual investors.21 This difference
leads to different conclusions about how network structure affects risk-taking. In our setup, a more
integrated network (at least for the acyclic case) will mitigate the moral hazard or agency conflicts,
inducing managers to take less risk, in contrast with Galeotti, Ghiglinoy, and Goyal (2016).
Jackson and Pernoud (2019) study an economy incorporating both equity and debt holdings, but
only allow for default cost and limited liability. Limited liability creates a conflict between creditors
and borrowers, inducing borrowers to take riskier actions in their networks. In our model, managers
maximize the expected value of all shareholders subject to various frictions - default cost, limited
liability, interest conflicts, and moral hazards. With interest conflicts or moral hazard, this setup
creates agency conflicts between shareholders and managers.
Finally, the study of how within-firm conflicts affect investment decisions is not new. It can be
traced back to Coase (1937); Jensen and Meckling (1976); Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990);
Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), John, Litov, and Yeung (2008),
Laeven and Levine (2009), Gilje (2016); Edmans, Levit, and Reilly (2018); He, Huang, and Zhao
(2019). We, however, are concerned with the network effects of such within-firm conflicts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the basicmodel and shows how
21. Specifically, each firm maximizes a quadratic utility function of risk-averse outside investors. Managers are aligned
with the outside shareholders only, creating a conflict between outside and inside shareholders.
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it can be adapted to incorporate various frictions. Section 2.3 describes the equilibrium investment
choices of firms in response to an exogenous shock under the various frictions. The curvature of
the friction function determines firm investment responses. Section 2.4 specializes in the case of
quadratic friction functions for analytical tractability. Section 2.5 studies how network structure
affects the firm’s equilibrium investment decisions and the propagation of shocks in equilibrium.
Section 2.6 studies the impact of agency conflicts on the aggregate payoff. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Model
Let # = {1,2, . . . , =} be the set of firms and suppose two periods C = 0,1. Each firm holds two types
of assets: an operating asset (fixed capital stock like machines) and a financial asset issued by other
firms. The quantity of the operating asset held by firm 8 ∈ # in period 0 is denoted 08 . The equity
share of firm 9 held by firm 8 is denoted 8 9 . I is the holding matrix with (8, 9)th entry 8 9 . Each
firm has an investment opportunity set denoted O8 from which it can select investments. In period
0, firm 8 chooses an investment in O8 that generates random cash flow in period 1.
Investments in O8 vary by their risk-return profiles, indexed by f8 which is to be interpreted
as a standard deviation as well as a proxy for the riskiness of an investment. Investment f8 has
an associated mean, denoted `(f8) with `(f8) > 0. The realized payoff to firm 8 at period 1 from
choosing investment project f8 in period 0 depends upon the quantity, 08 , of the operating asset held
at period 0:
G8 (f8) = 08 (`(f8) +f8I8 + 18). (2.1)
Here I8 is a random variable with mean zero and standard deviation 1. In some contexts we set
18 = 0 and interpret `8 = `(f8) to be the expected return of the investment. In other contexts, 18 ≠ 0,
which we interpret as the risk free return facing firm 8, then, `(f8) is the excess return above the risk
free rate. We will often refer to an investment G8 by its corresponding standard deviation f8 . Here,
for simplification, we implicitly assume all firms take the same technology - the same function `(·).
Our results still hold even if the function `(·) varies across firms.
Our formulation includes as a special case ‘investment with adjustment cost’ proposed in
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) + 8 [+ I8] + (08 − 8)A, (2.2)
Here, q(·) is usually convex due to a convex adjustment cost associated with investment, and A is
the risk free rate . 8 [+ I8] is the investment return delivered by a linear technology, (08 − 8)A is
the return from a riskless investment (e.g. save 08 − 8 in the bank with interest rate A). If we set
f8 = 8/08 , the cash flow has the form in (2.1) with `(f8) = −q(f8) + (−A)f8 +A and 18 = A. Thus,
`(f) is a concave function.
Assumption 2.2.1. In the following, unless stated otherwise, we assume 08 , 18 ≥ 0 and f8 > 0. The
random variables I8 each have zero mean, standard deviation 1 and are i.i.d across firms.
We make several assumptions regarding `
Assumption 2.2.2. ` is a smooth function defined over a compact set [0, B] satisfying the following
for all 8 ∈ #:
1. `(f8) > 0, ∀f8 ∈ [0, B].
2. `′′ ≤ 0, ∃ f" ∈ (0, B), s.t. `′(f"
8
) = 0.
Condition (1) says the expected return of a risky investment is positive. If ` is the investment
return with convex adjustment cost as described in (2.2), it satisfies condition 2.22 One implication
of condition 2 is that if there are two projects with the same return but different risk, the project
with lower risk is strictly preferred to the one with higher risk by managers who maximize the
shareholders’ benefit.
If firm 8 chooses investment f8 ∈ O8 in period 0, in the absence of default costs (or other frictions)




8 9+ 9 + G8 (f8) ∀8 ∈ #. (2.3)
22. The convex adjustment cost has been widely documented and studied in the literature emphasizing the role of sluggish
adjustment to investment in business cycles and asset pricing. For further details, please see Dixit, Dixit, and Pindyck
(1994); Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006); Bloom (2009); Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry
(2018).
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In matrix notation, the value is
\ = (O−I)−1x(2) (2.4)
with O being the identity matrix, I = {8 9}8∈# , 9∈# and x(2) = (G1(f1), ..., G= (f=)) ′. Given that I
is a holding matrix, we know that
Assumption 2.2.3. 8 9 ≥ 0, ∀8, 9 ∈ # , 88 = 0,∀8 ∈ # , and
∑
9 98 ≤ 1,∀8 ∈ # .
Assumption 2.2.3 is standard (see, for example, Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014)). We
distinguish between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ shareholdings.23 The first refers to the shares held by the
firms in our model. The ‘inside’ value of firm 8 is denoted+ 
8
. The second refers to the shares held by
outsiders, called households. The value of firm 8’s outside shareholdings is+>
8












8∈[# ] G8 (f8).
The efficient profile of investments, denoted, 2" = (f" , ...,f" ) ′ ∈∏8∈# O8 , satisfies:




G8 (f8)] . (2.5)
Firm 8 by itself will choose f̂8 so that
f̂8 ∈ arg max
f8 ∈O8




38 9 [G 9 (0 9)] = arg max
f8 ∈O8
 [G8 (f8)] (2.6)
where 38 9 is the (8, 9)Cℎ entry of matrix J = (O−I)−1. Assumption 2.2.2 implies that f̂8 =f" , ∀8 ∈
# . We summarize our baseline results as a proposition
Proposition 2.2.1. The individual optimum coincides with the social optimum, that is, 2̂ = 2" ,
with 2̂ = (f̂1, ...f̂=) ′ and 2" = (f" , ...,f" ).
2.2.1 Frictions
In this section, we introduce various frictions such as default costs, limited liability, interest conflicts
between managers and shareholders. We do so by distinguishing between the ‘actual’ value of firm
23. See Brioschi, Buzzacchi, and Colombo (1989); French and Poterba (1991); Fedenia, Hodder, and Triantis (1994) and
Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) for a discussion.
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8 denoted +8 and its ‘theoretical’ value, denoted +̃8 . The various frictions cause the two values to
diverge. Specifically, +8 = +̃8 − 6(+̃8), where 6(·) is the ‘friction function’. We require that 6(+̃8)
be differentiable and 6′(·) < 1 to guarantee that 1− [6′(+̃8)] > 0. The assumption that 6′(·) < 1
implies that the marginal loss caused by frictions is small compared to the marginal value itself. As
will be seen, the conclusions we draw depend upon whether 6 is convex or concave. We give four
examples that can be modeled using an appropriate 6 function. In each case we state whether 6 is
convex or concave.
Default costs. When a firm’s value becomes sufficiently low, it hits a failure threshold at which it
discontinuously loses further value (see Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) and Acemoglu, Ozdaglar,
and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015)). This is modeled as follows. Let j be the characteristic function and g8




8 9+ 9 + G8 (08) −_j+̃8≤g8 ∀8 ∈ #.
If the firm’s actual value drops below g8 , it bears a default cost of _.24
Let +̃8 denote the value of firm 8 sans default and set 6(+̃8) = _j+̃8≤g8 . Then, +̃8 =
∑
98 9+ 9 +G8 (08)
and +8 = +̃8 − 6(+̃8). The choice of 6 function in this example is not differentiable. If we treat the
threshold g8 as random (independent of +̃8 and realized in the first period) rather than a fixed
parameter, we can ‘smooth’ away the discontinuity by focusing on the expected value of 6(+̃8).25 For
example, if g8 is exponentially distributed with parameter : , the expected value of 6(+̃8) is _4−:+̃8 .
Note, 6′(+̃8) < 1 and 6(·) is convex.
Limited liability. Under limited liability, +8 = max{+̃8 ,0}, which can be captured by setting +8 =
max{+̃8 ,0} = +̃8 −6(+̃8), with 6(+̃8) =min{+̃8 ,0} and +̃8 =
∑
98 9+ 9 + G8 (08).
Again, the non-differentiability of 6 can be smoothed away using randomization. For example,
let g be a random number that is exponentially distributed with parameter : . Consider max{+̃8 , g},
24. Elliott et al. (2014) uses a proportional default cost, that is, _+̃8 , which can be incorporated into our model.
25. Note the action f8 is taken at period 0 and the manager cares only about expected payoff when choosing an action.
Introducing a random threshold simplifies our analysis without changing the action chosen by managers
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as : →∞, g → 0 almost surely, then max{+̃8 , g} → max{+̃8 ,0} = 6(+̃8) almost surely using the
continuous mapping theorem Durrett (2019). Hence, the smoothed 6(+̃8), after taking expectations
with respect to an exponentially distributed random g, can be approximated by − 4−:+̃8−1
:
for : large.
Again, 6′(+̃8) < 1 and 6(·) is convex.
Conflict of interest. Conflicts between managers and shareholders is central to the study of
corporate finance (see Hart (1995) and Stein (2003)). We model such conflicts by requiring the
manager to bear a private cost of termination (_0) if shareholder value (+̃8) falls below a threshold,
g80, or enjoys a private benefit (_1) if shareholder value exceeds g81.26 The objective function for the
manager can be written as+8 = +̃8−_0j+̃8≤g80 +_1j+̃8≥g81 . In this case, 6(+̃8) = _0j+̃8≤g80−_1j+̃8≥g81 .




8 9+̃ 9 + G8 .
Again, by introducing a random threshold, we can focus on the expected value of 6(+̃8) which is
differentiable.
Alternatively, the manager is rewarded with a fraction of the firms value. Formally, the manager
earns a fraction U of the firm’s value while shareholders retain the remaining (1−U) fraction. Then,
the manager’s objective function is:
+8 = +̃8 −_0j+̃8≤g80 +_1j+̃8≥g81 +
U
1−U+̃8 (2.7)
which can be captured by setting 6(+̃8) = _0j+̃8≤g80 − _1j+̃8≥g81 −
U
1−U+̃8 . We also smooth the
discontinuity via randomizing the thresholds. When the share U in the hands of managers increases,
the coefficient of +̃8 in the expression for 6(+̃8) declines. In section 2.4.1 we show that under some
additional conditions, 6(·), is concave.
26. It is well documented that managers have an excess taste for running large firms - “empire-building” tendency, and
that it is easier for managers to expropriate private benefits when the value of the firm is large enough Jensen (1986);
Stulz (1990); Jensen (1993); Zwiebel (1996); Edmans and Holderness (2017), both can be captured by _1j+̃8≥g81 .
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Moral hazard. The misalignment of objectives between managers and investors can arise from
the hidden actions of managers. Suppose +̃8 , the value to the shareholder, depends on both manager’s
effort as well as the investment selected. If the manager of firm 8 chooses effort 4 under investment
G8 , the outcome is denoted G8 (08 , 4), the cost associated with the effort 4 for manager is 2(4). Neither
effort nor G8 are contractible by shareholders.27 Thus, the manager’s compensation can only be
conditioned on the realized observable value +̃8 and we denote it ℎ(+̃8). To induce managers to
choose an effort level 4∗ that maximizes shareholder value, shareholders solves max4,ℎ  [+̃8 |4]
subject to incentive constraint  [ℎ(+̃8) |4∗] ≥ sup4′  [ℎ(+̃8) |4′].
Let ℎ∗(·) be the optimal contract for the shareholders, there is a multiplier _0, such that the
manager’s optimal choice of 4 solves the following:28
max
4
 [+̃8 |4] +_0 [ℎ∗(+̃8) |4]
Thus, 6(+̃8) = −_0ℎ∗(+̃8), with +̃8 =
∑
98 9+̃ 9 +G8 (08 , 48).29 The multiplier _0 ≥ 0 is the shadow price
paid by the shareholders to overcome the moral hazard problems. The more severe the firm’s moral
hazard problem, the higher _0 is. Hölmstrom (1979) proves that the optimal contract ℎ(·) is convex
when the manager’s cost of effort is convex. Thus, by Hölmstrom (1979), 6(·) is concave. The basic
intuition is that to induce the manager to exert more effort which in turn increases the probability
of high shareholder value +̃ , shareholders should significantly increase the reward when the good
outcome is realized and severely penalize the manager when the bad outcome is realized.
We emphasize that our model does not rely on a specific contract between managers and
shareholders. It suffices that that the payoff is of the form +8 = +̃8 − 6(+̃8). Our main results only
depend on the form of 6(+̃8) and +̃8 as discussed in section 2.3.
27. See, e.g., Sannikov (2013) and papers cited therein.
28. One may prefer to format the optimal problem as max4  [+̃8 |4] + _0 ( [ℎ∗ (+̃8) |4] − sup4′  [ℎ(+̃8) |4′]), which is
equivalent to ours since sup4′  [ℎ(+̃8) |4′] is independent of 4.
29. A naive interpretation is to think of 48 as the inverse of f, which is unobservable to shareholders.
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2.3 Equilibrium Investment Choices
In this section, we compare the equilibrium profile of investments selected in the presence of frictions
with the efficient profile of investments, 2" defined in (2.5). We first emphasize the essential
difference between models with default costs or limited liability and those with interest conflicts or




8 9+ 9 + 08 [`(f8) + 18 +f8I8] . (2.8)
In model # 1, each firm 8 chooses an investment to maximize  [+8]. We use model #1 to understand





8 9+̃ 9 + 08 [`(f8) + 18 +f8I8] . (2.9)
In model # 2, the manager of firm 8 (not the firm itself), chooses an investment to maximize  [+8].
We use model #2 to evaluate the impact interest conflicts and moral hazard.
In both models, agents choose investment to maximize  [+8] =  [+̃8 − 6(+̃8)]. We emphasize
that the difference in 2.8 and 2.9 seems small, but the impact on the propagation of shocks are
significant.
Definition 2.3.1. A profile of investments 24 = (f41 ,f
4
2 , . . . ,f
4
= ) forms an equilibrium if for all
8 ∈ # , holding f4−8 fixed, f48 = argmaxf  [+8] =  [+̃8 −6(+̃8)] .
2.3.1 Model # 1
We briefly discuss model #1 and argue that shocks will be dampened in propagation. Equation (2.8)
associated with model # 1 is non-linear and can have multiple solutions for each given investment
profile 2 = (f1, ...,f=). In the appendix (see Lemma E.1), we provide conditions which allow us to
make a consistent selection from the solution set or guarantee the uniqueness of the solution.
In model # 1, an exogenous shock that lowers the value of a firm is not propagated because the
effect of the initial shock is muted by the investment choices of each firm. To see why, suppose a
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downward shock to 08 or 18 . The first kind of shock can be interpreted as a reduction in the quantity
of the firm’s operating assets. The second as a drop in the risk free rate. Both lower the value of
firm 8 holding everything else fixed. Without loss of generality, let us focus on a drop in 18 . Denote
the optimal value of firm 8 by
! (f∗8 ;18) =max
f8
+8 =  [+̃8 −6(+̃8)],
with +̃8 =
∑
98 9+ 9 +08G8 (f8). For economy of exposition we don’t explicitly write out all variables
that influence the optimum value !. Denote the optimal value of f8 by f∗8 (18). Let Δ18 < 0 be the
change in value of 18 . The change in firm 8’s optimal value is





(18), 18+Δ18)−! (f∗(18), 18) andΔ!'8 = ! (f∗8 (18+Δ18), 18+Δ18)−! (f∗(18), 18+
Δ18). The first term, Δ!#'8 , captures the value drop in the absence of any change in 8’s investment
choice. The term Δ!'
8
(> 0) is the increase in value due to a best response by firm 8. The magnitude
of the second term relative to the first term depends on the function 6 and `. Overall, due to
the action response and alignment of objectives between managers and shareholders, the drop in
expected value should be smaller than it would be under the regime with no action response.
Consider a firm holding an equity stake in firm 8 and label it ℎ(8). From the first order condition
for optimality, we know thatf∗
ℎ (8) should respond to a change in the expected value of its subsidiaries.
Denote by f∗
ℎ (8) (!8) the optimal choice of f
∗
ℎ (8) as a function of !8 . Then,
Δ!ℎ (8) = ! (f∗ℎ (8) (!8 +Δ!8), !8 +Δ!8) − ! (f
∗






ℎ (8) = ! (f
∗
ℎ (8) (!8), !8 +Δ!8) − ! (f
∗





ℎ (8) = ! (f
∗
ℎ (8) (!8 +Δ!8), !8 +Δ!8) − ! (f
∗
ℎ (8) (!8), !8 +Δ!8) > 0.
The last inequality follows from optimality of f∗








Δ!'8 +Δ!'ℎ (8) .





ℎ (8) > 0. The first positive term
comes from the best response of firm 8 which creates a positive value for ℎ(8), and the second term
comes from the best response of firm ℎ(8). In summary, the alignment of interests between managers
and shareholders retards the propagation of an initial negative shock via two channels - the action
choice of the firm exposed to the shock reduces the drop in expected value caused by the shock, and
this reduced drop increases the value for a holding firm via both equity holding and its best response.
The effectiveness ofmuting depends on the function 6 and `. The key insight is that the alignment
in interests between shareholders and managers induces managers to take actions to reduce the initial
impact of subsidiaries exposed to bad shocks.
2.3.2 Model # 2
In model #2, a unique \̃ = (+̃1, ...,+̃=) satisfying (2.9) for each realized x = (G1, G2, ..., G# ) exists
if the matrix (O −I) is non-singular. Non-singularity of (O −I) is a standard assumption, see for
example Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014).
Recall, +̃8 =
∑
98 9+̃ 9 +08 [`(f8) +18 +f8I8] . Inmatrix form, \̃ = Jx where +̃ is the vector whose
8Cℎ component is +̃8 , J = (O−I)−1 and x = (G1, ..., G=) where G8 = 08 [`(f8) + 18 +f8I8], ∀8 ∈ # .
In model # 2, the payoff of firm 8’s manager is +8 , differs from that of the shareholder,
which is +̃8 . The manager’s optimization problem is maxf8  [+8] =  [+̃8 − 6(+̃8)] . Now,  [+̃8] =∑
9 38 9 (0 9 [`(f9) + 1 9]). Thus, m+̃8mf8 = 38808 [`
′(f8) + I8]. The first order condition for optimality is
m [+8]
mf8
= 38808{`′(f8) [1− [6′(+̃8)]] − [6′(+̃8)I8]} = 0.






Here, we implicitly assume the optimum to be interior. Proposition E.1 in the appendix gives a
condition to guarantee the existence of an interior equilibrium profile. Appendix 2.8 gives the second
order condition.
For convenience, let 5 (8) =  [6
′ (+̃8)I8 ]
1− [6′ (+̃8) ]
, with all values evaluated at equilibrium. Therefore, the
first order condition can be written as `′(f̂8) = 5 (8).
Lemma 2.3.1. If 6 is convex, then m 5 (8)
mf8
> 0. If 6 is concave, then m 5 (8)
mf8
< 0 and the second order
condition implies `′(f8) is steeper than 5 (8).
All proofs appear in Appendix 2.8.
To determine how the riskiness of a chosen investment depends on 18 , which causes a change in
expected value in period 0, we need to evaluate m 5 (8)
m18
.
Proposition 2.3.1. 1. If 6 is convex, then f̂8 < f" . Furthermore, a drop in 18 (a decrease in
the risk free rate) induces firms to increase f̂8 .
2. If 6 is concave, then f̂8 > f" . Furthermore, a drop in 18 induces firms to choose more
riskier investments (increase f̂8).
To close this subsection, we state how the equilibrium profile 24 = (f41 , ...,f
4
= ) deviate from the
efficient investment choice (benchmark).
Proposition 2.3.2. the following holds:
1. If the friction function 6 is convex, each firm chooses a less risky investment than the benchmark
without frictions, i.e., f4
8
< f" , ∀8 ∈ #.
2. If the friction function 6 is concave, each firm chooses riskier investments than the benchmark
without frictions, i.e., f4
8
> f" , ∀8 ∈ #.
3. If the friction function 6 is linear, f4
8
= f" , ∀8 ∈ #.
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2.4 Quadratic Friction Function
For analytical tractability in model #2, we focus on the special case when the friction function is
quadratic. Specifically, 6(+̃8) = +̃8 (_− ^+̃8/208).30 Note, 6 is convex if ^ < 0 and concave if ^ > 0.
When ^ > 0, 6 can be interpreted as a randomization over the proportional cost (borne by managers)
 [_0+̃8j+̃8<08 g80 |+̃8] with g80 following a uniform distribution over [0,2/^0] and ^ = _0^0.31 It
can also be interpreted as a private benefit  [_1j+̃8>08 g81 |+̃8] that is realized when the cash flow
exceeds some threshold. In either case, ^ captures the extent of the misalignment of incentives
between manager and firm. As discussed in 2.7, the parameter _ declines when the share in hands
of managers increases. In the moral hazard case, a positive ^ also capture the cost paid by the firm
(shareholders) to motivate managers as in 2.2.1.
For now we investigate how firm 8’s investment choice will change in response to a shock
holding the investment choices of other firms fixed. When 6 is quadratic, 6′′ is constant, thus,





9 38 90 9 [`(f̂9) + 1 9]
. (2.10)
The next proposition states how investment selection responds to an initial shock to 08 . A drop
in 08 has two effects: a decrease in expected value and a drop in the volatility of the cash flow of the
associated investment.
Proposition 2.4.1.
1. If 6 is convex and quadratic, then m 5 (8)
m08
> 0. As 08 decreases, f̂8 increases and approaches
the benchmark f" .
2. If 6 is concave and quadratic, then m 5 (8)
m08
< 0. A decrease in 08 will induce less risk taking,
i.e., f̂8 declines toward the benchmark f" .
30. There are two ways to avoid the effect of value inflation arise from network structure. One is to set 6(+̃8) =
+̃8 (_− ̂88^+̃8/208), with ̂88 = 1−
∑
9  98 as in Elliott et al. (2014). Another is to set 6(+̃8) = +̃8 (_− ^+̃8/20̃8), with
0̃8 =
∑
9 38 90 9 , Both help cancel out the effect of value inflation from network structure. Our main results are robust
to these alternatives.
31. Another interpretation is to view _0+̃8 as the portion of firm value n kept by the manager. The quadratic term can be
generated if the density of g80 declines linearly.
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When 6 is concave and quadratic, an increase in 08 leads to an increase in 08`(f8) which induces
the manager to choose less risky investments. However, an increase in 08 , increases 08f8I8 , i.e.
raises volatility. This increases the chances of failure, inducing more risk taking.
2.4.1 Network Effects in Equilibrium
We examine equilibrium investment choices under the quadratic friction function. Equilibrium exis-
tence follows from continuity and concavity of each manager’s payoff function. For the comparative
statics we will need an ‘interior’ equilibrium profile. The appendix contains a sufficient condition
to guarantee an interior equilibrium profile and the uniqueness. Denote the equilibrium investment
choice of the manager of firm 8 by f4
8
.
Proposition 2.4.2. If 24 = (f41 , ...,f
4
= ) is an equilibrium investment profile that is interior, then,






9 38 90 9 [`(f49 ) + 1 9]
= 5 (8). (2.11)
1. Firm 8 takes excessive risk if ^ > 0, that is f4
8
> f" .
2. Firm 8 takes insufficient risk if ^ < 0, that is f4
8
< f" .
Suppose firm 8 has a stake in firm : (directly or indirectly). To understand how the equilib-









, ∀8 ∈ #, : ∈ #. This is done in the next lemma.
Lemma 2.4.1. Let 58 9 = m 5 (8)mf 9 , 88 =
−^











[`′(f8) (`(f:) + 1:) +f:X8:]
`′(f8)2 +1
,
and m18: = 0: 8808
`′ (f8)
`′ (f8)2+1
. For convenience of notation, all terms of 8 9 , m08: , m18: are evaluated
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+ 38:m18: . (2.13)
The proof of this lemma involves some lengthy calculus derivation and is in the online appendix
E.3.
Equations (2.12) and (2.13) of Theorem 2.4.1 reveal three channels by which a change in 0: or
1: affects firm 8. The first is direct, captured by m08: and m18: , respectively. In the absence of a









+ m 5 (8)
m0:
. (2.14)
The second term on the right hand side of (2.14) is a direct effect due to a value change in firm : .
The initial response by 8 will further change firm 8’s value which in turn induces a further change in




on the right hand side. The total effect is m08: . The second,
which we call the value channel is captured by 38:m08: (38:m18:). Recall that 38 9 is the share of
firm 9 held by 8 directly or indirectly since J = (O−I)−1 = O +I +I2 + . . . . Thus, for : ≠ 8
38: = 8: +
∑
9
8 9 9: + . . . .
The first term is the direct holding, the remaining terms are indirect holdings. If there were no
investment choices made by other firms, the change in investment taken by firm 8 will be
38:m08: = 8:m08: + [
∑
9
8 9 9:]m08: + . . . .
The first term captures the direct value effect due to 8’s direct holding of firm : , the remaining terms
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capture the second and higher order indirect value effects due to indirect holdings.
The third way is via the investments taken by other firms (called the investment channel). A
change in investment by firm 9 will change the value of firm 8 if 38 9 ≠ 0 which in turn induces 8 to
alter its investment in response. This is captured by
∑









the effect of firm :’s investments on firm 8 via 9 which is proportional to 38 9 and 8 9 .
2.4.2 Propagation of Shocks
Equations (2.12) and (2.13) describe how the riskiness of an investment selected by the manager of
firm 8 changes in response to a shock to firm : . The magnitude and extent of the cascade that is
triggered depends on the severity of the interest conflict between manager and shareholders captured
by ^, and the structure of the equity holding network captured by 38 9 . This is formalized in the next
three propositions. For completeness, we will also discuss the case of ^ < 0 even though it admits
no natural interpretation.




Now, restrict attention to a setting in which all firms directly or indirectly hold shares of firm :
which is exposed to a shock. Denote by J̃ the =×=matrix whose (8, 9)Cℎ entry 3̃8 9 = 38 98 9 5 >A 9 ≠ 8
and 3̃88 = 0.
Definition 2.4.1. Call matrix J̃ the action (investment) weighted holding matrix, and 3̃8 9 the action
(investment) weighted amplification multipliers.
Lemma 2.4.2.
1. If the interest conflict is of linear, i.e. ^ = 0, then 8 9 = 0, 8, 9 ∈ # . The investment channel
disappears.
2. Suppose 38 9 > 0. Then, 3̃8 9 > (<)0 if and only if ^ > (<)0
Proposition 2.4.4 (Strategic Substitutes or Complements). Suppose the friction function 6 is
quadratic, the second order condition holds and 38 9 > 0. Then, f̂8 and f̂9 are strategic complements
(substitute) if and only if ^ > (<)0.
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Assumption 2.4.1. (O− J̃) is invertible.




= [O− J̃]−1+0: , m2
4
m1:
= [O− J̃]−1+1: ,
where24 = (f41 , ...,f
4
= ) ′,+0: = (31:m01: , ..., 3=:m0=:) ′ and+1: = (31:m11: , ..., 3=:m1=:) ′ capture
the net network effect without the investment effect as a response.
Suppose a shock to 1: , say a drop in its value. Firm : will choose a riskier investment no matter
the sign of ^ since m1:: < 0. A firm 8 holding shares of firm : will also choose a riskier investment
as a response to a drop in 1: since 38:m18: < 0. For ^ < 0, an increase in risk taking by : , will
boost the firm’s value since previously it took less risk (choosing an investment with risk below the
benchmark), canceling out the initial value drop effect. This boosting effect will reduce the incentive
for risk taking. For ^ > 0, an increase in risk taking by : moves it farther away from the benchmark
investment (since f4
:
is larger than the benchmark). This lowers both the firm’s value, as well as
the value of firms that have a stake in : . This further drop in value induces even more risk taking,
leading to a further drop in firm value.













Proposition 2.4.5. Under assumption 2.4.1
1. if ^ > 0, the shock to 1: will be propagated by the chosen investments in response.
2. If ^ < 0, the shock to 1: will be mitigated by the chosen investments in response.
The insight here is that f̂8 and f̂9 are strategic complements (substitute) when ^ > (<)0. Thus,
a bad shock to 1: induces a high f̂: initially, which in turn further induces a high(low) f̂9 , 9 ≠ :
when ^ > (<)0, strengthening(weakening) the impact of the initial shock.
Although ^ > (<) 0 both reflect misalignment between managers and shareholders, the underly-
ing conflicts are different. When ^ > 0, the manager takes more risk than the benchmark investment,
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a drop in 18 (a drop in expected value) induces higher risk taking, deteriorating the interest conflicts
further. For example, in an economy with convex adjustment cost of investment, ^ > 0 corresponds
to excessive investment or risk taken by managers. In contrast, when ^ < 0, the manager takes less
risk than the benchmark investment, a drop in 18 induces less risk taking which in turn reduces the
interest conflicts between managers and shareholders.
Proposition 2.4.6. ∀8, 9 , : ∈ # , we have
1. If ^ > 0, we have 88 > 0, furthermore, 8 9 > 0, m18: < 0 and m08: < 0, 0=3 m088 > 0.
2. If ^ < 0, we have 88 < 0, furthermore, 8 9 < 0 m18: < 0, and m08: < 0.
2.5 Equity Holding Network Structure
We examine the role of network structure in propagating shocks. In the absence of investments,
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) find that a denser network will facilitate the prop-
agation of the shock if the shock is large enough because more firms are exposed to the initial
shock when the network becomes denser. Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) argue that integration
mitigates the initial failure of the firm itself since it is less dependent on its own loss, but promotes
the propagation of failure conditional on an initial failure. They also find that diversification can
encourage propagation because more firms are exposed to the failures.
We allow firms to choose investments in response to the initial shock, which endogenizes its
propagation and further risk taking after initial shock. As the optimum investment profile depends on
the network structure, investment choices can counteract the features of the network that propagate
shocks.
Denote the set of all equity holding networks by
C = {C : C is the holding networks with set of firms # = {1,2, ..., =}}.
Obviously, C is convex since the convex combination, CC1 + (1− C)C2, C ∈ (0,1), of two holding
networks C1 and C2 is also an equity holding network. Denote the correspondence that associates
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with each C the set of equilibrium investment profiles, expected return, and marginal return as
24 (C) = (f41 (C), ...,f
4
= (C)),u4 (C) = (`41 (C), ..., `
4
= (C)), and u′4 (C) = (`′1
4 (C), ..., `′=4 (C)). We
assume the equilibrium investment profile is unique for each C. This is true for the examples below.
To isolate the effect of firm size assume 08 = 0, 18 = 1∀8 ∈ # . Therefore, the only difference
between firms is their position in the equity-holding network. Under this assumption the equilibrium
profile of investments (2.11) will satisfy:




(1−_) + ^∑ 9 38 9 [`(f49 ) + 1] , (2.15)
recall 388 is the 8th diagonal element of D ≡ (I−C)−1.
The investment weighted amplification multiplier can be written as
3̃8 9 = 38 98 9 =
38 9
388
`′(f8) [`′(f8)`′(f9) + X8 9]
f8`
′′(f8) − `′(f8) [`′(f8)2 +1]
, 9 ≠ 8 and 3̃88 = 0. (2.16)
All variables are evaluated at the equilibrium.
Using the equilibrium profile in (2.15), we study how network structure affects the propagation
of initial shocks via the investment weighted amplification multipliers in (2.16).
2.5.1 Network Structure and Risk Taking
To understand how network structure influences risk taking, rewrite (2.15) in matrix notation. Let
us define the response vector as R(2) = ('(f1), '(f2), ..., '(f=)) ′ with '(f) ≡ − f`′ (f) . Thus, the








32. Firm value can be inflated due to double counting in the cross-holding network. Our results thus far hold since
the adjustment for the double count only depends on  that is a constant for a fixed . However, when comparing
two networks, the double counting may obscure the conclusions of this section. In appendix E.4, we show that the
results in this section remain true even after deflating the double-counting effect. The intuition is that the equilibrium
investment choices can be still characterized by an equation that is similar to equation E.4.
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with diag(D) = diag(311, ..., 3==), 1 is a vector of length = with all entries being 1, and u =
(D1, D2, ..., D=) with D8 = `8 + 1.
In the following we omit the superscript 4 when it will not cause confusion.
Lemma 2.5.1. if ^ > 0, '(f) = −f/`′(f) decreases in f when f > f" . Furthermore, '′(f) <
`′(f) < 0 when f > f" , i.e. '(f) drops faster than `(f) as f increases.
Proof. This statement is obvious from the fact that 3̃8 9 > 0 and `′(f8) < 0 at equilibrium for ^ > 0.
Thus, we have f8`′′(f8) − `′(f8) [`′(f8)2 +1] < 0 when f8 > f" , which implies the statement in
lemma.

As discussed in proposition 2.3.2, in equilibrium with ^ > 0 (^ < 0), the investment chosen must
be f4 > (<)f" , thus, the expected return is always monotonic decreasing (increasing) in f in the
region of equilibrium. We can treat '(f8) as a function of D8 because f8 = `−1(D8) using the inverse
function theorem. Without confusion, we define
'(D8) = '(`−1(D8)) := −`−1(D8)/`′(`−1(D8)) (2.18)
with D8 = `8 + 18 .







with R(u) = ('(D1), ..., '(D=)) = ('(`−1(D1)), ..., '(`−1(D=))) ′, and '
′ (D8) > 1.
Lemma 2.5.2 is useful in linking investment decisions to network structure. Given the underlying
equity network we use the equation in Lemma 2.5.2 to pin down the expected equilibrium return,
then, recover the level of risk chosen, f8 , using `8 = `(f8) and f8 > f" . Lemma 2.5.2 also
provides us intuition on how network structure affects a firm’s risk taking. There are two forces -
exposure to itself and others.
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1. 388 captures all the direct and indirect exposure of firm 8 to itself. Being more exposed to 8
itself would exacerbate the conflicts between managers and shareholders (see 2.15), induce
more risk taking, and push down the expected equilibrium return of firm 8.
2. 38 9 , 9 ≠ 8 captures the direct and indirect exposure of firm 8 to another firm 9 . Being more
exposed to other firms, in contrast, would mitigate the conflicts between managers and share-
holders, induce firms to take less risk and push up the expected return in equilibrium.
We are now ready to provide general results for the effects of network structure on the investments
decisions and expected returns. We start with acyclic holding networks C’s for Propositions 2.5.1
and 2.5.2. Then we argue that the insights generalize to cyclic holding networks.
We begin with the following monotonicity result: firms have higher expected returns and take
less risks when they hold more of others’ equity.
Proposition 2.5.1 (Monotonicity). 1. Consider the class of acyclic holding networks, that is,
388 = 1, ∀8 ∈ # . For any two holding networks C and C′ such that
 ′8 9 ≥ 8 9 ∀8, 9 ,and ∃8, 9 , B.C. ′8 9 > 8 9
then, u(C′) ≥ u(C) and ∃8, B.C.`′
8
> `8 . On risk taking, we have f48 (C′) ≤ f48 (C) with strictly
inequality for at least one 8.
2. Within the same holding networks, suppose 38′ 9 ≥ 38 9 , ∀ 9 , then `8′ ≥ `8 .
A special case is the subclass of acyclic networks CC = CC, C ∈ [0,1] for any given acyclic equity
holding network C. C acyclic implies CC is acyclic for each C, thus 388 (CC ) is always 1 for all C. With
an increase in C, the network becomes denser as in Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015).
It is also more integrated as in Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) because a higher share of each
firm is held by others as C increases. The optimal amount of risk selected by firms declines and the
expected equilibrium return increases, implying that `′(f8) increases towards 0.
The result differs from Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) and Elliott, Golub, and
Jackson (2014). The first argues that a denser network facilitates the propagation of a large shock.
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The second states that a more integrated network will be less vulnerable to an initial shock, but
facilitates the propagation of it to others once failure occurs since firms are more exposed to failures
of the counter-parties. However, when the risk is endogenized, the effect of the shock is diminished
due to less risk taking when firms are more exposed to others. As shown in sections 2.5.2 and
2.5.2, less risk taking will push down the investment weighted amplification multipliers although
the denser networks boosts the value of 38 9
388
. Overall, the change in the investment amplification
multiplier, 3̃8 9 , as C increases, is ambiguous.
The intuition here is as follows. When the holding network is acyclic, a denser network makes
firms more exposed to others but does not change firms’ exposure to themselves (388 = 1). An
increase in the exposure to others induces managers to be more cautious, take less risk, and push up
the equilibrium return.
We next examine the effect of diversification via convexification of two holding networks. Let
us define
C(C) = CC1 + (1− C)C2.
Convexification changes equilibrium investments via two channels.
• First, convexification inflates the value ofDwhich in turn reduces the interest conflicts between
managers and shareholders, leading to a higher expected return in equilibrium and lower risk
taking. Mathematically,
D(C) = ( −C(C))−1 ≥ C (I−C1)−1 + (1− C) ( −C2)−1 = CD1 + (1− C)D2.
Here, we say A ≥ B if and only if 8 9 ≥ 8 9 , ∀8, 9 . This value boosting effect can be seen
clearly in lemma 2.5.2 through boosting Du+ 1−_
_^
1
• Second, convexification depresses the expected return via decreasing diag(D)−1.
Thus, in general, the net effect of convexification is ambiguous, but for acyclic networks, we have
the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.5.2. Suppose C1 and C2 are acyclic networks and induce the same equilibrium
investment decision,i.e. 24 (C1) = 24 (C2), then, a convex combination C(C) = CC1 + (1− C)C2 will




(C1) ∀8 ∈ # .
The results hold for the class of acyclic networks since the convex combination of two acyclic
networks is still acyclic and 388 = 1 for all acyclic networks. Thus, a convex combination will push
up D but leave diag(D) unchanged.
Cyclic networks. Nowwe turn to cyclic networksC (see assumption 2.2.3), with
∑
9 98 > 0,∀8 ∈ #
such that each firm is held by at least one other firm.
The following result shows that expected returns increase and the risks decline as we uniformly
increase link intensities for any holding network.
Proposition 2.5.3. Given any holding network C, there exists C0 > 0 such that for the class of
networks CC = CC, C ≤ C0, as C increases, the equilibrium investment profile 24 (CC ) declines and
expected return increases.
For more general cases in cyclic networks, things become more complicated when the network
becomes denser since it will make each firm more exposed to both itself and others. Being more
exposed to firm 8 itself would induce more risk taking while being more exposed to others would
induce less risk, overall, the net effect depends on the relative magnitude of these two effects.
Here we present an example to illustrate the intuition.
Example 1 (Ring networks). LetCC be a ring network indexed by link intensity C: 12(C) =88+1(C) =
. . . = =1(C) = C > 0.
The expected returns in equilibrium increase with C for relatively small C.
To be specific, due to the symmetry we have the equilibrium return D1 = . . . = D= ≡ D(C), which
depends on C. We claim that D′(C) > 0 for small C, but not necessary for large C. The intuition is that
when C is small, the exposure to firm 8 itself would be negligible compared to the exposure to others.
When C is large enough, the effect associated with exposure to the firm itself would dominate the
effect of the exposure to others.
83
Figure 2.1 plots the expected return D(C) as a function of the link density C. A“relatively small”
C refers to any C that is below a threshold of approximately 0.95 in this example. For such C’s, the
equilibrium expected return increases in C. However, as C hits the threshold, the equilibrium expected
return drops significantly.
Figure 2.1: The Effect of Link Density in Ring Network
Note: This figure plots D(C) as a function of the link density C in example 1. The expected return increases in C when C
is smaller than a threshold of approximately 0.95. We assume a power function for the expected return `(f8) = −VfW8
(when f8 > f" ), which implies '(D) = 2(1 − D)2/W−1 with 2 and 1 constants. We set W = 4 and 2 = 213/2 such that
'′(0) = 1 and '′(D) > 1 when D < 1. In addition, 1−_^ = 0.3, 1 = 0.4
1−_
^ = 0.12, and the number of firms = = 100.
Now we turn to the effect of diversification. Consider the class of “regular ring lattice” holding
networks. In the : Cℎ network, each firm is exposed to 2: < = adjacent firms. The figure displays a
regular ring lattice with : = 2 and = = 20.
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Figure 2.2: An Illustration of Regular Ring Lattice
Figure 2.3: Effect of Diversification in Regular Ring Lattice
Note: This figure illustrates how the equilibrium expected return D changes in the number of neighbors : in example
2. The left panel shows the D increases sharply with : , and then becomes stable as : increases further. This pattern
corresponds with the changes of self-exposure 88 in : , plotted in the right panel. This figure assumes the same functional
form and parameters as in Figure 2.1, and in addition sets 20 = 0.8.
To make the comparison we fix the total exposure of each firm as 20 > 0.
Example 2 (Regular ring lattice). Consider a class of regular ring lattice holding networks {C: }
indexed by the level of diversification : . That is, in C: each agent is linked with 2: adjacent firms:
8 9 (:) = 202: ·1{|8− 9 | ≤ : or |8− 9 | ≥ =− :}.
As the holding network becomes more diversified (i.e. : increases), the expected return will
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increase.
Recall J: ≡ (O −I:)−1, whose 8 9-th element 8 9 (:) represents 8’s exposure to 9 . Due to the







ª®¬D + 1−_^ .
Lemma 2.5.3. For the regular ring lattice in the example 2, the row sum of the Leontief matrix J:
is constant, i.e.,
∑=
9=18 9 (:) = 11−20 .
From Lemma 2.5.3, as : increases, the total exposure,
∑
9 8 9 (:), holds constant, but the
exposure to self 88 (:) declines. This is illustrated in the right-panel of Figure 2.3. As a result, as
the regular ring lattice becomes more diversified (increases in :), the expected return will increase
(the left panel of Figure 2.3).
2.5.2 Network Structure and Propagation of Shocks
Here we examine how network structure affects the propagation of initial shocks. The key is to
examine the investment weighted amplification matrix with entry (8, 9) in equation (2.16). The
propagation of the shock from 9 to 8 depends on three terms:
1. 38 9 - The net share claim of firm 8 in 9 via direct and indirect holdings. The larger the net
claim is, the larger the exposure of firm 8 to 9 itself.
2. 388 - The net share claim of firm 8 in 8 itself. The larger the exposure to itself is, the smaller its
exposure to others.
3. The investment multiplier is captured by %8 9 =
`′ (f8) [`′ (f8)`′ (f 9 )+X8 9 ]
f8`
′′ (f8)−`′ (f8) [`′ (f8)2+1]
, which depends both
on network structure and the function `. Note, 3̃88 = 0 by definition.
A large 38 9 , 9 ≠ 8 and small 388 induces firm 8 to take less risk in equilibrium. On the other hand,
it makes firm 8 more vulnerable to the shocks suffered by firm 9 , holding investments fixed. Thus,
without imposing more specific restrictions on `(f), little can be said about %8 9 and 3̃8 9 since the
investment effect may move against 38 9 .
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Here, we provide two examples that show that the investmentmultiplier can be inflated or deflated
when 38 9 , 9 ≠ 8 increases.
Power Return




, ∀ 9 ≠ 8.
To guarantee the second order condition to be true, W, V and f" should be chosen such that
(W − 2) − `′(f8)2 > 0 in our interested region where equilibrium exists. Under this specific form,
it is easy to check '(D) in 2.18 is monotonic increase and convex with respect to D since '(D) =
2(1−D)2/W−1 with 2 and 1 constants.
Lemma 2.5.4. Suppose ^ > 0, under the power form, %8 9 monotonically decreases with respect to
both `′(f8) and `′(f9) when `′(f8) < 0 and `′(f9) < 0.
Note our analysis has been made in equilibrium, we only need to take account of `′(f8) < 0.
Quadratic Return




, ∀ 9 ≠ 8.
Lemma 2.5.5. Suppose `(f8) = −W(f8 −f" )2/2 and ^ > 0. Then, %8 9 monotonically decreases
in both `′(f8) and `′(f9) when `′(f8) < 0 and `′(f9) < 0.








Similar to the power case, '(D) is convex with respect to D.
Propagation of Shocks
Lemma 2.5.6. Under the quadratic or the general power form of `(f), the equilibrium expected






with R(u) = ('(D1), . . . , '(D=)) ′. '(D8) satisfies
'′(D8) > 1 and '′′(D8) > 0.
Note that strict convexity of ' guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibrium expected return
profile if it exists. Thus, the equilibrium investment profile will be unique if it exists and is interior.
Consider two acyclic holding networks C and C′ such that  ′
8 9
≥ 8 9 . In equilibrium, u(C′) ≥
u(C), thus, we have `′(f8 (C′)) ≥ `′(f8 (C)), implying %8 9 (C′) ≤ %8 9 (C). In summary, although
a denser network facilitates the propagation of shock via pure network effect 8 9 , the optimal
investments taken will move against this amplification via two channels - first, a denser network will
induce firms to take less risk, leading to a smaller endogenized shock in period 2 on average; second,
it also implies a lower investment amplification multiplier %8 9 , mitigating the effect of 8 9 . Overall,
the net effect on the amplification multiplier 3̃8 9 is ambiguous when we move to a denser networks
for the two examples we examine.
We close this section with a general theorem that links network structure, risk taking and
investment amplification multipliers.
Proposition 2.5.4. Suppose ^ > 0 and `(f8) is quadratic or the general power as in 2.5.2 and 2.5.2.
Consider two equity holding networks C and C′ and suppose C′ induces a higher (lower) level of
risk taking than C in equilibrium, that is, 2(C′) ≥ (≤)2(C), then for the investment amplification
multiplier, we have %8 9 (C′) ≥ (≤)%8 9 (C).
The reason is that a higher (lower) risk taking implies a lower (higher) marginal return `′(f),
which further implies a higher (lower) %8 9 . The theorem states that a network inducing riskier
investment activities makes firms more vulnerable to shocks exposure to the counterparties. There
are two things worth mentioning.
1. The endogenized shocks move in the same direction as the investment multipliers. When the
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endogenized shocks are large (high level of risk taking), the investment multipliers %8 9 also
become large.
2. In 2.5.4, we compare two networks C and C′ in very abstract way via the comparison of risk




and 38 9/388 . This is
quite different from our previous analysis where we start from C, and find that the denser or
integrated acyclic networks will induce less risk taking and smaller investment multipliers.
2.6 Consequences for Aggregate Economy
We conclude with an investigation of the impact of within firm conflicts on aggregate payoffs.
Interpret `(f8) to be the net expected return of investment f8 . For notational convenience, denote
`(f8) by `8 and assume 18 = 0 or let it be absorbed into the definition of `8 . If firm 8 chooses




08 (`(f8) +f8I8). (2.20)
Denote the initial exogenous shock to the log of asset values : X log(a) = (X log(01), ..., X log(0# )) ′,





= G8/H being firm 8’s fraction
of total output. We decompose the fluctuation of the aggregate output into three components
XH = XH (1) + XH (2) + XH (3) (2.21)
and
XH/H0 = XH (1)/H0 + XH (2)/H0 + XH (3)/H0 (2.22)
with H0 = H =
∑
8 08`8 , XH (1) =
∑




`′ (f8) X log(`8), and
XH (3) =
∑
8 08X`8 . The first term is the direct effect if there were no action taken, the second term
comes from the endogenous action, and the third term comes from the endogenous shocks induced





38 90 9D 9∑
: 38:0:`:
be the net share position of firm 8’s value in firm 9 through direct and indirect holdings - it measures
the fraction of firm i’s value that accrues to firm 9 .
Lemma 2.6.1. Suppose X log(08) are independent, BG8 =$ (1/=), and+0A (X log(08)) ≤  , we always




The following proposition states the aggregate effect when the agency conflict is non-negligible.
When the friction function takes a linear form, the second and the third terms disappear since there
is no change in actions.
Proposition 2.6.1. Under the case of power return (2.5.2), consider iid shocks X log(08) with finite
variance, and a symmetric network 33 with an exposure matrix of order B8 9 =$ (1/=),∀ 9 ≠ 8.
1. If there are no agency conflicts 34, the idiosyncratic shock always diminishes as =→∞.
2. If there are agency conflicts, under the quadratic friction function:
2.1 B88 =$ (1/
√
=), the idiosyncratic shockwill not diminish as =→∞, specifically, XH (3)/H0 =
`′2$ ? (1), and XH (2)/H0 = `′$ ? (1).
2.2. B88 =$ (1/=), the idiosyncratic shock will not diminish as =→∞, specifically, XH (3)/H0 =
`′2$ ? (
√
=), and XH (2)/H0 = `′$ ? (
√
=).
2.3. B88 = $ (1), the idiosyncratic shock will diminish as =→ ∞, specifically, XH (3)/H0 =
`′2>? (1), and XH (2)/H0 = `′>? (1).
The basic insight here is the aggregate effect due to the idiosyncratic shock will not diminish as
long as that the agency conflicts is non-negligible (`′ is not zero) and that the exposure to others
is large enough compare to the exposure to the firm itself (cases 2.1 and 2.2). This offers a new
perspective on the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Equity-holding between firms has been widely
documented in Japan, Korean, and recent China (see La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer
33. A network is symmetric if and only if the holding network is unchanged under a permutation of (1,2, . . . , #).
34. i.e., the friction function 6(+̃8)is linear or zero.
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(1999); Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000); Kim (2010); Allen et al. (2019a)). Misconduct by the
managers induced by bad corporate governance has also been widely remarked upon Mitton (2002);
Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000). A combination of well connected holding networks
and misconduct by managers could significantly amplify the aggregate effect of the initial shock
based on proposition 2.6.1
2.7 Conclusion
We developed a flexible model of equity holding networks, allowing each firm to take an investment
decision in response to an exogenous shock that incorporates various firm-level frictions. We first
show that the underlying friction plays a key role in the propagation of initial shocks. Specifically, we
find that the shock will be mitigated under the regimes of limited liability or default cost economy,
but be further amplified and propagated under the regimes of moral hazard or interest conflicts
between managers and shareholders.
In the regime with interest conflicts between managers and shareholders, we examined the role
of network structure in shaping investment decisions (risk-taking) and the propagation of shocks.
Even in acyclic networks, although a denser or integrated network can promote the propagation of
the initial shocks via the channel emphasized by Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014); Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015), such networks may mitigate the propagation of shocks via two
channels - a lower level of endogenized risk-taking and a smaller investment amplification multiplier
when allowing for investment taken as a response to the initial shock. Overall, the net effect on the
propagation of shocks will be ambiguous. Furthermore, in some cases (at least for quadratic and
power form of `), we prove that the endogenous risk-taking and propagation of shocks are highly
related, a network that induces riskier investment activities (i.e., creation of shocks), also make firms
more vulnerable to shocks exposure to the counterparties and facilitate the propagation of shocks.
Finally, we argue that the impact of these within-firm agency conflicts is non-negligible. The ag-
gregate effect of an idiosyncratic shock via propagation need not diminish under plausible conditions.
This suggests a potentially important role of corporate governance in macro fluctuations.
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2.8 Appendix: Omitted Proofs




|f8=f̂8 = 08388{`′′(f̂8) (1− [6′(+̃8)]) − 08388 [6′′(+̃8) (`′(f̂8) + I8)2]} < 0. (2.23)
Inequality (2.23) holds when 6 is convex. If 6 is concave, an additional assumption is needed to
guarantee global optimality.
Assumption 2.8.1. `′′(f̂8) − 08388  [6
′′ (+̃8) (`′ ( f̂8)+I8)2 ]
1− [6′ (+̃8) ]
< 0.35


















= 0 938 9 [`′(f9) + I 9] as well as 5 (8), we have
m 5 (8)
mf9
= 0 938 9
 [6′′(+̃8) (I8 + 5 (8)) (`′(f9) + I 9)]
1− [6′(+̃8)]
.
At the optimum, 5 (8) = `′(f8), therefore, m 5 (8)mf 9 = 0 938 9
 [6′′ (+̃8) (I8+`′ (f8)) (`′ (f 9 )+I 9 ) ]
1− [6′ (+̃8) ]
. The proposi-
tion follows from the fact that m 5 (8)
mf8
= 08388
 [6′′ (+̃8) (`′ (f8)+I8)2 ]
1− [6′ (+̃8) ]
< 0(> 0) if 6 is concave (convex).


















= 0 938 9 , yields m 5 (8)m18 = 08388`
′(f8)  [6
′′ (+̃8) ]
1− [6′ (+̃8) ]
> 0.
35. One sufficient condition to guarantee the global uniqueness of the optimum is `′′(f8)−08388  [6
′′ (+̃8) (`′ (f8)+I8)2 ]
1− [6′ (+̃8) ]
< 0.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3.2. The proposition follows from the fact that  [6′(+̃8)I8] < (> 0) if 6 is
concave (convex), `′(f" ) = 0 and `′′(f) < 0.
Proof ofProposition 2.4.1. Now, m 5 (8)
m0 9
= 11− [6′ (+̃8) ]
 [6′′(+̃8)I8 m+̃8m0 9 ] +
 [6′ (+̃8)I8 ]
[1− [ (6′ (+̃8))2 ]
 [6′′(+̃8) m+̃8m0 9 ] .
Using m+̃8
m0 9




 [6′′(+̃8) (I8 + `′(f8)) (`(f9) + 1 9 +f9 I 9)]
1− [6′(+̃8)]
.
For the quadratic case, i.e. 6′′ is constant, therefore,
m 5 (8)
m0 9
= 38 9 [6′′(+̃8)]
[`′(f8) (`(f9) + 1 9) +f9X8 9]
1− [6′(+̃8)]
.





[`′(f8) (`(f8) + 18) +f8]
1− [6′(+̃8)]
,
which is strictly positive for convex 6, and strictly negative for concave 6 (see appendix for proof).
For more general cases, the net effect is ambiguous.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2. The first order condition for optimality is `′(f8) =  [ (_−^+̃8/08)I8 ]1− [ (_−^+̃8/08) ] . In
addition, +̃8 =
∑




 [38 90 9 (`(f9) + 1 9 +f9 I 9)I8] = 08388f8 .




 [38 90 9 (`(f9) + 1 9 +f9 I 9)] =
∑
9
38 90 9 [`(f9) + 1 9]
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Thus, the equilibrium action, f4
8





9 38 9 [0 9`(f9) + 1 9]
.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.3. 38: = 0 implies 38 93 9: = 0 ∀ 9 ∈ # . If not, ∃ 9 ∈ #, B.C. 38 93 9: ≠ 0,
then, directly or indirectly, firm 8 holds a share of firm 9 , and firm 9 holds shares of firm : , implying
8 holds shares of : , leading to a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.2. From theorem 2.4.1, 88 > (<)0 if and only ^ > (<)0 which implies
8 9 > (<)0 if and only if ^ > (<)0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.4 At the optimum, we have `′(f8) = 5 (8). Taking partial derivatives
with respect to f9 , 9 ≠ 8, we have mf8mf 9 =
58 9
`′′ (f8)− 588 , where 58 9 =
m 5 (8)
mf 9
. The second order condition
(2.23) implies `′′(f8) − 588 < 0. From equation (E.6), if 38 9 > 0, we know that 58 9 < (>)0 if ^ > (<)0.
Thus, mf8
mf 9
> (<)0 if ^ > (<)0
Proof of Proposition 2.4.5 The total effect of a shock to 1: is
m24
m1:
= [O− J̃]−1+1: = [O + J̃ + J̃2 + ...]+1: (2.24)




= ) and+1: = (31:m11: , ..., 3=:m1=:) ′. +
1:
8
(= 38:m18: < 0) measures how
firm 8 responds to the shock to : ignoring the investment choices of all other firms. If ^ > 0, the
terms O, J̃, J̃2, ... on the right hand side of (2.24) accumulate since all entries are positive from
lemma 2.4.2. If ^ < 0, all entries of J̃ are negative from lemma 2.4.2, the signs of the (8, 9)Cℎ entry
[:]8 9 alternate and cancel out each other. As a result, the net effect will retard propagation of the
shock to 1: .
94
Proof of Proposition 2.4.6. The sign of 8 9 can be directly deduced from lemma 2.4.2 To determine
the sign of m18: , from theorem 2.4.1, observe that if ^ > 0, then 88 > 0 and `′(f8) < 0. If ^ < 0,then
88 < 0 and `′(f8) > 0. In both cases, we have m18: < 0. Note that m18: only depends on 8 not : . It
captures the effect due to a pure value change.
To determine the sign of m08: , from theorem 2.4.1, observe that : ≠ 8, X8: =  [I8I:] = 0.
Therefore, m08: = `(f:)m18: < 0. For : = 8, a drop (rise) in 08 has two effects - a drop (rise)
in expected value 08`(f8) and a drop (rise) in volatility 08f8 . The first effect is captured by
`(f:)m18: < 0 , while the second is captured by 881+`′ (f8)2f8 > (<)0 if ^ > (<)0. Thus, when ^ > 0,
the two direct effects on firm 8 itself due to an initial drop in 08 run in opposite directions. However,
the net effect is definitely positive if we use the first order condition (2.10):
`′(f8)`(f8) +f8 = f8
1−_)08 + ^
∑
9≠8 38 9 [0 9`(f9) + 1 9]
(1−_)08 + ^
∑
9 38 9 [0 9`(f9) + 1 9]
> 0.
Proof of Lemma2.5.2 The proof is obvious fromLemma 2.5.1 if we recall that '′(D8) = '
′ (f8)
`′ (f8) > 1.
To prove Proposition 2.5.1, we first state a lemma.
Lemma 2.8.1. Suppose C is an acyclic holding network spanned by firms # = {1, ..., =}, there exists
a permutation %: {1, ..., =} → {1, ..., =}(i.e., to reindex the n firms) such that the holding matrix of
the reindexed firms is upper triangular.
Specifically, denote C% as the holding matrix of the reindexed firms under permutation %, with
%,8 9 = %−1 (8)%−1 ( 9) . The lemma tells us we can reindex the firms such that the holding matrix of
the reindexed firms is upper triangular. That is, after reindexing, firm 9 can only hold shares of : > 9
but not hold ∀: < 9 .
Proof of proposition 2.5.1. Using the lemma 2.8.1, we next prove the proposition 2.5.1. Consider
two acyclic networks C′ and C with  ′
8 9
≥ 8 9 ,∀8, 9 ∈ # . Consider a permutation % such that C′%
is an upper triangular matrix. Since  ′
8 9
≥ 8 9 ∀8, 9 ∈ # , we have  ′%,8 9 ≥ %,8 9 , thus the reindexed
matrix C% of C is also upper triangular. Note that the equilibrium return profile associated with the












)−1, and the reindexed return profiles of u(C) and u(C′) as u(C%) and u(C′%), for the
acyclic networks, we have R(u(C%)) = D%u(C%) + 1−_^ 1 and R(u(C
′
%)) = D′%u(C′%) + 1−_^ 1
Note that 3 ′
%,8 9
≥ 3%,8 9 with 3 ′%,8 9 and 3%,8 9 the (8, 9) entry of D′% and D% who are both upper
triangular matrix. Furthermore, we have 3 ′
%,88
= 3%,88 = 1 ∀8 ∈ # . From the above two equations, we
know the =th elements of u(C%) and u(C′%) are the same, i.e., D= (C%) = D= (C′%).
Furthermore, '′(·) > 1, 3 ′




backward induction and note that 3 ′
%,8, 9
≥ 3%,8, 9 , it is easy to see D8 (C%) = D8 (C′%), ∀8 ∈ # . To close
the proof, we note that u(C′
%
) and u(C%) are just permutations of u(C′) and u(C), which implies
D8 (C′) ≥ D8 (C).




(I−CC)−1 =CD2C and 33C diag(DC )
−1 =−diag(DC )−2diag(C[I−





we only need to consider the sign of














with diag(R′(u)) = diag('′(D1), ..., '′(D=))). Thus, we have




Note that DC → I and M(C) →Cu as C→ 0 since diag(C) = 0, we have [diag(R′(u)) − I] 3u(C)3C |C=0 =
Cu From this, we have 3D8 (C)
3C
|C=0 > 0 if ∃ 9 ∈ # such that 8 9 > 0 and u >> 0.
Proof of Example 1. Let vt = (C0, C1, ..., C=−1), and define the right-shift operator (':
('vt = (C=−1, C0, C1, ..., C=−2).
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Then the 8Cℎ row of JC is JC ,8 = 11−C= (
8−1
'
vC , with (8−1' as the 8−1 times of right-shift operations. From
2.5.2 and the symmetry, D(C) satisfies '(D) = 1−C=1−C D+ (1− C
=) 1−_
^
. The expected return is determined
by the intersection of two curves: '(D) and 1−C=1−C D + (1− C
=) 1−_
^
. The curve 1−C=1−C D + (1− C
=) 1−_
^
consists two parts: 1−C=1−C D increases while (1− C
=) 1−_
^
decreases with C. When C is small, the first
term dominates, thus, the equilibria returns increase with C for small C.
Proof of Example 2 (Lemma 2.5.3). Note that (O −I:)J:1 = 1, with 1 = (1, ...,1) ′. The
row sum of J is the same across rows due to the invariance under right-shift operation, that is,
J:1 = (
∑
9 1 9 (:))1. Therefore it is without loss of generality to focus on the first row. Furthermore,
(1−I:)1 = (1− 20)1 since the sum of each row for I: is 20 from definition of regular ring lattice.
Thus, we have (1− 20)
∑
9 1 9 (:)1 = 1 which implies
∑
9 1 9 (:) = 11−20 ,∀: .
Proof of Results in Section 2.6. In the following, for abbreviation, the approximately equal
between two terms means the same order of magnitude. In this section, we estimate the aggregate


















We examine how the vector of returns - = (`1, `2, ..., `=) ′ responds to initial shocks, rather than
actions.
From equation (2.15), we have (1−_)08 + ^
∑
9 38 90 9` 9 = ^08388'(`8). To see how the equilib-




38 9` 90 9 (X log(0 9) + X log(` 9)) = ^08388`8'′(`8)X log(`8) + ^08388'(`8)X log(08).
Thus,
∑
9 38 9` 90 9 (X log(0 9) + X log(` 9)) = 08388`8'′(`8)X log(`8) + (
∑
9 38 9` 90 9)X log(08).
The expression for B8 9 can be rewritten as
∑
9
B8 9 (X log(0 9) + X log(` 9)) = B88'′(`8)X log(`8) + X log(08). (2.27)
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Therefore,









f`′′(f) − `′(f) . (2.29)
For simplicity, we consider the power case of 2.5.2, then '′(`)−1 = W0`′(f)2, with W0 a constant.
From equation (2.15), when ^ is very small, `′(f8) ≈ ^ 388f81−_ , the propagation effect from the
counterparties due to agency conflicts disappears. When ^ is large enough, `′
8
≈ −B88 f8`8 , the
magnitude of `′ in equilibrium increases when the economy suffers a sudden drop in ` or increase
in f - a worsening off in investment opportunity. We also note that when the share held by the
manager declines, _ increases which elevates `′(f8).
Lemma 2.8.2. Under the case of power return (2.5.2), we have





The magnitude of X log(-) can be estimated as follows:













ii. When the agency conflict is non-negligible, roughly,




diag(Y) (O− Y)X log(a)









Interpret B88 , the (8, 8)Cℎ entry of matrix Y, as the exposure of firm 8 to itself, and B8 9 , 8 ≠ 9 as
the exposure of firm 8 to 9 . We see a similar intuition in Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014). High
exposure to a counterparty will promote the propagation of the initial shocks. However, exposure to
the firm itself has two counter effects, captured by diag(Y) (O− Y).
Let us consider the aggregate effect when the agency conflict is non-negligible. We examine
the case when =→∞, so the share of each firm diminishes to zero at rate $ (1/=). Let us consider
the symmetric networks where `′
8
are the same across firms, and B8 9 =$ (1/=), 9 ≠ 8, B88 =$ (1/
√
=).
This assumption implies firm’s exposure to itself should be much larger than that to any other firm,
but much less to the aggregate exposure to others. We further assume X log(08), 8 ∈ # are iid random
variables with bounded second order moment. We have YX log(a) = $ ? (1/
√
































≈ `′2$ ? (
√
=su
′X(log(a)) = `′2$ ? (1). Similarly, we have XH
(2)
H0













X log(08). In the general case,
we have +0A ( XH
(1)
H0
) =$ (∑8 (BG8 )2).
Proof of Proposition 2.6.1. Since X log(08), 8 ∈ # are  . . random variables with finite variance,
we have YX log(a) = $ ? (1/
√
=) if B8 9 = $ (1/=), ∀ 9 ≠ 8 and B88 = $ (1/=) or $ (1/
√
=). If B88 =
$ (1),∀8 ∈ # , then Y log(a) = $ ? (1). Here, YX log(a) = $ ? (1/
√
=) means that each entry of the




Case 1. First consider B88 =$ (1/
√








The third line comes from (O− Y)X log(a) ≈ X log(a) by omitting the term YX log(a) with the order
of $ ? (1/
√
=). We also use the symmetry of the networks such that diag(Y) = B88 O and `′8’s are the
same across firms.












≈ [(W0`′2)−1−1]−1su ′$ (
√
=)X(log(a)) ≈ [(W0`′2)−1−1]−1su ′$ (=)
√
1/=X(log(a)) (2.32)












$ ? (1) (2.33)













Case 2. B88 =$ (1/=),∀8 ∈ # . We still have YX log(a) =$ ? (1/
√
=) and the approximation in 2.35








≈ W0`′2su ′$ (=)X(log(a)) ≈ W0`′2$ ? (
√
=) (2.34)
Similarly, we have ($ ? (
√
=) also depends on `′)
XH (2)
H0






















(1− B88)X(log(a)) ≈ $ ? (su ′X(log(a))) if B88 = $ (1). Since the
entry of su is $ (1/=), we have XH
(3)
H0






Tiered Intermediation in Business
Groups and Targeted SME Support
3.1 Introduction
The recent COVID-19 pandemic has posed an unprecedented challenge to policymakers ability to
provide support to businesses in crisis. In particular, the pandemic has led to a complete if temporary
shutdown of many businesses, hitting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with a smaller
balance sheet much harder than larger corporates. While monetary easing in general alleviates
stress on corporate balance sheets, SMEs tend to benefit little. Governments and central banks have
thus designed various schemes, including credit guarantees, debt payment deferrals, and directed
lending through special purpose vehicles, to support small businesses36. However, these programs
can expose the governments to credit risks, and, in addition, efficient targeting is quite difficult to
accomplish, as it relies on pre-existing, traditional intermediation infrastructure for implementation,
with inherent shortcomings. For example, banks are more familiar with larger corporate entities,
so getting them to lend others is difficult. The real outcomes of these schemes has shown mixed
evidence on their effectiveness (see Banerjee and Duflo (2014); Bhue, Prabhala, and Tantri (2016);
Chatzouz, Gereben, Lang, and Torfs (2017)).
36. World Bank: SME-Support Measures in Response to COVID-19
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Thus, the basic questions are posed: how to provide targeted and effective support to SMEs
and through what intermediaries? Our contribution in this paper is to show that bank credit in
some countries can reach relatively smaller firms through an alternative intermediation mechanism:
smaller firms in business groups without direct credit access but with high returns can be reached
through the internal equity markets, with the parent firm as intermediary. To the best of our
knowledge, this channel has thus far been left out of current discussions.
Elaborating on this background in a bit more detail, direct bank credit comes with the advantage
of risk-bearing and diversification, yet this has traditionally played a limited role in SME financing.
Bank credit generally favors larger, older, and more connected firms over the smaller and younger
ones, especially during crises (see Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (1998); Borensztein and Lee (2002);
De Haas and Van Horen (2012)). Besides, small business lending tends to be particularly sensitive
to bank liquidity shocks Khwaja and Mian (2008); Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen (2020). The
situation deteriorated further in the aftermath of the global financial crisis as bank supervisors
across the world tightened regulatory requirements (BIS, 2018). Finally, SMEs may receive bank
financing with government guarantees, but it tends to have little impact on real outcomes such
as output or investment (see D’Ignazio and Menon (2013); Chatzouz, Gereben, Lang, and Torfs
(2017)).
We provide in this chapter a new angle for supporting SMEs through the banking sector. We
show that SMEs partly owned by other corporates, although unable to directly borrow from banks,
can benefit indirectly from an increase in bank credit supply through the internal capital markets
of their business groups. A business group is formed by a parent company together with a group
of legally independent firms under the common ownership. We show that the parent companies in
business groups can function as intermediaries. When bank credit becomes more available, large
corporates increase borrowing from banks and channel credit to profitable subsidiaries in need. In
many countries, business groups have become a common corporate governance structure, including
Japan (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991)), South Korea (Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015)),
Chile (Buchuk, Larrain, Muñoz, and Urzúa (2014)), and Italy (Santioni, Schiantarelli, and Strahan
(2017)). In France, over 50 percent of the non-financial corporate loans are originated from other
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non-financial corporates, among which a significant fraction have the lender and the borrower in the
same business group (Eurostat, 2018). The corporate finance literature has studied the operation
and effectiveness of internal capital markets extensively. Nevertheless, the relationship with bank
lending and its implication for providing targeted external supports to SMEs has yet to be analyzed.
Our paper fills in the gap.
Using an administrative business registry dataset from China, we show that internal capital
markets in business groups take advantage of an increase in bank lending to pass credit to the smaller
businesses in their groups. Controlling for local economic conditions, we find that when bank
lending increases by 10%, parent companies exposed to such an event would see their unexposed
subsidiaries increasing investment by addition of 0.6 percent of their fixed assets. The increase is
substantial compared to the median (mean) value of their investment-to-fixed asset ratio, 1.4 (14)
percent. That is because the subsidiaries are mostly smaller businesses with fewer assets so the size
of investment is substantial.
What is the intuition behind the observed tiered intermediation by parent companies? Parent
companies in business groups have more of an incentive and more of an ability to finance their
subsidiaries compared to banks. Arguably, they have more direct control over subsidiary decisions
and may have superior information over subsidiaries investment projects. In addition, a parent
company can not only claim returns from subsidiaries generally but rather, with cashflow rights,
directly from their specific named investment projects. This in turn provides the parent companies
with more information for better targeting and with more incentives, especially when seeing a higher
upside risk. To summarize, if extra bank credit is available to the parent companies, they borrow
from banks and channel the credit to subsidiaries. The financially constrained subsidiaries then
engage in the investment projects with the received capital from their parent companies, and finally
pass returns back to parent equity holders37.
Our findings have an important and ironic implication for better-targeted SME support schemes:
provide capital to SMEs in a business group through the usual bank lending channel. Again,
37. Under Article 20 of “The Lending General Provision of PBOC”, when applying for a bank loan, a borrower in general
shall not use the loan to engage in equity investment. Companies however can use bank credit to finance any ongoing
projects and then finance their subsidiaries with retained earnings or other cashflow incomes. Therefore we do not
consider the channel documented in the paper as a violation of the PBOC requirement.
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increased bank credit supply can be helpful for SMEs who reside in business groups, as larger
companies in the groups act as intermediaries to channel bank credit38. Moreover, such a scheme
avoids the unwanted consequences of direct government lending to SMEs, including inefficient credit
allocation and excessive government risk-taking. Government-led schemes can thus be smaller and
focus on stand-along SMEs that are badly hit in the pandemic. By numbers those in business
groups may be small, but business groups in some countries nevertheless contain the larger group
of profitable high return entities.
In our empirical analyses, we begin by documenting that a significant fraction of Chinese firms
reside in business groups. A business group typically consists of a parent company and legally
independent subsidiaries, possibly operating in different sectors, that function through a common
source of control. We adopt a broader definition of shareholders in this paper, which includes both
majority controlling shareholder (>50% shares) and minority shareholders (50% shares)39. The
business registry data we use, unlike public firm disclosure data, identifies business groups among
all registered firms in China. As of 2017, 16% out of the universe of over 35 million firms were
part of business groups. In our merged sample, these firms in business groups contribute to 60%
of output, 70% of total fixed assets, and 60% of employment. Shareholders in the groups are
much larger compared to subsidiaries or out-of-group firms: the average value of total assets for
shareholders, subsidiaries, and out-of-group firms, are 712 million, 512 million, and 134 million
RMB, respectively. We also verify that the subsidiary firms out-perform the shareholders in terms
of total factor productivity (TFP) and return on assets (ROA) on average. Nevertheless, they have
lower leverage ratios (table 3.1) and thus would need help from their shareholders.
Next, we provide causal evidence that a positive bank credit supply shock to a corporate share-
holder benefits subsidiary firms that are unexposed to the shock. Our identification relies on the
geographical diversification of the business-group network and the regional segmentation of China’s
banking system. According to the business registry data, 38% of the shareholder-subsidiary pairs
38. There is an example during the current crisis. BlueJeans is a B2B videoconferencing company embracing a great
opportunity due to the stay-at-home policy. However, Bluejeans is subject to a strong financial constraint to expanding
business and research. Verizon has stepped in and acquired Bluejeans at 500 million dollar to support its long-term
investment plans. https://www.wsj.com/articles/verizon-to-buy-zoom-conferencing-rival-bluejeans-11587041218
39. In the robustness checks, we separate the majority controlling shareholder and minority shareholders and find that the
significant result in the baseline is primarily driven by the majority shareholder.
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have the shareholder and the subsidiary located in two different municipal cities. The network
spans the entire country without following a particular pattern. The regional segmentation of the
banking system is a result of the localized business model of Chinese banks and inefficiency in the
inter-bank market. Local bank branches have substantial decision-making power, and thus even large
commercial banks make lending decisions on a regional basis Panizza, Pagano, and Huang (2019).
Regulation of the 75% ceiling in loan-to-deposit ratio and limited competition on the repo market
further prevent the inter-bank market from smoothing funding gaps across the country (see Acharya,
Qian, Su, and Yang (2020); Ruan (2017); Chen, Ren, and Zha (2018)).
We implement our identification strategy using variations in local bank credit growth as a
proxy for positive credit supply shocks. Taking the existing network of business groups as given,
we compare similar subsidiary firms located in the same city but having their shareholders in
different other cities experiencing varying levels of bank lending growth. Our results suggest that
the higher bank credit growth the parent companies are subject to, the higher investment their un-
shocked subsidiaries make. If idiosyncratic credit demand shocks are uncorrelated across cities,
such evidence would suggest the transmission of bank credit supply shocks from parent companies
to subsidiaries. Finally, we control for city-by-year and industry-by-year fixed effects to control for
any city- or industry-specific trends in the baseline.
The validity of our identification hinges on the assumption that credit demands across cities
are uncorrelated. To mitigate any concerns on this identifying assumption, we also construct a
Bartik-type instrument for local bank credit supply shocks (similar to Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen
(2020)). We use the expansion of commercial banks at the national level as a proxy for aggregate
bank credit supply, which should not be affected by local credit demands of individual cities. A
commercial bank that expanded fast in China is considered to be more ambitious in providing new
credits to firms. If this bank had also controlled a significant fraction of the credit market in a given
city before its expansion, the city would have experienced a more substantial positive bank credit
supply shock. The estimates using this Bartik-type instrument support our hypothesis that corporate
shareholders pass along a positive credit supply shock from banks to their subsidiaries.
Another challenge is that other networks, such as input-output networks Alfaro, Chor, Antras,
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and Conconi (2019), may overlap with the business-group network. To deal with this challenge, we
control for other networks in additional robustness tests. The controls include estimates of upstream
supply shocks and downstream demand shock as proxies for supply chain linkages; trade credit
measures (account payable and receivable) as proxies for credit from trading partners; shareholder
industry cross subsidiary industry fixed effects, and shareholder city cross subsidiary city fixed
effects to control for any geographical overlay of industries; and a common shareholder dummy to
control for the tunneling effects.
The effectiveness of tiered credit intermediation in business groups depends on two elements:
subsidiary firms’ financial constraints and investment opportunities. We construct various proxies
for firm financial constraint and investment opportunities following Manova, Wei, and Zhang (2015)
and Giroud and Mueller (2015) . Our findings indicate that subsidiary firms with more substantial
long-term external financial constraints, proxied by the Rajan-Zingales measure Rajan and Zingales
(1998) tend to invest more following a positive credit supply shock to their shareholders. In contrast,
the short-term liquidity constraints, as indicated by the inventory ratio, the trade credit ratio, and
the tangible asset ratio, matter less. Among the group of financially constrained subsidiaries, the
ones with good investment opportunities also invest more following a credit supply shock to their
shareholders.
We do not observe significant reverse credit intermediation from subsidiaries to parent com-
panies, nor among subsidiaries in the same business group. The finding suggests that the parent
company is the only one playing the role of a financial intermediary in a business group.
Last but not least, and crucial in terms of the crucial intermediation mechanism, we show that
explicit active equity transfers between parent companies and subsidiaries are the other side of credit
intermediation flows within business groups. We establish this channel using the same identification
strategy but replace the left-hand side with total equity shares held by corporate shareholders. We
find that for an average subsidiary firm, total equity shares held by corporate shareholders increases
following a positive credit supply shock to these shareholders. This is the smoking gun.
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Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature studying bank lending and its effectiveness. We emphasize the
importance of the bank lending channel (see Bernanke (1983); Peek and Rosengren (2001); Morgan,
Rime, and Strahan (2004); Khwaja and Mian (2008); Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen (2020)), but
beyond the direct bank-firm relationship. We show that an increase in bank credit supply could
further indirectly benefit SMEs in business groups with large and connected firms.
This paper is also closely related to the literature on corporate ownership and internal capital
markets. There has been an extensive literature focusing on how internal capital markets allocate
resources, either to maximize the entire group’s profit by directing capital to the most profitable
projects (see Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991); Shin and Stulz (1998); Giroud and Mueller
(2015); Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015); Santioni, Schiantarelli, and Strahan (2017); Buchuk,
Larrain, Prem, and Urzúa Infante (2020)) or just to maximize the controlling shareholders cash-flow
benefits (see Fedenia, Hodder, and Triantis (1994); La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999);
Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru (2007); Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010); Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010)). We bring
in the interaction between the internal capital market and the external financial market and shed light
on the macroeconomic implication of liquidity provision to SMEs through internal capital markets.
Our paper complements the literature studying the financing of SMEs. Small and medium-sized
enterprises, often with features such as highly variable returns, asymmetric information, and a lack
of collateral, tend to have poor access to debt financing Raghavan and Mishra (2011). Banks do
lend to SMEs sometimes, but many require a lengthy period of relationship building Petersen and
Rajan (1994) and it can be sensitive to bank liquidity shocks and credit cycles (see Khwaja and
Mian (2008); Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen (2020)). SMEs rely more on other forms of non-bank
financing, including inter-company lending Canales and Nanda (2012), trade credit Carbo-Valverde,
Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Udell (2016), and informal finance through social networks and industrial
clusters Long and Zhang (2011); Banerjee and Duflo (2014), among which inter-company and
relationship-based financing act as substitutes for bank investment loans. The above-mentioned
arguments suggest that the credit channel of monetary easing, which traditionally work through
the banking sector, are difficult to reach the SMEs during crises. We contribute to the literature
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by showing that large non-financial corporates pass bank credit to their smaller subsidiaries, thus
overcoming various shortcomings of direct bank lending to SMEs.
Our paper also contributes to the recent burgeoning discussion on shadow banking activities
in China. Shadow banking involves financing activities that are not subject to regulatory oversight
and has been attributed to playing a key role in financing rising private sectors in China (see Allen,
Qian, and Qian (2005); Chen, He, and Liu (2020); Amstad, Sun, and Xiong (2020)). Chen, Ren,
and Zha (2018) document a rapid rise in shadow banking activities in terms of entrusted loan during
2009-2015 and justify that contractionary monetary policy in that period caused the rising shadow
bank loans. Allen et al. (2019) argue that most of the entrusted loans by listed companies are
affiliated loans between parents and subsidiaries or suppliers and customs. Our paper contributes
to this discussion in three-fold. First, the entrusted-loan activities boomed only after 2009 as a
response to series of contractionary monetary policy and the scale was very small before 2008 Chen,
Ren, and Zha (2018). There is little knowledge on the financing activities among non-financial
firms before the global financial crisis which is the period studied in our paper. Second, different
from the intercompany lending channel, we document that the equity-transfer channel is important
for credit transfer among non-financial firms in our sample 2001-2008, which is facilitated by the
equity shareholding relationship. Third, we show that inter-company financing could be a way to
effectively channel bank credit to the needed enterprises.
Finally, this paper fits broadly into the literature on financial linkages. Interlinked financial
activities can expose the financial sector into more substantial systemic risks and raise challenges on
financial stability Allen and Gale (2000); Eisenberg and Noe (2001). In our paper, we emphasize the
bright side of the financial intermediary ownership of networks and the importance of monitoring
firm-to-firm investment in equity shares. That is, we show the existence of a sizable cross-holding
network and its effect in linking the financial sector to the real economy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we discuss the theoretical framework
of this paper and develop hypotheses for the empirical analyses. Section 3 describes the identification
strategy and provides a detailed overview of our innovative data sets. In section 4, we present our
empirical findings. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
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3.2 Business Groups and Hypotheses Development
In this section, we briefly explain the definition of business groups and how they connect firms
in China. Then we provide a theoretical framework to help understand how firms in a business
group would react to credit supply shocks from the banking sector. Last but not least, we develop
hypotheses for our empirical analyses.
3.2.1 Business Groups in China
A business group refers to a group of legally independent firms under common ownership. In order
to identify business groups, one needs to know about each company’s corporate shareholders and
their shares of equity holdings. A corporate owning more than 50% of another corporate is often
referred to as the controlling majority shareholder, who effectively has the absolute control right.
Thus it can easily interfere with the other corporate’s financing and investment decisions. In defining
business groups, the literature has used various equity shareholding thresholds, such as 50% and
20%, as the cutoff levels Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, Villegas-Sanchez, Volosovych, and Yesiltas
(2015); Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007), as some argue that many corporates do not have a
controlling majority shareholder. In our baseline, we don’t distinguish between the majority and
the minority shareholders, so that our results are not driven by the cutoff shareholding levels. In
our attempt to further understanding the mechanism, we do find that the minority shareholders with
less than 50% of equity holdings have no significant effect in passing bank credit to subsidiaries.
Figure 3.1 provides an example of a business group under the baseline definition. Each line in the
figure represents one shareholder-subsidiary linkage. A solid line indicates a controlling majority
shareholding, whereas a dashed line implies a minority shareholding linkage. The business group
presented in figure 3.1 is in a pyramid structure, which refers to the case when subsidiaries do not
own any equity shares of their shareholders. The pyramid-like business groups are prevalent in
Asian countries, including Thailand, South Korea, Singapore Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang
(2002) and China Allen, Cai, Gu, Qian, and Zhu (2019b).
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Figure 3.1: A Example of a Business Group
Note:  Thick solid line - equity shareholding >50%; dashed line - equity shareholding <= 50%.
"DUO" is the ultimate parent company of the business group;
"A", "B", and "C" refer to the direct subsidiaries of "DUO"; 







Information of corporate shareholders in China is available in the State Administration of
Industry and Commerce Database (hereafter the SAIC). The SAIC provides a complete record
for all enterprises registered in China on the original shareholders, including both individuals and
corporates, their capital contributions, and each update of the shareholding structure40. The data
spans from 1950 to 201741. Besides the shareholders information, it also contains basic information
on enterprises, including the company name, the legal person, the start-up capital, the domicile of
the enterprise (location), the business scope, and the year of establishment.
We rely on the SAIC to identify equity shareholding relationships between firms in the non-
financial sectors, and track the evolvement of business groups in China over time. From 2000 to
2017, this network of business groups in China has explained rapidly and almost tripledcits size.
As of 2017, out of the 36 million registered enterprises in China, there are roughly 5.5 million
40. Including any updates or changes in shareholder capital contribution, shareholding status, and their holding shares.
41. By 2017, there have been approximately 40 million registered enterprises in the SAIC, among which 28 million are
private entities.
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Table 3.1: Firm-level Summary Statistics
Mean SD Median 25th 75th No of Obs. Data Source
Out-of-business-group Firms:
Log(Firm Age) 1.868 1.946 0.818 1.386 2.398 1.722e+06 ASCIE
Log(Total Asset Value) 9.413 9.288 1.204 8.587 10.12 1.621e+06 ASCIE
Subsidiary Firms:
Log(Firm Age) 2.160 2.197 0.836 1.609 2.639 620,208 ASCIE
Log(Total Asset Value) 10.43 10.31 1.481 9.378 11.39 599,636 ASCIE
Leverage Ratio 0.572 0.571 0.296 0.358 0.767 620,252 ASCIE
ROA 0.0460 0.0175 0.120 -0.193 0.842 599,636 ASCIE
TFP 0.00495 0.0553 0.483 -0.205 0.298 397,298 ASCIE
Investment 0.146 0.014 0.301 0 0.140 395,638 ASCIE
R&D 0.002 0 0.007 0 0 305,745 ASCIE
Corporate Shareholders:
Log(Firm Age) 2.451 2.398 0.889 1.792 3.091 409,878 ASCIE
Log(Total Asset Value) 10.83 10.73 1.553 9.691 11.89 399,288 ASCIE
Leverage Ratio 0.618 0.620 0.277 0.432 0.794 409,955 ASCIE
ROA 0.0426 0.0165 0.107 0 0.199 399,288 ASCIE
TFP -0.0071 0.0558 0.521 -0.228 0.315 267,056 ASCIE
Investment 0.159 0.015 0.317 0 0.161 275,070 ASCIE
R&D 0.003 0 0.009 0 0 214,948 ASCIE
This table summarizes a partial list of variables used in the empirical exercises. The data sources are the Annual Survey
of Chinese Industrial Enterprises by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, CompuStat, and the SAIC database. Firm
age is measured as the number of years since establishment. The construction of leverage ratio, investment, and R&D is
described in Firm-level-Data; the construction ROA and firm-year TFP is discussed in Mechanism
pairs of shareholder-subsidiary linkages. A total of 2.55 million firms hold equity shares of other
companies, while the total number of subsidiary firms is 3.79 million. On average, each corporate
shareholder connects to 1.5 subsidiary firms and holds 57.9% of the equity shares of each subsidiary
firm. The distribution of shareholder-subsidiary linkages is highly skewed - 90% of the corporate
shareholders have one or two subsidiairies, whereas around 2% of the shareholders control more
than 10 subsidiaries.
Despite that there is only a small fraction of firms (roughly 15.6%) that are associated with any
business groups, these firms make a major economic contribution: 80% of the registered capital,
60% of the output, 70% of the total fixed asset, and 60% of the employment in our merged sample
are from firms within business groups. Table 3.1 provides a detailed comparison between the out-
of-business-group firms and the within-business-group firms, based on firm characteristics from the
SAIC and the Annual Survey of Chinese Industrial Enterprises (ASCIE) 42
42. A detailed description of the Annual Survey of Chinese Industrial Enterprises database and the construction of firm
level variables is available in section 3.3.2. We further divide firms within business groups into subsidiary firms and
corporate shareholders to compare their differences. Overall, firms that are part of the business groups tend to be
older and much larger than the stand-alone ones. Compared to the corporate shareholders, the subsidiary firms have
better performance (in terms of TFP and ROA), but they borrow less from the banking sector (lower leverage ratio).
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3.2.2 Hypothesis Development
We make two assumptions to capture theoretically the transmission of credit supply shocks within
business groups. The first assumption is that each individual firm within business groups face a
binding credit constraint. This assumption is necessary to generate a positive response to bank credit
supply shocks and it can be micro-founded with limited pledgeability or weak legal and regulatory
environment outside of firms. The second assumption is that shareholder has both the ability and
the incentive to transfer capital to subsidiaries for more profits Stein (1997); Gertner, Scharfstein,
and Stein (1994). There are many circumstances under which the second assumption would hold.
One example, which is the context of our empirical analysis, is that subsidiaries could have a higher
marginal return on capital yet they cannot benefit directly from a lending boom in other cities.
Their shareholders in other cities might have access to the newly available credit, but they may not
have new projects to invest in. It could also happen when banks are more willing to lend to the
shareholders, given that they are older firms with more assets as potential collaterals.
The first question of our interest is why parent companies would be willing to function as
intermediaries between banks and smaller subsidiaries. A non-financial corporate shareholder is
also a company producing with capital and labor. When it faces a positive credit supply shock from
the banking sector, its marginal return on capital would decline. At the same time, their subsidiaries’
returns on capital remain high if these subsidiaries are not exposed to the positive shock to bank
lending. The corporate shareholder thus has more incentives to transfer capital to their subsidiaries
for higher capital returns, and the expansion in bank lending allows it to do so. Once receiving
capital from shareholders, the financially-constrained subsidiaries would increase their investment
to generate more profits for both themselves and the shareholder. Our first hypothesis is thus:
• When shareholders experience a positive local bank lending shock, their subsidiaries unex-
posed to the shock would increase their capital expenditure more compared to stand-alone
firms or other subsidiaries with no bank lending shocks to their shareholders.
The winner-picking feature of the internal capital market implies that subsidiaries have different
likelihoods of receiving capital transfers from the parent company depending on their marginal
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returns on capital. A higher marginal return on capital implies a larger gap between firm’s financing
capacity and its desired investment, which could be the result of either a higher firm productivity or
a tighter firm financial constraint. Thus we develop two additional testable hypotheses:
• When shareholders experience a positive local bank lending shock, subsidiaries with greater
investment opportunities would increase their capital expenditure more.
• When shareholders experience a positive local bank lending shock, subsidiaries with tighter
external financial constraints would increase their capital expenditure more.
How does the tiered intermediation take place is another question of our interest. We propose that
one possible channel of credit transfer is through the equity exchanges between parent companies and
subsidiaries. The SAIC provides information on the equity shareholding structure of all companies,
including both corporate and individual shareholders. Corporate shareholders would increase their
equity shareholdings in exchange of credit transfer to subsidiaries. We thus hypothesize the following:
• When shareholders experience a more positive local bank lending shock, equity holdings of
their subsidiaries switch from individual to corporate shareholders compared to stand-alone
firms or subsidiaries with no credit growth shocks to their shareholders.
The actual amount of credit transfer through exchanges of equity shares should depend on the
marginal return on capital of the subsidiaries. However, given that our sample contain mostly
private firms without market valuation, we cannot compute the amount of credit transferred from
shareholders to subsidiaries following a bank credit supply shock.
3.3 Empirical Strategy and Data
In this section, we provide an overview of our unique data set and empirical strategy for testing the
theoretical hypotheses.
3.3.1 Identification Strategy
Our identification strategy exploits the geographical dispersion of business groups in China. Recall
from 3.2.1 that a business group refers to a group of legally independent firms under common
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ownership. In other words, firms in the same group are bounded by equity shareholdings but not
geographical approximity. Figure 3.2 below illustrates the shareholder-subsidiary linkages across
different provinces in China43, indicating that business groups indeed span all across the country.
In our baseline analysis, we compare similar subsidiary firms located in the same city with their
shareholders located in other cities and experienced different credit supply shocks. The network
of business groups is fixed at the beginning of the sample period. Assuming that the credit supply
shocks to shareholders are uncorrelated across cities, we infer the transmission of these shocks to
subsidiaries located in other cities from their various responses. For example, consider two textile
firms in Guangzhou similar in both scale and exporting status, but are owned by two separate
corporate parents in Beĳing and Chengdu. In 2009, following the four-trillion Yuan stimulus, bank
lending in Chengdu grew by 62 percent. Beĳing, on the contrary, experienced a smaller credit boom
with a credit growth of only 24 percent. The difference in the two textile companies’ investment
behaviors are then used to identify the pass-through of bank lending shocks to the two shareholders
in Beĳing and Chengdu. We add city cross year fixed effects to control for any local credit market
and macroeconomic conditions. We also include firms that are not in any business groups in our
control group to estimate local average trends and fixed effects.
We argue that the above-mentioned identification strategy is valid in testing the transmission
of bank credit within business groups in tow-fold. First, the Chinese financial system operate at a
regional level due to institutional and regulatory constraints. Local credit growth is thus unlikely to
depend on credit demand in other cities. To further eliminate any potential impacts of credit demand
on bank lending growth, we construct a Bartik-type IV for local credit supply. Second, our findings
will not be fully explained by other business relationships between cities. After controlling for other
possible business linkages, including the input-output linkages, industrial agglomerations, etc., we
still find parent companies playing significant roles in passing credit from the banking sector to
subsidiaries.
The first argument is supported by the large literature documenting the geographical segmentation
43. Provinces with higher intensities of shareholder-subsidiary linkages, defined as the number of linkages divided by the
total number of firms in the province, are marked as yellow; and the ones with lower intensities of the linkages are
marked as purple.
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Figure 3.2: The Geographical Diversification of Business Groups
of the Chinese financial system and its distortionary effects on capital allocation. The geographical
segmentation is a result of both institutional and regulatory restrictions. From the institutional
perspective, both local financial institutions and large policy and commercial banks tend to operate
within cities Dobson and Kashyap (2006). The inter-bank market is dominated by the four largest
Chinese banks, which makes it harder for smaller banks to smooth local funding gaps. Several
regulations also limit financial institutions to conducting businesses at the national level. First, there
has been a loan-to-deposit ratio requirement until 2015: Chinese banks could not lend more than
75% of their deposits. Second, interest rate ceilings applied to both deposits and loans in our sample
period Panizza, Pagano, and Huang (2019).
While our identification suffices as long as city-level credit growth depends only on local supply
and demand, we construct an instrument orthogonal to local credit demand to further mitigate the
concern. Our Bartik-type instrument exploit the opening of new local bank branches across cities,
which is in a similar spirit to the shift-share instrument in Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen (2020). A
commercial bank that expanded fast can be considered as being more ambitious in providing new
credits to firms. If the bank had controlled a large fraction of the credit market in a city, we consider
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the city as experienced a larger credit supply shock. The estimates using this Bartik-type instrument
support our hypothesis that corporate shareholders would pass though a positive credit supply shock
to their subsidiaries.
For the second argument, we show that the shareholding relationships still matter for credit
transimission after controlling for other types of business networks in the robustness tests. We
include in estimates for upstream supply shocks and downstream demand shocks as proxies for the
supply chain linkages, trade credit measures (account payable and receivable) as proxies for credit
from trading partners, shareholder industry cross subsidiary industry fixed effects and shareholder
city cross subsidiary city fixed effects to control for any geographical overlay of industries, and a
common shareholder dummy to control for the tunneling effects44.
3.3.2 Firm-level Data and Key Variables
In 3.2.1, we have discussed how to identify business groups from the business registry data - the
SAIC. In this section, we explain the construction of other firm-level variables and how we merge
different firm-level data sets.
To capture firm investment and financing activities, we use corporate balance sheet information
from the Annual Survey of Chinese Industrial Enterprises (ASCIE) data. The ASCIE is an annual
survey conducted by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics since 1995. It covers all state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), and private firms in themanufacturing, mining and energy sectors with an annual
operating revenue over 5 million RMB. After 2011, the operating revenue cutoff was increased to
20 million RMB. We delete all observations after 200945to avoid any bias due the change in the
sampling criteria. We also drop the observations before 2000 to preserve consistency in data quality.
All observations in 2009 are dropped out of the sample due to insufficient coverage of variables.
Finally, we remove the outliers following Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2014), which leaves
us with an unbalanced sample of 688,560 firms and 2,602,126 observations spanning 9 years (2000
44. Specifically, we attempt to control the tunneling effect through any additional common shareholders of subsidiaries
and their shareholders.
45. The data for 2004 and 2008 are from the national industrial census. We match the census data with the annual
survey using firm ID, firm name, legal person, address at six digital county level, phone, zip, 4 digital industrial code,
founding year suggested by Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2014).
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- 2008) 46. Roughly 95% of the firms appear in the sample for at least two years47.
We merge SAIC and ASCIE using the legal name, the name of the legal representative, the
domicile (location), and the year of establishment48. We are able to match 547,411 out of the
658,678 firms in ASCIE to the SAIC database, which accounts for 83 percent of our sample.
After merging the two data sets, we are left with a total of 138,453 holding firms49 and 151,604
subsidiaries50.
In our empirical analysis, the firm-level outcome variables of subsidiaries include investment,
R&D expenditure, profit margin, leverage ratio, and the book value of total debt. Investment is
constructed as the net formation of tangible fixed asset, normalized by the one-year lagged value of
total tangible fixed asset. The real value of total tangible fixed asset is recovered from the nominal
tangible fixed asset using the program suggested by Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2014).
R&D expenditure is directly reported by firms as an item in their operating costs. We normalize
R&D expenditure using also the one-year lagged total asset value. Firm-level profit margin is the
ratio of operating profit divided by operating revenue; the book value of debt includes long-term and
short-term bank loans and corporate bonds; and finally, leverage ratio is constructed as the ratio of
total book value of debt divided by the total book value of equity liabilities.
We also study the equity transfers between shareholders and subsidiaries. Our data set, unfor-
tunately, does not allow us to directly observe the equity trading between firms. We test the equity
transfer channel by looking into the changes in the total fraction of equity shares (0 to 100 percent)
held by all corporate shareholders of a given subsidiary company. When a subsidiary company sells
its equity in exchange for capital injection, the total equity shares held by the corporate shareholders
of the firm would increase with or without new equity issuance.
46. The total number of observations in our results is smaller because firm fixed effects absorbed firms only appeared
once in the data set; and certain variables are missing for some firms in certain years.
47. The average number of observations that one firm contributes to is 5.7 and the corresponding standard deviation is
2.8.
48. According to the corporate law in China, each registered enterprise has a unique legal representative, who has the full
responsibility in dealing with the enterprise’s legal issues.
49. They are roughly 20 percent of our ASCIE sample and 43 percent of the whole sample of holding firms in the SAIC
database.
50. These firms account for 18 percent of our ASCIE sample and 26 percent of the whole sample of subsidiary firms in
the SAIC.
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3.3.3 Local Credit Supply Shocks and Economic Condition
For local credit growth and economic conditions, our main data source is the province and city year
books from the China Data Center, which cover 312 prefecture-level cities from 2000 to 2016.
In the baseline analysis, we use city-level bank lending growth as a proxy for local credit supply
shock. Note that our identification strategy allows the measured city-level credit supply shocks to
depend on local credit demand, as long as they are orthogonal to the investment opportunities of
subsidiary firms located in other cities. Bank lending growth is thus measured as the growth rate
of the total amount of bank loans outstanding in each city. The outstanding bank loans in nominal
terms is directly available in the city year books. For subsidiary firms with multiple shareholders, we
compute the weighted average bank lending growth in shareholders’ cities using different weights
(see 3.4.1 for details).
In an alternative specification, we construct a Bartik-type instrument to isolate the local credit
demand shocks from the local credit supply shocks. Our variable shares a similar spirit as the one in
Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen (2020) which instruments changes in local credit supply using a shift-
share setup. A bank that expands fast at the nationwide is considered to have been providing more
credits to firms and the expansion should be less relevant to credit demand in individual cities. The
national-level credit demand shocks are controlled with year fixed effects. We obtain bank branch
information from the bank branch registry database provided by the China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC). The bank branch registry data includes the name, location (specific to street
names), date of establishment, cancellation for each bank branch in China. Section 3.4.2 discusses
in detail the construction of the Bartik-type instrumental variable.
Table 3.2 summarizes the equity shareholding conditions and local credit growth in shareholders’
cities for the group of subsidiary firms.
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Table 3.2: Equity Holding and Credit Growth Statistics
Mean Median SD Min Max No. of Obs. Data Source
Subsidiaries:
Avg. Credit Growth in Holding Firms’ Cities (%) 16.7 15.4 17.3 -21.7 60.6 428,735 ASCIE, CDC
Log (Equity Held by Corporate Shareholders) 6.211 8.007 4.413 0.001 12.19 574,748 ASCIE, SAIC
Equity Shares Held by Corporate Shareholders (%) 57.9 84.3 45.2 0 100 562,682 ASCIE
This table summarizes additional variables on the equity shareholding and credit growth for the subsidiary firms. Section
3.3.2 provides a detailed discussion on the measurement of equity shareholdings. The construction of credit growth is
available in 3.4.1."CDC"refers to the China Data Center.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Baseline Specification and Results
Our baseline specification (3.1) is designed to study if subsidiary firms respond to credit supply
shocks to their parent companies located in other cities:
.8C = U2C + \8 +WA438CA>FCℎ?C + ^′-8C + n8C . (3.1)




!>0=+>;D<42 ( 9) ,C ) − log(
∑
9∈80,2 ( 9)≠2
!>0=+>;D<42 ( 9) ,C−1)
(3.2)
where 80 is the set of firms holding equity shares of firm 8 at the beginning of the sample period51,
and 2( 9) is the city where parent company 9 located in52. 2 is the home city of subsidiary 8.
!>0=+>;D<42 ( 9) ,C is the total value of the outstanding loans in city 2( 9) at the end of year C. We
include in firm fixed effect \8 to control for firm-level heterogeneity, and city cross year fixed effect
U2C to capture any local credit market and macroeconomic shocks. Other controls, -8C , are standard
controls for investment regressions Denis and Sibilkov (2010); Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012);
Gulen and Ion (2016), which include firm ownership and age fixed effects, an one-year lagged firm
51. We use the shareholder-subsidiary linkages established at the beginning of the sample period to avoid the concern
that business groups formation might endogenously respond to local credit supply shocks.
52. Companies in China usually register with local registries. When a company moves to another city, it will acquire a
new ID and thus be identified as a different firm in the data set. Thus shareholders changing location will not affect
the validity of our estimation.
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Table 3.3: The Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Investment R&D Profit Margin Leverage Ratio Debt Growth
Avg. Credit Growth in Holding Firms’ Cities 0.0619*** 0.0001 -0.0061* 0.0366 0.872
(0.014) (0.0001) (0.003) (0.023) (0.841)
Number of Observations 1,379,261 1,015,249 1,535,540 1,528,291 1,516,490
City × Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
2-digit Industry × Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES
This table presents how holding firms pass credit supply shocks to subsidiary firms. Holding firms’ cities credit growth is
computed as the weighted average of the growth rate of total bank loans. Column (1) to column (5) reports the baseline
estimates of the effect of credit growth shocks to parent companies on subsidiary firms’ investment, R&D expenditure,
profit-to-sales ratio, leverage ratio, and the growth rate of external debt. Firm-level controls include firm size, ownership,
and age fixed effects; one-year lagged debt-to-asset ratio, and one-year lagged net profit margin. All specifications include
city cross year fixed effects, 2-digit industry cross year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. The standard error clustered at
firm level are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, significant
at the 10 percent level.
size dummy, one-year lagged debt-to-asset ratio, and two-digit industry cross year fixed effects for
any industry-specific time trends.
We use the baseline specification to study the effect of corporate shareholders’ local credit
supply shocks on subsidiaries. The left-hand-side variables of interests include investment, R&D
expenditure, profit margin, leverage ratio, and the growth rate of total debt outstanding. A positive
W1 implies that when shareholders experience a positive local credit growth, subsidiaries located in
other cities increase their investment or other relevant measures in response.
Table 3.3 reports our baseline results. Column (1) indicates that controlling for local credit
market dynamics, a 10% bank credit growth in shareholders’ cities would lead to subsidiaries in
other cities increase capital expenditure by an additional 0.6% of their fixed asset. This additional
0.6 percentage point accounts for 42.5% of the median investment rate (1.4%) and 4.3 % of the
average investment rate (14%) of all subsidiary firms. In terms of the magnitude, our result is also
comparable to Cingano, Manaresi, and Sette (2016) who study the direct effect of bank lending on
corporate investment. They find that a 10% credit contraction would lead to a fall in investment that
is equivalent to 24% of median investment rate. This suggest that financial intermediation within
business groups is both statistically and economically significant.
The treatment variable, A438CA>FCℎ?C , is constructed using the size of local bank lending in
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Table 3.4: Alternative Shareholder Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Size-adjusted Weights Cash-flow Rights Weights Simple Average
Avg. Credit Growth in Holding Firms’ Cities 0.0619*** 0.0710*** 0.0755*** 0.0570***
(0.014) (0.0167) (0.021) (0.0163)
Number of Observations 1,314,458 1,314,458 1,314,458 1,314,458
City × Year FE YES YES YES YES
2-digit Industry × Year FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Firm-level Controls YES YES YES YES
This table presents estimates of holding firms passing credit supply shocks to subsidiary firms using different shareholder
weights. Holding firms’ cities credit growth is computed as the average growth rate of total bank loans, weighted
by the size of local credit market, the size of local credit market multiplied by firm total asset value relative to city
average, shareholders’ cashflow rights, and an equal weight in column (1) to column (4). Firm-level controls include firm
size, ownership, and age fixed effects; one-year lagged debt-to-asset ratio, and one-year lagged net profit margin. All
specifications include city cross year fixed effects, 2-digit industry cross year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. The
standard error clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses.*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the
5 percent level, significant at the 10 percent level.
each shareholder city(!>0=+>;D<42 ( 9) ,C−1) as shareholder weights (equation (3.2)) to avoid outliers
from extreme credit market fluctuations in small cities. Table 3.4 shows the effect of shareholders’
local credit growth shock on subsidiary investment using different shareholder weights. Column (2)
adjusts the baseline weights using the size of each parent company relative to the size of an average
firm in their city (in terms of initial registered capital53), taking into account the relative importance
of the shareholder in their local credit market. Column (3) and (4) ignore the differences in local
credit markets but weight each shareholder by their relative cash-flow rights and by an equal weight,
respectively. The estimates using alternative shareholder weights are still positive. In addition, they
are significant and statistically indifferent from our baseline estimate, indicating a positive outcome
in subsidiary investment following credit supply shocks to shareholders.
Besides firm investment, we also study the impact on subsidiary firms’ R&D expenditure, profit
margin, leverage, and the total amount of outstanding debt. Subsidiary firms’ average profit margin
declines slightly following a positive credit supply shock to their parent companies. This finding
could be explained by a similar rationale as in Caballero and Hammour (1994): when the external
condition improves54, subsidiary firms tend to slowdown the destruction of outdated projects and
53. We do not use the value of total asset here because it is not provided in SAIC, and thus not available for firms below
a certain scale.
54. This explanation would have effects either when parent companies pose a positive demand shock to subsidiary firms
or when they lower the cost of finance of subsidiary firms. We distinguish the specific mechanism in 3.4.4.
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thus results in a lower profit margin on average.
Other variables of our interests were not affected by the credit market conditions in parents’
cities. R&D expenditure on average is not as sensitive to changes in external financing conditions as
investments (Table 3.3, Column (3)). Compared to capital investment, R&D requiresmore consistent
spending in human capital and is more likely to create intangible assets, thus it tends to depend more
on internal financing (Hall and Lerner, 2010). In our sample, less than 10% of the firms have ever
actively engaged in R&D activities. It is then not surprising that credit supply shocks to parent
companies have insignificant impacts on the R&D expenditures of subsidiary firms.
Another important finding is that subsidiary firms’ external debt financing is not affected by
credit supply shocks to their parent companies in other cities (Table 3.3, Column (4) and (5)). This
finding implies that subsidiary firms do not face an easier external financing environment following
a positive credit supply shock to their parent companies, reassuiring that credit transmission exists
within business groups.
Although the geographical segmentation of local financial markets works in favor of our iden-
tification, we still face the challenge that subsidiaries and shareholders may not locate randomly
across cities. For example, two cities with more synergies may have more firms investing in each
other. In such case, parent companies’ and the subsidiary firms’ cities may have positively correlated
local credit demand. If such a correlation is due to similar industry layouts in these cities, our
2-digit industry cross year fixed effects can deal with it. For other possibilities, we construct a
Bartik-type instrument and estimate the effect using an instrumental variables approach. Section
3.4.2 discusses the instrument for local credit supply shocks and the estimation results. Another
concern is that other types of networks, such as the input-output network, could also overlap with the
business-group network. It is more of a challenge to interpreting the results in Table 3.3 rather than
to the identification itself. To address this concern, we add other types of networks in our baseline
specification and discuss the estimation in 3.4.3. For the rest of the empirical analysis, we focus only
on the investment of subsidiary firms.
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3.4.2 Instrument for Local Credit Supply
In this section, we use an instrumental variables approach to address possibly correlated credit
demand across cities. As discussed in 3.3.1, our baseline specification is valid as long as local
bank lending growth does not depend on credit demand in other cities. To further mitigate the
identification challenge, we construct a Bartik (shift-share) instrument /?C for local credit growth
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where 1,2,C is the total number of branches of bank 1 in city 2 at time C. 6A0=2ℎ2 ( 9) ,C is the
projected growth rate of the total number of bank branches in city 2( 9) at time C (defined below).
Finally,
∑
1 1,2 ( 9) ,C−3∑
2 ( 9)
∑
1 1,2 ( 9) ,C−3
is the weight of city 2( 9) among all parent companies’ cities, constructed
as the ratio of the number of bank branches in city 2( 9) over the total number of branches in all
parent companies’ cities.
6A0=2ℎ2 ( 9) ,C is defined as:
6A0=2ℎ2 ( 9) ,C =
∑
1
1,2 ( 9) ,C−3∑
1 1,2 ( 9) ,C−3
·
∑
2′≠2 ( 9) (1,2′,C −1,2′,C−1)∑
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. (3.4)
We use time C −3 to compute the share of bank branches to mitigate the concern of endogenous
branch allocation. Branches of policy banks and trusts are excluded to ensure the economic relevance
of the instrument. Finally, we drop cities that only have one bank branch, which leaves us with a
sample of 249,785 firm-year observations.
The significance of the shift-share instrument could be partly explained by heterogeneous ex-
pansion of city commercial banks (CCBs) and other banks following the 2006 deregulation Amstad,
Sun, and Xiong (2020). Before 2006, the CCBs were only allowed to conduct businesses within the
city where their headquarters locate in. Then with the real estate markets commercialized across
the country, the CBRC lifted the constraint on CCBs setting up inter-city branches. At the end
of 2005, the new regulation “Notice of the China Banking Regulatory Commission on Issuing the
Measures for the Administration of Non-Home-City Branches of City Commercial Banks” autho-
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Figure 3.3: New Bank Branches Established by CCBs
Note: The figure shows the total number of new branches established by city commercial banks in China from 1990 to
2013.
rized qualified CCBs to open new branches in other cities. Following the branching deregulation,
there began a large wave of inter-city branch openings in China. For example, as of 2014, Bank of
Beĳing, a city commercial bank established in 1996 in the city of Beĳing, has 116 out of its 136
branches established after 2006 in 9 other provinces. Figure 3.3 presents the total number of newly
established cross-city CCB branches in each year since 1990. The deregulation of CCB branching
accelerated the expansion of these city commercial banks at the national level. Moreover, CCBs also
increase their footprint in the banking sector faster compared to the state-owned banks following the
deregulation (Figure 3.4).
The first-stage and second-stage results are summarized in Table 3.5:
The estimated effect of credit supply shocks to the shareholders on subsidiary firms is four times
larger compared to the baseline estimates. For a 10% annual growth of total credit in shareholders’
cities, a subsidiary firm is expected to invest 2.6% more of their fixed asset value, which is 18%
of the average investment rate among all subsidiary firms. There are two possible explanations for
the OLS estimate to be downward biased: first, local credit growth of shareholders’ cities is often
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Figure 3.4: CCBs’ Share of Total Banking Sector Assets
Note: The figure presents the ratio of CCBs’ total asset value relative to the value of total assets held by the “Big Five”
state-owned banks, the 12 big national commercial banks, all CCBs, and all foreign banks. The ratio is only shown from
2002 to 2009 due to data availability.
Table 3.5: The Instrumental Variables Approach
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Stage Second Stage
Avg. Credit Growth of Hol. Firms’ Cities Investment Leverage Ratio Debt Growth
Branch Bartik IV 1.643***
(0.019)
F-Value 1.2e+04
Avg. Credit Growth in Hol. Firms’ Cities 0.258** -0.017 0.017
(0.102) (0.015) (0.053)
Number of Observations 249,785 249,785 285,555 284,536
City × Year FE YES YES YES YES
2-digit Industry ×Year FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Firm-level Controls YES YES YES YES
This table presents the results of the instrumental variables approach. Column (1) reports the first-stage outcome that the
Bartik IV constructed based on bank branch formation can significantly predict local credit growth. Column (2) to column
(4) reports the IV estimates of the effect of credit supply shocks to parent companies on subsidiary firms’ investment,
leverage ratio, and the growth rate of external debt. Firm-level controls include firm size, ownership, and age fixed effects;
one-year lagged debt-to-asset ratio, and one-year lagged net profit margin. All specifications include city cross year fixed
effects, 2-digit industry cross year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. The standard error clustered at firm level are
reported in parentheses.*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, significant at the 10
percent level.
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a noisy measure of the actual credit supply shocks, which can create an attenuation bias; second,
credit demand in shareholders’ cities and subsidiaries’ cities could be negatively correlated if banks
also face limited resources. Column (3) and (4) of Table 3.5 again imply that subsidiary firms’
external financing is not affected by the positive credit supply shocks to their shareholders. So the
positive and significant impact on subsidiaries’ investment should not be a result of subsidiary firms
having a more relaxed borrowing constraint following a positive credit supply shock to their parent
companies.
3.4.3 Other Robustness Tests
Another challenge we need to address is about interpreting the findings as credit transmission
within business groups. The connections between shareholders and subsidiaries may overlap with
other networks across cities. Even if we establish the causality between credit supply shocks to
shareholders and investment of subsidiaries, it might have been driven by other business linkages.
Therefore in this section, we rule out other explanations by controlling for various possible networks
in our robustness tests.
Supply chain linkages and trade credit Clayton and Jorgensen (1999) argue that shareholder-
subsidiary relationships are often found between firms along the same supply chain. Therefore, a
significant W in eq (3.1) may not necessarily imply that holding firms pass along the credit supply
shocks to their subsidiary firms, but could be the result of holding firms passing a supply-side shock
(a decrease in the cost of capital) or a demand-side shock (an increase in production scale) to the
upstream or to the downstream. Another reason that the supply chain linkages matter is that firms
sometimes rely on trade credit for external financing. If the shareholders and subsidiaries are also
trading partners, they can finance each other through trade credit instead of equity transfers.
To control for demand and supply shocks along the supply chain, we compute for each firm
the weighted average of upstream and downstream output growth using the approach in Acemoglu,
Akcigit, and Kerr (2016) and based on the 2002 China Input-Output Table (3-digit industry level).
For the trade credit channel, we add firm account payable and receivables (normalized by the one-
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year lagged total asset value) to control for trade credit. Column (1) and (2) in table 3.6 indicates
that controlling for supply chain linkages, local bank credit growth affecting the holding firms still
has a positive and significant impact on the subsidiary firms. Compared to the baseline estimate in
Column (1) of Table 3.3, the effect is slightly smaller but statistically indifferent. Therefore, supply
chain linkages and trade credit are not sufficient to explain our baseline findings.
Geographical network Acemoglu et al. (2016) point out that the geographic overlay of industries
(i.e. how industries co-locate in various local labor markets) is also an important type of business
network because any industry-to-industry effects can show up in firm-level analysis relying on cross-
region variation. They control for the geographic overlay between different industries based on
the industry composition in each region. We use a more general approach to directly control for
shareholder industry cross subsidiary industry fixed effects and shareholder city cross subsidiary city
fixed effects, to take into account any possible industry-to-industry or city-to-city spillover effects.
Column (3) and (4) in Table 3.6 summarizes the results of the robustness test for the geographical
network channel. The geographical overlay of industries does partially contribute to the impact, but
our main finding still holds.
The Tunneling effect Last but not least, we try to rule out tunneling effect documented in the
literature of cross-holding relationships. A large corporate finance literature (see La Porta, Lopez-
de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999); Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002); Gopalan, Nanda, and
Seru (2007); Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010); Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010)) argue that in a cross-holding
network, there are potential conflicts of interest between voting rights and cash-flow rights. A
controlling shareholder may divert the resources from one subsidiary firm with low cash-flow rights
to another subsidiary with high cash-flow rights to benefit more, which creates a distortion in internal
investment decisions. The tunneling effect works against our argument if the holding firm and the
subsidiary firm have the same controlling shareholder whomay have incentive to divert the resources
from the holding firm to the subsidiary firm.
To control for the tunneling effect, we create a common shareholder dummy between subsidiaries
and their shareholders and add to specification (3.1). The regression result in column (5) of table
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Table 3.6: Robustness Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Investment
Avg. Credit Growth in Holding Firms’ Cities 0.0571*** 0.0624*** 0.0413*** 0.0480*** 0.0625***
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0157) (0.0144) (0.0144)
Log (Demand from downstream) 0.00213
(0.00212)






Number of Observations 1,306,201 1,299,605 1,233,051 1,306,169 1,306,201
Shareholder Ind. × Subsidiary Ind. FE NO NO YES NO NO
Shareholder city × Subsidiary city FE NO NO NO YES NO
Common Shareholder Dummy NO NO NO NO YES
City × Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
2-digit Industry × Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES
This table presents additional robustness tests on how holding firms pass credit supply shocks to subsidiary firms. Column
(1) and column (2) control for supply and demand shocks along the supply chain and trade credit (normalized by one-year
lagged total assets), respectively. Column (3) and (4) include shareholder industry cross subsidiary industry fixed effects
and shareholder city cross subsidiary city fixed effects, respectively, to control any industry-to-industry or city-to-city
spillover effects. Firm-level controls include firm size, ownership, and age fixed effects; one-year lagged debt-to-asset
ratio, and one-year lagged net profit margin. All specifications include city cross year fixed effects, 2-digit industry
cross year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. The standard error clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses.***
Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, significant at the 10 percent level.
3.6 shows that the key coefficient of our interest is unchanged after controlling for the common
shareholder dummy.
3.4.4 The Equity Transfer Channel
We argue that an important channel for reallocating capital from shareholders to subsidiaries fol-
lowing a positive credit supply shock to the shareholders is through equity transfers. For example,
a holding firm can purchase additional equity stakes of its subsidiaries as way to pass along cash to
subsidiaries (Almeida et al., 2015). Compared to commercial banks, the holding firms are typically
more inclined to finance subsidiaries due to an information advantage or additional shareholder
benefits Stein (1997). When facing good investment opportunities or positive credit market shocks,
holding firms might increase external borrowing and finance subsidiaries through the internal capital
markets Shin and Stulz (1998); Manova, Wei, and Zhang (2015).
To show that holding firms reallocate capital to subsidiaries through equity transfers, we repeat
the baseline and IV analyses but replacing the left-hand side variable with the total equity shares held
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Table 3.7: Equity Transfer in Response to Credit Supply Shocks
(1) (2)
OLS IV
Equity Shares Held by Corporate Shareholders (%)
Avg. Credit Growth in Holding Firms’ Cities 3.380*** 10.070***
(0.084) (0.127)
Number of Observations 748,829 379,261
City × Year FE YES YES
2-digit Industry × Year FE YES YES
Firm FE YES YES
Firm-level Controls YES YES
This table presents how holding firms exchange equity shareswith subsidiary firms following a positive credit supply shock.
Holding firms’ cities credit growth is computed as the weighted average of the growth rate of total bank loans. Column
(1) and column (2) reports the OLS and IV estimates, respectively. Firm-level controls include firm size, ownership, and
age fixed effects; one-year lagged debt-to-asset ratio, and one-year lagged net profit margin. All specifications include
city cross year fixed effects, 2-digit industry cross year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. The standard error clustered at
firm level are reported in parentheses.*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, significant
at the 10 percent level.
by corporate shareholders. Intuitively, subsidiaries transfer or issue new equity stakes to holding
firms in exchange for more cash. Therefore, the coefficient of our interest is expected to positive and
significant, indicating that the total equity shares held by corporate shareholders increase following
a positive credit supply shock to the shareholders. The results of the analyses are summarized in
table 3.7. 0.5% additional equity shares are sold by the subsidiaries to their shareholders following
an average 16.7% credit growth in shareholders’ cities, which is worth of 2.5 millions RMB based
on the average book value of subsidiary firms in our sample.
3.4.5 The Effectiveness of Financing within Business Groups
Finally, we look into the conditions under which parent companies can be an effective intermedi-
ary between banks and subsidiaries. An effective intermediation should see subsidiaries respond
significiantly to credit supply shocks to their shareholders.
A direct implication based on the internal capital market theory Stein (1997) is that we should
expect a larger effect when a shareholder claim a larger fraction of subsidiaries’ returns. To test
for such an implication, we compare controlling majority versus minority shareholders. Table 3.9
implies that a positive credit shock to controlling shareholders who own more than 50% of the
subsidiaries’ equity shares would significantly increase the investment of subsidiary firms; while the
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Table 3.8: SOE versus Non-SOE Shareholders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Size-adjusted Weights Cash-flow Rights Weights Simple Average
Avg. Credit Growth in SOE Holding Firms’ Cities -0.0638 -0.0119 -0.0870 -0.0602
(0.0532) (0.0741) (0.0768) (0.0650)
Avg. Credit Growth in Non-SOE Holding Firms’ Cities 0.0664*** 0.108*** 0.0918*** 0.0739***
(0.0191) (0.0238) (0.0255) (0.020)
Number of Observations 1,314,458 1,314,458 1,314,458 1,314,458
City× Year FE YES YES YES YES
2-digit Industry× Year FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Firm-level Controls YES YES YES YES
This table compares SOE and non-SOE holding firms in passing credit supply shocks to subsidiary firms using different
shareholder weights. Holding firms’ cities credit growth is computed as the average growth rate of total bank loans,
weighted by the size of local credit market, the size of local credit market multiplied by firm total asset value relative to
city average, shareholders’ cashflow rights, and an equal weight in column (1) to column (4).Firm-level controls include
firm size, ownership, and age fixed effects; one-year lagged debt-to-asset ratio, and one-year lagged net profit margin. All
specifications include city cross year fixed effects, 2-digit industry cross year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. The
standard error clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses.*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the
5 percent level, significant at the 10 percent level.
same shock to minority shareholders generates a positive yet insignificant effect. We also compare
SOE versus POE (privately owned enterprises) shareholders. Interestingly, although the SOEs are
considered generally as financially unconstrained compared to POEs, we do not find subsidiaries
benefitted from SOE shareholders passing bank credit to subsidiaries (Table 3.8). This finding
is intuitive, given that by definition the SOEs could have other incentives instead of the business
group’s best interests in mind Megginson (2016). Ljungqvist, Chen, Jiang, Lu, and Zhou (2015)
document a similar result that the state groups are less efficient in capital allocation compared to
private groups, based on a smaller sample of stock market listed firms
Another important feature of the internal capital market is that its significance depends on sub-
sidiary firms’ financial constraints aswell as their investment opportunities (Hypotheses-Development).
To understand the importance of subsidiaries’ financial constraints, we construct four measures
of industry-level financial vulnerability following Manova et al. (2015): the external financial
dependence (the Rajan-Zingales measure), the inventory ratio, the tangible asset ratio and the trade
credit ratio. Conceptually, the four measures capture different types of financial vulnerabilities. The
external financial dependence is measured as the share of capital expenditure that is not financed by
the cash flows in operations, which matters more to long-term investment activities. The other three
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Table 3.9: Controlling versus Minority Shareholders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Size-adjusted Weights Cash-flow Rights Weights Simple Average
Avg. Credit Growth in Controlling Holding Firms’ Cities 0.0917*** 0.0800*** 0.0791*** 0.0923***
(0.0248) (0.0246) (0.0227) (0.0248)
Avg. Credit Growth in Minority Holding Firms’ Cities 0.0329 0.0855 -0.0635 0.0331
(0.0414) (0.0557) (0.0585) (0.0406)
Number of Observations 1,314,458 1,314,458 1,314,458 1,314,458
City × Year FE YES YES YES YES
2-digit Industry × Year FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Firm-level Controls YES YES YES YES
This table compares controlling and non-controlling holding firms in passing credit supply shocks to subsidiary firms
using different shareholder weights. Holding firms’ cities credit growth is computed as the average growth rate of total
bank loans, weighted by the size of local credit market, the size of local credit market multiplied by firm total asset
value relative to city average, shareholders’ cashflow rights, and an equal weight in column (1) to column (4). Firm-level
controls include firm size, ownership, and age fixed effects; one-year lagged debt-to-asset ratio, and one-year lagged net
profit margin. All specifications include city cross year fixed effects, 2-digit industry cross year fixed effects, and firm
fixed effects. The standard error clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses.*** Significant at the 1 percent level,
** significant at the 5 percent level, significant at the 10 percent level.
remaining variables imply the short-term financial constraints of corporates. The inventory ratio,
calculated as the ratio of inventory value over total sales, signals the needs for working capital due
to variable costs in the production process. The tangible asset ratio indicates the collateral value
of the industry, which is defined as the ratio of fixed asset value55 to the book value of total assets.
Finally, the trade credit ratio, computed as the ratio of the change in accounts payable to the change
in total assets, is the proxy for average firm access to credit from trading partners.
We modify the baseline specification (3.1) to study the impacts of subsidiaries’ financial vulner-
ability on the pass-through of credit supply shocks from shareholders to subsidiaries:
.8C = U2C + \8 +W0A438CA>FCℎ?C +W1A438CA>FCℎ?C ×8=+D;8B + ^′-8C + n8C , (3.5)
where 8=+D;8B equals to 1 if the financial vulnerability measure of industry B (8 ∈ B) is above
median, and 0 otherwise. We construct four non-time varying measures at the industry level using
CompuStat data for US public firms to avoid endogeneity concerns.
Table 3.10 summarizes the results. We only include in private subsidiary firms given that SOEs
face atypical constraints on the credit market. Column (1) in the table implies that following an
55. Fixed asset value refers to the value of plant, property and equipment on the balance sheet.
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Table 3.10: Financial Vulnerabilities and the Pass-through of Credit Supply Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment
Avg. Credit Growth in Holding Firms’ Cities 0.0463 0.110*** 0.0994*** 0.107***
(0.0371) (0.0316) (0.0351) (0.0310)
Avg. Credit Growth in Hol. Firms’ Cities ×
High External Finance Dependence 0.116**
(0.0493)
High Inventory Ratio -0.0149
(0.0542)
High Tangible Asset Ratio 0.0141
(0.0523)
High Trade Credit Ratio -0.00737
(0.0567)
Number of Observations 753,316 753,316 753,316 753,316
City × Year FE YES YES YES YES
2-digit Industry × Year FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Firm-level Controls YES YES YES YES
This table presents how holding firms pass credit supply shocks to subsidiary firms. Holding firms’ cities credit growth is
computed as the weighted average of the growth rate of total bank loans. ‘High” indicates that the financial vulnerability
measure of the sector is above median. Column (1) to column (4) reports the effect of credit growth shocks to parent
companies on subsidiary firms’ investment, conditional on external finance dependence, inventory ratio, tangible asset
ratio, and trade credit ratio, respectively. Firm-level controls include firm size, ownership, and age fixed effects; one-year
lagged debt-to-asset ratio, one-year lagged net profit margin, and one-year lagged financial vulnerability measures. All
specifications include city cross year fixed effects, 2-digit industry cross year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. The
standard error clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses.*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the
5 percent level, significant at the 10 percent level.
average 10% annual growth of total credit in shareholders’ cities, subsidiaries in industries with an
above-median external finance dependence invest 1.1% more of their fixed asset value compared
to subsidiaries in industries with a below-median external finance dependence. The two short-
term financial vulnerability measures, the inventory ratio and the trade credit ratio, appear to have
insignificant effects on the pass-through of credit supply shocks from shareholders to subsidiary firms
(Column (2) and (4) in Table 3.10). The ability to collateralize has limited impact as well (Column
(3)), which again complements our baseline finding (Table 3.3,Column (4)) that the subsidiary firms’
bank financing condition is not affected by shocks to their parent companies in other cities.
For subsidiary firm investment opportunities, we construct four proxies following Giroud and
Mueller (2015): return on asset (ROA), return on capital (ROC), sales growth, and estimated TFP.
The ROA is calculated as the ratio of net profit to one-year lagged total asset value; the ROC is
measured as the ratio of net profit to lagged total fixed capital stock, and the sales growth is computed
as the annual growth rate of total revenue. To estimate TFP, we follow the literature Bertrand and
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Mullainathan (2003); Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008); Giroud and Mueller (2015) and
estimate first the linear production function at the 2-digit industry level:
H8C = V0 + V;;8C + V<<8C + V: :8C + `8C , (3.6)
where ;8C , <8C , :8C represent labor, intermediate input, and capital, respectively. The firm-year TFP
estimates is obtained by computing the residual term ˆ̀8C , from production function (3.6). For
robustness, we have also imposed an '(1) process on productivity `8C and the same results hold.
Next we extend again the baseline specification (3.1) to study the impacts of firm investment
opportunities on the pass-through of credit supply shocks from shareholders to subsidiaries::
.8C = U2C + \8 +W0A438CA>FCℎ?C +W1A438CA>FCℎ?C × =E$??8,C−1 + ^′-8C + n8C , (3.7)
where =E$??8,C−1 equals to 1 if the investment opportunity measure of firm 8 at time C−1 is above
median, and 0 otherwise.
Table 3.11 summarizes the results. As expected, the better-performing subsidiary firms make a
significantly larger investment following the same credit supply shock to the parent companies.
To further understand the differential responses of subsidiary firms, we divide the subsidiaries
into three groups: SOEs, domestic private companies, and foreign-invested companies. Compared
to the domestic private firms, both SOE subsidiaries and foreign-invested companies should be
less financially constrained due better access to non-bank capitals. Table 3.12 shows that only the
domestic private subsidiary firms positively respond to credit supply shocks to their shareholders,
while SOEs and foreign-invested companies are largely unaffected.
Finally, we look at whether subsidiaries can also play the role of a financial intermediary. Column
(1) of Table 3.13 examines whether subsidiaries’ investment responds to the bank lending shocks
to other subsidiaries located in other cities under the umbrella of the same corporate shareholder.
We find that the coefficient is insignificant and much smaller compared to subsidiaries responding
to the credit supply shocks to their parent companies. There could be several explanations. First,
subsidiaries tend to be smaller and face a tighter financial constraint, so they may gain limited extra
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Table 3.11: Investment Opportunities and the Pass-through of Credit Supply Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment (high external financial dependence firms)
Avg. Credit Growth in Holding Firms’ Cities 0.111** 0.110*** 0.123** 0.0777*
(0.0466) (0.0428) (0.0480) (0.0451)
Avg. Credit Growth in Hol. Firms’ Cities ×
High ROA (t-1) 0.097***
(0.0470)
High ROC (t-1) 0.089***
(0.0506)
High TFP (t-1) 0.071***
(0.0466)
High Sales Growth (t-1) 0.064***
(0.0467)
Number of Observations 376,189 376,189 371,944 265,616
City × Year FE YES YES YES YES
2-digit Industry × Year FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Firm-level Controls YES YES YES YES
This table presents how holding firms pass credit supply shocks to subsidiary firms depending on the investment op-
portunities of subsidiaries. We focus on the group of firms with above-median external finance dependence for more
significance. Holding firms’ cities credit growth is computed as the weighted average of the growth rate of total bank
loans.“High” indicates that the investment opportunity measure of the firm is above median. Column (1) to column (4)
reports the effect of credit growth shocks to parent companies on subsidiary firms’ investment, conditional on one-year
lagged ROA, ROC, TFP, and sales growth, respectively. Firm-level controls include firm size, ownership, and age fixed
effects; one-year lagged debt-to-asset ratio, and one-year lagged investment opportunity measures. All specifications
include city cross year fixed effects, 2-digit industry cross year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. *** Significant at the
1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.12: Heterogeneous Response of Subsidiaries
(1) (2) (3)
Domestic Private Firms SOEs Foreign-invested Companies
Avg. Credit Growth in Holding Firms’ Cities 0.0946*** 0.00945 0.00724
(0.0217) (0.0329) (0.0229)
Number of Observations 970,214 115,653 209,310
City × Year FE YES YES YES
2-digit Industry × Year FE YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Firm-level Controls YES YES YES
This table presents how different subsidiary firms respond differently to holding firms’ credit supply shocks. Holding
firms’ cities credit growth is computed as the weighted average of the growth rate of total bank loans. Column (1) to
column (5) reports the baseline estimates of the effect of credit growth shocks to parent companies on subsidiary firms’
investment for domestic private subsidiaries, SOE subsidiaries, and foreign-invested subsidiaries, respectively. Firm-level
controls include firm size, ownership, and age fixed effects; one-year lagged debt-to-asset ratio, and one-year lagged net
profit margin. All specifications include city cross year fixed effects, 2-digit industry cross year fixed effects, and firm
fixed effects. The standard error clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level,
** significant at the 5 percent level, significant at the 10 percent level.
135
Table 3.13: Subsidiaries are not Effective Intermediaries
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Subsidiary Firms Investment Shareholders Investment
Avg. Credit Growth in Cities of Other Subsidiaries under Common Ownership 0.00733
(0.0237)
Avg. Credit Growth in Subsidiaries’ Cities -0.0157
(0.0236)
Number of Observations 121,485 200,717
City × Year FE YES YES
2-digit Industry × Year FE YES YES
Firm FE YES YES
Firm-level Controls YES YES
This table presents the effect of subsidiaries as potential financial intermediaries in business groups. Other subsidiaries’
cities credit growth is computed as the weighted average of the growth rate of total bank loans. Firm-level controls include
firm size, ownership, and age fixed effects; one-year lagged debt-to-asset ratio, and one-year lagged net profit margin. All
specifications include city cross year fixed effects, 2-digit industry cross year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. The
standard error clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at
the 5 percent level, significant at the 10 percent level.
external financial support during a bank lending boom. Second, moving capital from one subsidiary
to another might be more closely given that the subsidiaries do not hold each others’ equity shares.
Even a small fixed transaction cost of equity exchanges could discourage capital transfer from one
subsidiary to the shareholder, then to another subsidiary. In Column (2), we examine whether
the corporate shareholder’s investment respond to the bank lending shocks exposed to subsidiaries
located in other cities. The result shows that the response is small, negative, and insignificant both
economically and statistically.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we document a large network of business groups in China in which non-financial
corporates hold equity stakes of each other. We show the existence of tiered intermediation within
business groups: corporate shareholders could play the role of financial intermediaries, propagating
credit from the banking sector to their subsidiaries. The equity transfers between corporate share-
holders and subsidiaries serve as an important channel of the tiered intermediation within business
groups. Intermediation is more effective when subsidiaries face higher financial constraints or
greater investment opportunities.
Our paper touches an important question on the interaction between the internal and external
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capital markets. More specifically, it sheds light on how internal capital markets could facilitate
the transmission of monetary or fiscal policies that intend to stimulate the economy through bank
lending. Parent companies in large corporate groups could complement banks by allowing their
credit to reach the smaller firms in the group through the internal markets. Policies supporting SMEs
can thus focus more on standalone firms to improve the effectiveness of policies.
An interesting question for future research would be on how to incorporate the internal capital
markets into optimal policy design. For example, Garcia et al. (2020) propose systematically
evaluating the value of government subsidies and risk exposures for development banks to facilitate
policy designs. Mature development banks such as the Korean Development Bank and German KfW
often lend to large conglomerates that span many economic sectors. Understanding the operations
of these large groups’ internal capital markets could help better assess the costs and benefits of fiscal




Appendix for Chapter 1
A Derivations of the Network Model
A.1 The Knowledge Diffusion Matrix
In this section, we provide a heuristic micro foundation to the innovation network that extends the
static version by Bloom et al. (2013) to the general dynamic settings.
Arrival of Innovations
Suppose there are [P] = {1,2, ..., } sectors (i.e., representative firm), and [Z] = {1,2, ...,)} as the
set of technology classes in technology space. Denote
G(C) = [1(C), ...,  9 (C), ...,  (C)] ′ (A.1)
as the joint technology stock at time t, with  9 (C) the technology stock of sector 9 ∈ [P].
Within the time interval [C, C +1], denote # 9 (C, C +1) as the new arrival of technology inventions.
The technology will be lifted up due to new innovation, we write as
log(




8≤# 9 (C ,C+1)
[I 98 (C +1) + I 9 (C +1) + I(C +1)] (A.2)
Here, we decompose the lift-up effect of each invention into three components - innovation specific,
firm specific and time specific, i.e., we allow for correlation of shocks between sectors. Without
loss of generality, we set EC I 98 (C + 1) = 0, 6, 9 = EC I 9 (C + 1) and 6 = E 9 I(C + 1). If we assume
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I 98 (C +1), I 9 (C +1), and I(C +1) are independent of # 9 (C, C +1), then
C log[
 9 (C +1)
 9 (C)
] = C# 9 (C, C +1)C [I 98 (C +1) + I 9 (C +1) + I(C +1)]
and
C log[
 9 (C +1)
 9 (C)
] = ` 9 (C)
with ` 9 (C) is the arrival intensity of new technology between C and C +1.
Endogenous Learning
In this subsection, we model the process of arrival intensity as a learning process in a dynamic
setting. In reality, one firm in a specific industry (e.g. Microsoft) may issued many patents,
spanning several technology classes in technology space [Z]. We denote @← 9 (C) as the fraction of
sector 9’s technology in technology class @, denote
Lj (t) = (1← 9 , ..., @← 9 , ..., )← 9) ′ (A.3)
as the technology distribution of sector 9 in technology space [Z]. Empirically, the distribution L 9
is very persistent over time if we interpret it as the patent distribution in technology space Acemoglu
et al. (2016b). Denote







the technology insights in field @ contributed by all sectors between C and C +1, which is the available
technology can be learned by all sectors (companies).
Figure 1.12 shows how firms learn from each other. Firm 9 (Walmart) put efforts and resources
to establish research groups or laboratories in various technology fields - scientific computation,
software, and forecasting etc. Consider researchers in scientific computation, they not only obtain
insights from the technology progress in scientific computation, but also from the technology
progress in other fields like software contributed by other companies likeMicrosoft, IBM, and Uber
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etc. Specifically, we denote the effort or resource vector as
e 9 (C) = (4 9 ,1, ..., 4 9 ,g , ..., 4 9 ,) ) ′(C)
with 4 9 g (C) the resources put by 9 in technology field g at C. Given the efforts e 9 (C), we model the
arrival intensity at C +1 as
` 9 (C) = (1− \0)` 9 (C −1) + \1
∑
g∈[Z ]
5 (4 9 g (C), ; 9 g
∑
@
Ωg←@)%@ (C)) + nD9C (A.5)
We explain this setup one by one as follows
1. If there is no learning or R&D, the arrival process is mean-reverse (i.e., \0 > 0)
` 9 (C) = (1− \0)` 9 (C −1) + nDC
2. )%@ (C) is the technology knowledge in field @ that researchers can learn. Ωg←@ measures the
easiness of researchers with expertise in field g learning from field @. We useΩg←@ to capture
the technology closeness between fields g and @ and allow for heterogeneity in the easiness.
This is quite intuitive, it is easier for researchers in Algorithm to learn from technology class
Optimization than Hardware Designers. The higher Ωg←@ is, the easier it is that knowledge
flows from @ to g.Overall, we use
Ωg←@)%@ (C))
to capture the amount of knowledge in field @ available to field g adjusted by learning easiness.
3. In real world, sometimes it is more difficult for some sectors (firms) than others to obtain or
apply the useful insights from a given technology field. To capture this effect, we use ; 9 ,g to






the easiness of researchers in technology field g of firm (industry) 9 from others.
4. 5 (4 9 g (C), ; 9 g
∑
@Ωg←@)%@ (C)) is the search-match function in technology field g for firm
(industry) 9 .With more efforts put in searching for ideas, it is more likely to get new ideas
and promote the arrival rate of invention. For simplicity, we further assume the search-match
function take the form of
5 (G1, G2) = U0G2 + GU1 G
1−U
2
U0G2 captures the externality due to technology diffusion, andU ∈ (0,1) capture the diminishing
marginal effect in learning.
5. The promotion effect due to learning is additive across research groups
∑
g∈[Z ]




with )%@ (C) the pool of knowledge in technology class @ from which firms can learn new
insights. *
5. In equation A.5, an increase in effort e 9 (C) promotes both the instaneous and future arrival
intensity due to the dynamic property. As a result, to pin down the optimal effort at time t,
we need to discount all the future marginal value of the effort into current period. [Insert
LiteratureHere] emphasize this channelXXX.Here, to emphasize the network effect, we shut
down this channel via a tricky. Specifically, we denote + 9 (C, C + B) as the expected discounted
value of one unit innovation of C + B at C. We define
+̃ 9 (C) =
∑
B≥0
+ 9 (C, C + B) (1− \0)B
Then +̃ 9 (C) is the value that firm 9 is willing to pay to increase ` 9 (C) by one unit. We assume
the matching function in A.5 with the normalized cost
4̃ 9 g (C) =




Put differently, the more valuable the innovation is, the higher the cost is to produce. */
Optimal Searching Efforts
Firms choose efforts e 9 (C) = (4 9 ,1, ..., 4 9 ,g , ..., 4 9 ,) ) ′(C) to improve the arrival rate `(C) which will
in turn accelerate the arrive of the new invention in the future. At period C, given
Based on the search and match function in equations A.5 and A.6, the optimal level of resources
put in field g is




[ ; 9 g∑@Ωg←@)%@ (C)
4 9 g (C)
]1−U
= 1 (A.7)
Thus, the optimal amount of resources put into searching for ideas or insights would be





Ωg←@)%@ (C) = +̃ 9 (C) (U\1)
1





The dynamics of arrival intensity follows
` 9 (C) = (1− \0)` 9 (C −1) + (U0 + \̃1)
∑
g@,:
; 9 gΩg←@@←:Δ log(: (C)) (A.9)
with \̃1 = \1(U\1)
1
1−U . Let us denote d = \0, and
, 9: = (U0 + \̃1)
∑
g,@
; 9 gΩg←@@←: (A.10)
We have
-(C) = (1− d)-(C −1) +]Δ log(G(C)) (A.11)
in matrix form. Also note that it is very easy for us to incorporate shocks fD zD (C) to the arrival
intensity in equation A.5. Thus, the reduced diffusion process can be written as
-(C) = (1− d)-(C −1) +]Δ log(G(C)) +fD zD (C) (A.12)
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A.2 General Cases
In this section, we address the general cases of the nested input-output networks. We start with the
basic equations to characterize the equilibrium.
The General Equilibrium




 9C = (1−[)
∑
9
% 9C. 9C = (1−[).C =⇒ Δ2C+1 = ΔHC+1 (A.13)
with 2C = log(C ), HC = log(.C ), Δ2C+1 = 2C+1− 2C , and ΔHC+1 = HC+1− HC .




- 98C = .8C =⇒ %8C28C +
∑
9∈[ ]








% 9C. 9C = U8C +[
∑
9
\̃ 98C% 9C. 9C = %8C.8C
=⇒ U8 (1−[).C +
∑
9
\̃ 98C% 9C. 9C = %8C.8C
(A.14)
The above is just the accounting identity of input-output table. \̃ 98C =
%8C- 98C
 9C_ 9C
is the reliance of
sector or firm 9 on firm 8 - the share of expenditure of firm 9 on firm 8. From the optimization of
























\̃ 98C is the price adjusted input dependence of sector 9 on 8. The intuition for equation A.14 is that
- the final product of sector 8 will be used either as consumption, U8 (1− [).C , or the input to other
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\̃ 98C B 9C = B8C =⇒ s = (1−[) [ −[̃
′
C ]−1" (A.16)
with B 9C = % 9C. 9C/.C ,∀ 9 ∈ [], s = (B1C , ..., BC ) ′, " = (U1C , ..., UC ) ′ and ̃C = (\̃8 9C ) | |× | |.
There are several things worth mentioning.
1. The reliance of sector 9 on sector 8, \̃ 98C , is endogeneous, depending on GC and the structure
parameters in our model. For the Cobb-Douglas case, \̃ 98C = \ 98 is constant over time.
2. The intuition of equation A.16 is very clear - the products of firm or sector 8 will be used
either in consumption, i.e. U8 (1−[), or used as input for other sectors, i.e., [
∑
9 \̃ 98C B 9C . The
importance of firm or sector 8,B8C is defined recursively, depending on the importance of its
downstream firms and their reliance on 8.
3. How technology shocks affect the reallocation of resources across sectors can be fully captured
by ̃C , which in turn is observable from the input-output table. Thus, ̃C is the sufficient
statistics capturing the reallocation effects.
4. When E 9 > 1, the substitute effect dominates the income effect. When the price %8C increases,
firm 9 can substitute away -8C , the effective reliance of firm 9 on the firm 8, \̃ 98C , declines. In
partial equilibrium, if there is bad shock to firm or sector 8, leading to an increase in price
of firm 8, we would expect firm or sector 9 replace away from the product 8. Conditional on
B 9C , 9 ≠ 8, we expect the share of firm 8 to decline as shown in A.16.
5. When E < 1, the substitute effects are dominated, the firm or sector 9 can not fully substitute
away from 8 to offset the price shock exposure to 8. Under this case, the effective reliance on 8
increases.
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From the first order condition of firm optimization, we have
[B8C.C ]1−[ = _−[8C %8C8C[
[ , 8 ∈ []
=⇒ (1−[) [log(B8C ) + log(.C )] = −[ log(_8C ) + log(%8C ) + log(8C ) +[ log([)
=⇒ (1−[) [log(st ) +1 log(.C )] = −[ log(,t ) + log(Vt ) + log(Gt ) +[ log([)1
(A.17)










(1− E 9) log(_ 9C ) = (1− E 9) log(%8C ) + E 9 log(\ 98) − log(\̃ 98C )
=⇒ (1− E 9)\̃ 98C log(_ 9C ) = \̃ 98C [(1− E 9) log(%8C ) + E 9 log(\ 98) − log(\̃ 98C )]
=⇒ (1− E 9) log(_ 9C ) = (1− E 9)
∑
8∈[ ]
\̃ 98C log(%8C ) + E 9
∑
8∈[ ]
\̃ 98C log(\ 98) −
∑
8∈[ ]
\̃ 98C log(\̃ 98C )
(A.18)
The last equation is obtained by summing across all 8’s and use
∑
8 \̃ 98C = 1.









\̃ 98C log (
\̃ 98C
\ 98





8∈[ ] \ 98 log(\ 98) ∀E 9 = 1.
where # \
9C
is the sparsity of input-output matrix for firm 9 similar to Herskovic (2018). There
are two things worth mentioning. First, Herskovic (2018) obtains the measure of sparsity for Cobb-
Douglas case, which is
∑
8 \̃ 98C log(\̃ 98C ) and assume it is exogenous. Second, he takes the log-linear
approximation around Cobb-Douglas case to approximate for the general case, we extend the sparsity
definition to the general case accurately, but adjusted by an additional term E91−E9
∑





From equation A.18, we have log(_ 9C ) =
∑
8∈ \̃ 98C log(%8C ) −# \8C 56
log(,t ) =C log(VC ) −T \C (A.19)




]U8 = 1 =⇒ "′ log(VC ) = "′ log(") (A.20)
Solution to the General Nested Networks
There are 3| | +1 unknown variables in equations A.16, A.17, A.19, and A.20 - Vt = (%1C , ..., %#C ),
st = (B1C , ..., B#C ), ,t = (_1C , ...,_#C ) and the aggregate output .C , and 3| | +1 of independent equa-
tions. In equilibrium, \̃ 98C can be solved as a function of GC . Most importantly, \̃ 98C can be recovered
from the input-output table which enables us to obtain a closed-form solution to the general cases as
a function of GC and the observable ̃C . Substitute equation A.19 into A.17, we obtain
(1−[) [log(st ) +1 log(.C )] = [T \C + [O−[̃C ] log(Vt ) + log(Gt ) +[ log([)1
=⇒ (1−[) [s′C log(st ) + log(.C )] = [s′CT \C + (1−[)"′ log(") + s′C log(GC ) +[ log([)
(A.21)
Here, we have used the equations A.16, A.20,and s′C1 = 1. Thus, the output would takes the form of
log(.C ) = s′C
[























) \8 9 if E = 1
For E = 1, we have
log(,C ) = log(VC ) −T) , if E = 1
where T) = (∑ 9 \1 9 log(\1 9 ), ...,∑ 9 \ 9 log(\ 9 ))′ is the sparsity of the input-output networks. When E ≠ 1, there is
neither linear nor log-linear relationship between ,t and VC based on the above equation, they conclude that there is









, we still have a log-linear
relationship between ,C and VC .
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Furthermore, the price in equilibrium can be determined as




(1−[) log(st ) + (1−[)1 log(.C ) −[T \C − log(GC ) −[ log([)1
]
(A.23)
In the general case, the system goes beyond the Hulten’s theorem Hulten (1978); Baqaee and Farhi
(2019) by including additional terms s′C log(sC ), and −s′CT)t , both of which can be estimated from
the data.
A.3 Solution to Euler Equation
In this subsection, we solve the Euler equation 1.40 to derive the expressions of undetermined
coefficients 10 and b1 in the log of price dividend ratio: IC = 10 + b′1-C . The unexpected IC+1, Δ2C+1,
and market portfolio return A<,C+1 are


























CA<,C+1 = ^0 + ^1C IC+1 +CΔ2C+1− IC
= ^0 + ^1 [10 + b′C -C+1] +CΔ2C+1− IC
= ^0 + ^110 + ^1b1′[O +]̃]uC +
1
1−[ s
′-C − (10 + b′1-)
= ^0 + (^1−1)10 +
[
^1b1







To settle down the undetermined coefficients 10 and b1, use the Euler equation 1.40
1 = C [exp(<C+1 + A<,C+1)] = C exp(\ log(X) − \/kΔ2C+1 + \A<,C+1)





The above equation can be written as an affine function of -C .Thus, the constant and the coefficient
of -C in the above should be equal to 0. Note that Δ2C+1 − CΔ2C+1 and ΔA<,C+1 − CΔA<,C+1 are
independent of -C , implying



















Innovations of the log of state price kernel is
<C+1−C<C+1 = −\/k(2C+1−C2C+1) + (\ −1) (A<,C+1−CA<,C+1)
= − \/k
1−[ s














′fzC+1 + (\ −1)^1
1−k
k(1−[) s
′[^1(O +]̃) − O]−1 []fzC+1 +fD z
D
C+1]
= − 5<,0(C+1−C )Δ2C+1− 5<,1
s′
1−[ [O− ^1(O +]̃)]
−1 [C+1−C ]-C+1
(A.29)
with 5<,0 = 1− \ + \/k = W, and 5<,1 = ^1(1− \) (1− 1/k). The first term of equation A.29 is the
one related to CCAMP, and the second term comes from the knowledge diffusion matrices. The
intuition goes as follows - a shock to -t+1 will affect the realized knowledge growth at+2, which
in turn changes the stock of new knowledge from which researchers learn insights etc.Through this
propagation, the initial shock to the joint arrival intensity will have a persistent effect on future
growth of consumption. Through the recursive utility, the shock to future consumption growth
will be priced. In fact, when \ = 1, the preference is reduced to time-separable, the second term
disappears and the network structure of knowledge diffusion will not be priced.
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A.4 More General Lagged Effects
Solutions to the Undetermined Parameters
In our baseline model, firms only learn from the new knowledge with one-year lagged. In this
section, we extend our baseline to more general situations that enable firms to learn from historical
knowledge. This extension allows us to match data much better and still keeps the tractability.
-C+1 = (1− d)-C +]i(!)ΔaC+1 +fDIDC+1
ΔaC+1 = Δ log(GC+1) = -C +fzC+1
(A.30)
where i(!) = ∑B≥0 iB!B, with i0 = 1 and ! being the lag-operator. Under this case, the state
variables at period C are (-C ,Δlog(GB), B ≤ C) = (-C , XaB, B ≤ C). We write the log of price-dividend
ratio as




Where b1, and >B, B ≤ 0 are  ×1 vectors.
Denote i (B) (!) =∑ 9≥0 iB+ 9!B+ 9 , from equation A.30, we have
C -C+1 = [(1− d)O +]]-C +]i (1) (!)ΔaC
C aC+1 = -C
(A.32)
Furthermore, the expected log of price-dividend ratio can be written as






= 10 + b′1 [((1− d)O +])-C +]i















The innovation to the arrival intensity can be written as
-C+1−C -C+1 = fD zDC+1 +]fz

C+1 (A.34)
The innovation to the log of price-dividend ratio is











Using the log-linear approximation Campbell and Shiller (1988), we have
CA<,C+1 = ^0 + ^1C IC+1 +CΔ2C+1− IC
= ^0 + ^110 + ^1
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and the innovation to market return is

















Here, we have use the condition that [Δ2C+1−CΔ2C+1] = 11−[ s
′z
C+1 for the Cobb-Douglas case.
To pin down the undetermined parameters 10, b1, and >̃B, B ≥ 0, we use the first oder condition
1 = C4G?(<C+1 + A<,C+1)
= C4G?(\ log(X) − \/kΔ2C+1 + \A<,C+1)
=⇒ 0 = log(X) −1/kCΔ2C+1 +CA<,C+1 + \/2E0AC (A<,C+1−Δ2C+1/k)
(A.38)
Note that the innovations to consumption growth and market returns, Δ2C+1−CΔ2C+1 and A<,C+1−
CA<,C+1, are independent of the state variables. Plugging in the expressions of CΔ2C+1 and CA<,C+1,
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the coefficients of -C and at should be equal to zero.


















For the term of -C , we have
[O− ^1(O +]̃ ′)]b1 = −
1−k
k(1−[) s+ ^1>̃0 (A.40)
Compared to equationA.28where firms only learn from the newknowledge besides the lagged arrival
intensity, a new term ^1>̃0 comes in. with 5<,0 = 1− \ + \/k = W, and 5<,1 = ^1(1− \) (1− 1/k).
The first term of equation A.29 is the one related to CCAMP, and the second term comes from
the innovation network. The intuition goes as follows - a shock to -t+1 will affect the realized
knowledge growth at+2, which in turn changes the stock of new knowledge from which researchers
learn insights etc.Through this propagation, the initial shock to the joint arrival intensity will have a
persistent effect on future growth of consumption. Through the recursive utility, the shock to future
consumption growth will be priced. In fact, when \ = 1, the preference is reduced to time-separable,
the second term disappears and the network structure of knowledge diffusion will not be priced.










Thus, >B can be solved recursively,
[1− ^1]>̃B = ^1] ′biB+1 =⇒ >̃B = ^1] ′b[1− ^1]−1iB+1 = kB] ′b (A.41)




1 iB+1+ 9 . Sub-
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stitute the expression of >̃0 back to the equation on b1, we solve for b1
















The parameters of the system can be determined based on equations A.41 and A.42. In this section,
we explore the properties of pricing kernel.
The unexpected log of state price kernel takes the form of
<C+1−C<C+1 = −\/k(2C+1−C2C+1) + (\ −1) (A<,C+1−CA<,C+1)
= − \/k
1−[ s
























































































1iB. When firms only learn
from the newly generated knowledge beyond the -C , that is, iB = 0,∀B ≥ 1, the results are reduced to
the cases in equation A.29
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B State Space Model Estimate
B.1 Estimation with TFP Data
So far we measure the innovation process ΔaC with patent data. One caveat of doing so is that patent
issuance or filing can only measure R&D activities up to a time lag, as they are the results of the
R&D several months or even years ago. In this section, we measure the innovation process with
sector-level TFP data in the US, and investigate the technology shocks and innovation networks.
Model Setup
Different from patent-based measure of innovation, TFP growth can be decomposed into two parts:
technological progress and improvement in management efficiency. As a result, we modify our
model and divide the log TFP process ãt into technology and efficiency components as
ãt = at +mt (B.1)
Similar to the previous model, the technological growth is knowledge diffusion plus noise:
at = -C + &0C with &0C ∼ N(0,f20 O)
here the arrival intensity of innovation -C follows
-C+1 = (1− d)-C +]aC + &DC+1 = [(1− d)O +]]-C +]&
0
C + &DC+1, with &
D
C ∼ N(0,f2D O) (B.2)
where &DC is the technology shock process, and
] = ]̃, = diag{b1, ..., b },]̃ is from the citation matrix data. (B.3)
The growth of management efficiency mC follows AR(1) process
mC+1 = d<mC + &<C+1, with d< constant, &
<
C ∼ N(0,f2<O) independent with &DC (B.4)
154
The model can be written as a state space form with the measurement equation as:
ãt = -t +mt + &0C , with &0C ∼ N(0,f20 O) (B.5)


















In this problem, we hope to estimate d, d<,,f2D ,f20,f2< and look into the interaction of the
technology shock process &DC and the knowledge diffusion matrices.
Data and Estimation Results
For estimation, we use the sector level TFP data from the BEA-BLS database57. We use the the
official multifactor productivity (MFP) estimates as the measure of ãt in Equation (B.1). The data
is available at the sector level annually from 1987 to 2018, and we further construct 3-digit NAICS
level TFP each year to investigate its interaction with the knowledge diffusion matrix we construct
in Section ??.
Since the TFP data only cover a shorter time period than patent data, here we further assume
that  = b O. Thus we only need to estimate d, d<, b,f2D ,f20,f2<. Using the state space estimation
algorithm in Appendix D, the estimation results are in Table 1.5. Similar to the estimation results
with patent data, here 1− d + b = 0.9763, which is very close to 1.
With the parameter estimates, we can recover the technology shock process &DC , and investigate
its interaction with the knowledge diffusion matrices over time. In Figure 1.9, we plot the inner
product of the technology shocks and the leading eigenvector of knowledge diffusion matrices over
time. The grey shadow area plots the NBER recessions. We can see that during the Great Recession,
57. Data and relevant documents are available at this BLS webpage.
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the negative TFP shock get mostly amplified through the knowledge diffusion network.
C Data Appedix
C.1 Patent Data and Construction of Diffusion Matrix
In this appendix, we describe more details on the construction the standardized innovation diffusion
matrix ]̃. We mainly use the patent datasets constructed by Zhu (2020) who makes two significant
improvements in patent citations and assignees, compared to the data by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg
(2001) and Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017). First, Zhu (2020) constructs a more
complete patent citation datasets, which is roughly 170% of that in Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru,
and Stoffman (2017). Second, Zhu (2020) develop new algorithm to match the patent assignees
and companies in CRSP/CompuStat where 45% of patents are matched to CRSP/CompuStat, much
higher than that by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) and Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman
(2017). These improvements are important for us to construct a more complete innovation network.
Briefly speaking, the patent datasets include three sub-datasets - patent issuance, patent assignee,
and patent citation. The patent issuance and assignee datasets can be traced back to 1920 and updated
to 2014, while the patent citation dataset can only be traced back to 1947. At each year t, we use the
patent citation in the past five years to construct the innovation diffusion matrix. Thus, our dynamic
diffusion matrix ]̃ is available between 1952 and 2015. For the sample before 1952 or after 2015,
we implicitly assume the knowledge diffusion matrices to be stable Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Kerr
(2016a), and use the latest one to make approximation.
Static Diffusion Matrix
To illustrate the intuition of the construction on ]̃, we first consider the construction in a static con-
text. In the next subsection, we describe in more detail about the construction of dynamic diffusion
matrix.
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Figure 1.12 shows how firms learn knowledge from others. Firm 8 (Walmart) put efforts and
resources to establish research groups or liboratories in various technology fields. For example,
the company could have several research groups - scientific computation, software, and forecasting
etc. Consider the researchers in the scientific computation (technology class g), they not only obtain
insights from the new knowledge of the field scientific computation, but also from the new knowledge
of other technology fields (say, like software) created by other companies like Microsoft, IBM, and
Uber etc.. On the other hand, firm 9 (e.g. Microsoft) may issued many patents, spanning several
technology classes in technology space [Z].
Empirically, we interpret the technology fields as the classes based on patent classification main-
tained by US Patent Office (USPTO). Based on the usage and property of the patent, US Patent
Office (USPTO) assign each patent into one or several technology classes and subclasses called
USPC. Specifically, the patent is first assigned into three-digit main class, within the main class, the
patent will be further assigned into more detailed 6-digit subclass. In our paper, we focus on the
three-digit main classes.
To measure the knowledge flow intensity from the representative firm in industry 9 to 8, we
denote l = (;8,1, ..., ;8,) ) as the patent or reference distribution of industry 8 over the technology
space, denote L@ = (@,1, ..., @, ), @ ∈ [Z] as the distribution of patents in technology field @ over
industries, and Ωg,@ as the easiness of researchers with expertise in fields g learning insights from





The intuition here is straightforward. The knowledge that the representative firm in industry 8 learns
from 9 depends on the three parts - 1) the distribution of the resources of the representative firm in
industry 8 in various technology fields (g), captured by ;8g , g ∈ [Z], 2) the easiness of researchers in
technology class g learning from @, captured by Ωg,@, 3) the amount of knowledge in technology
field @ that the representative firm in 9 contributes to, captured by @, 9 .
157
To estimate the easiness of the knowledge flow from @ to g, we construct a technology class-to-
class citation matrix based on the patent-to-patent citations. Specifically, denote 8Cg,@ as the total
number of references made by patents in technology class g to the patents in technology class @ 58.




Construction of Dynamic ]̃
In the previous subsection, we mainly talk about the construction of ]̃ in a static and abstract
setting which provide useful insights to us. In this subsection, we describe how to construct it from
our real patent datasets. We use the patent datasets constructed by Zhu (2020). We construct the
time-varying ]̃8 9 (C)59 as
∑
g,@∈[Z ] ;8,gΩg,@@, 9 .
At year t, we estimate the l 8 (C) = (;8,1(C), ..., ;8,) (C)) based on five-year rolling window. Specif-
ically, at year t, we calculate ;8,g (C) as the fraction of patents, granted to firms in industry 8 in the
past five years, that belong to technology class g. If one patent is assigned to several technology
classes (say, : classes) by US Patent Office (USPTO), we split the patent into the : classes equally,
and accrue 1/: patent to each class. Obvisouly, ∑g∈[Z ] ;8,g (C) = 1.
To estimate the time-varyingΩg,@ (C). At year, we first find all patents, issued between year C and
C −5, that belong to the technology class g. If the issued patent is in several technology classes, we
split it equally among these classes. For the patent in class g issued in year C − B with 0 ≤ B < 5, we
count its references to patents in class @ that issued between C−B and C−B−10. Denote8Cg,@ (C) as the




Figure ?? shows the sparsity of Ωg,@ (C), g, @ ∈ [Z] at year 2014. For class g, we define its
in-degree as the number of three-digit classes to which patents in g refer in the past ten years, that
is, #{@ ∈ [Z],Ωg,@ (C) > 0}. Similarly, we define the out-degree as the number of classes citing the
58. If the patent belongs to each technology class, we equally split the patents into these classes
59. Here, we denote as ]̃ (C) to indicate time-varying
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class g, #{@ ∈ [Z],Ω@,g (C) > 0}. We can see that the both in-degree and out-degree distribution are
highly left-skewed, most of the technology classes only cite or are cited by few technology classes.
However, there are non-negligible technology classes citing or being cited by hundreds of other
technology classes.
Finally, to estimate the L@ (C) = (@,1(C), ..., @, (C)), @ ∈ [Z]. At year t, we first count the number
of patents issued between C and C −5 in the technology class @, and then use the fraction attributed
to the firms in industry 9 to estimate @, 9 (C), 9 ∈ [].
C.2 Sector Output Data
In this section, we describe how to construct US sector gross output {s 9} at three-digit NAICS code
level from 1947 to 2018. We use data from both the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Though BEA is the most authorized data provider of US industry
output data, they did not provide gross output data for detailed manufacturing industries from 1977
to 1997. Fortunately, BLS construct a detailed industry output measure for 205 sectors each year
from 1972 to 201860. For the year from 1947 to 1972, we use the historical gross output by industry
data from BEA61.
The 1972-2018 BLS industry output data are coded in the BLS 205 Order Industry Sectoring
Plan, and BLS provide an official guidance to map their industry classification to the NAICS 2017
classification. The 1947-1971 data are coded in the BEA IO code, which could be mapped to the
NAICS 2017 classification by hand62. After the mapping, we have industry output data from 1947
to 2018 coded in NAICS 2017 classification.
60. See “Data for Researchers” on this BLS webpage, last accessed on January 6, 2020. According to BLS report which
can also be downloaded from this webpage, they did a very careful job to construct the industry output measures from
1972 to 2018. We also compare the BLS data with BEA data for 1997-2017 when BEA also provide detailed industry
output for all the industries, and find that they are highly consistent with each other.
61. The data can be found in the gross output link on this BEA webpage, last accessed on January 6, 2020.
62. BEA only provides a verbal description for its historical industry classification, while we find the BEA historical
classification matches almost perfectly to 2-digit or three-digit level NAICS 2017 classification with few exceptions.
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Since the original industry division was not in three-digit NAICS level, each entry of the data
after the mapping may correspond to the total output of more than one three-digit NAICS industry,
or may correspond to the output of some 4-digit NAICS industries. To construct {s 9} for each single
three-digit NAICS industry, we first follow Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Kerr (2016a) to split the output
equally to each industry if one data entry is the total output of several industries. Then we merge
the data to three-digit NAICS level and calculate the sector output shares {s 9} for each three-digit
NAICS industry every year from 1947 to 2018.
C.3 Sector Input-Output Data
In this section, we describe how to construct US sector input-output {̃C } at three-digit NAICS
code level for non-government sectors63 every year between 1947 and 2018. The data source is the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), including a 71-industry input-output table for each year in
1997-2018, and a 65-industry table for each year in 1963-1996, and a 46-industry table for each year
in 1947-196264. Since BEA release various versions of input-output tables, we follow the literature
like Bigio and La’o (2016) to use the “Use Table after Redefinitions” for 1997-2018, and use the
“Use Table before Redefinitions” for 1947-1996 as the redefined data are not available then.
Similar to the sector output data, we need to map the original data in the BEA IO code to NAICS
code. The 1997-2018 input-output data are provided together with a concordance between its indus-
try classification and NAICS 2007, while the 1947-1996 data are provided with a concordance with
NAICS 2012 classification. So we first map the BEA IO code to the NAICS 2007/2012, then map
the NAICS 2007/2012 to NAICS 2017 to get consistent industry classification65.
To construct {̃C } between all the pairs of single three-digit NAICS industries, we need to split
63. Though the BEA IO table covers all sectors including government sectors, the map between those government sectors
and NAICS sectors is missing. So we follow the literature like Bigio and La’o (2016) to only focus the non-government
sectors in this paper. We would also drop the government sectors when calculating the sector gross output shares.
64. The data for 1997-2018 can be found in the “Make-Use Tables” section, and data for 1947-1962 and 1963-1996 in the
“Historical Make-Use Tables” section, both on this BEA webpage, last accessed on January 6, 2020. Note that the
BEA used to only release the input-output tables for every five years before 1997, while they recently released a new
dataset including annual input-output table since 1947, which is used in this paper.
65. For example, there are sectors 513 and 514 in NAICS 2012, which are merged into 515 in NAICS 2017.
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data entries that correspond to multiple NAICS industries. Similar to the work on sector output
shares, we split the input-output value equally to each industry if one data entry is the total input or
output of multiple NAICS industries. Then we merge the data to three-digit NAICS level to get the
input-output table {̃C } between all the three-digit NAICS industry pairs every year from 1947 to
2018.
C.4 NAICS Classification for Firms since 1925
In this paper, we classify industries following the 2017 version of the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS). However, NAICS code is generally not available in the Compustat
data until 1997, the year when NAICS was introduced66. Also, there have been five versions of
NAICS classification: 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017, among which the same industry code could
means different industries. To make our analysis more consistent, we map all public firms in the US
since 1925 into the 2017 NAICS classification. As some firms may operate in different industries
over the year, the mapping is constructed for every pair of {firm, year}. With a CRSP dataset on
the universe of US public firms since 1925 with their (Standard Industrial Classification) SIC and
NAICS code each year whenever possible, the construction procedure proceed as follows:
1. Map all NAICS code to the 2017 NAICS version. For each {firm, year} pair with NAICS
information available, take that NAICS code as the most recent version of NAICS in that year,
and map that NAICS code into the 2017 version of NAICS classification with the official
concordances provided by the Census Bureau67.
Among all 115,154 data entries in CRSP with NAICS information available, 110,757 (96.2%)
can bemapped to the 2017NAICS in this way, with the remaining 4,397 entries’ NAICS cannot
be found in the most updated version of NAICS then. There are 297 unique 6-digit NAICS
codes for those 4,397 data entries, and we search for them in other versions of NAICS. 132 of
them can be uniquely spotted in only one of the historical NAICS version. The remaining 140
66. NAICS is not available in the CRSP data provided by WRDS until 2004.
67. The official concordances can be found on this webpage, last accessed on March 30, 2020. In practice, we merge the
concordances between 1987 SIC and 2002 NAICS, 1997 NAICS and 2002 NAICS, 2002 NAICS and 2007 NAICS,
2007 NAICS and 2012 NAICS, 2012 NAICS and 2017 NAICS, so that we can get the concordances between all
historical NAICS and the 2017 NAICS, and also between 1987 SIC and 2017 NAICS.
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NAICS codes can be found in more than one historical version of NAICS. For those, we take
them as the latest version. This is totally acceptable, as we manually check that most of those
NAICS codes are exactly concordance with each other in different versions of NAICS. There
are also 25 NAICS code cannot be found in any historical versions of NAICS, so we would
not make use of those NAICS information, and would leave those firms to further steps.
2. Fill in NAICS code with SIC code. After the first step, we could get roughly 26.4% of the
CRSP data mapped to the 2017 NAICS, and we need to map the remaining data using their SIC
information. We take all SIC codes in CRSP as the most recent 1987 version, and map them
to the 2017 NAICS codes using the official concordances provided by the Census Bureau.
Similar to the last step, we also search in historical SIC classifications for those SIC codes that
cannot be found in the 1987 SIC, and map them into the 1987 SIC thus 2017 NAICS.
After the procedures detailed as above, we could find the 2017 NAICS industry classifications for
all the US public firms since 1925. To note, one firm could belong to one or more 6-digit NAICS
industries in a given year, and we would split firm’s variable value into each NAICS industry when
we calculate measures in the industry level. How we do the split would not matter much since most
of our analysis would be done in the three-digit NAICS level (so called “subsector”).
C.5 CRSP Data and Industry Stock Return
The first proxy for the innovation shocks X-C = (X`1C , ..., X`C ) is annual realized stock return (value-
weighted) at the three-digit NAICS level.
[Details to be added by Wu]
Using the NAICS classification for firms constructed in Section C.4, for those firms that belong
to multiple three-digit NAICS industry in a given year, we equally split their stock prices to each of
the NAICS industry...
162
C.6 Compustat Data and Industry R&D Expenditure
The second proxy for the innovation shocks X-C = (X`1C , ..., X`C ) is the realized drop in R&D
expenditure at industry level. We use the Compustat North America data to calculate YoY change of
quarterly68 R&D expenditure at the three-digit NAICS level. The quarterly data on R&D expendi-
ture begins in 1988Q3, so our measures for YoY expenditure change begins in 1989Q3 and ends in
2018Q4. For each firm, we drop their missing values of R&D expenditure before their first positive
report, and set missing values after their first report as 0. We also exclude all the negative report
values of R&D expenditure.
To calculate YoY change of quarterly R&D expenditure at the three-digit NAICS level from
1988Q3 to 2018Q4, we proceed as below. First, using the NAICS classification for firms con-
structed in Section C.4, for those firms that belong to multiple three-digit NAICS industry in a given
year, we equally split their R&D expenditure value to each of the NAICS industry. Second, for each
three-digit NAICS industry in each quarter, we first select all the firms that report R&D expenditures
both in the current quarter and in the quarter one year ago, and then we calculate the industry value
of R&D expenditure in the current quarter and in the quarter one year ago as the sum of the R&D
expenditure of those firms (or subfirms) in that quarters. Finally, we drop industries with 0 total
R&D expenditure one year ago, and calculate the YoY expenditure change for remaining industries.
Finally, we also winsorize change values outside the 95% percentile and 5% percentile of the
YoY expenditure change.
C.7 TFP Data at the Industry Level
Tomodel the innovation process, we also use the sector level TFP data from theBEA-BLS database69.
We use the the official multifactor productivity (MFP) estimates. The data is available at the sector
68. To note, the calendar quarters in the Compustat data are different from the calendar quarters we used to understand
with one month difference. For example, 2007Q1 in Compustat means Feb 2007 to Apr 2007, while 2007Q4 means
Oct 2007 to Jan 2008. We will take this difference into account for later calculation.
69. Data and relevant documents are available at this BLS webpage.
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level annually from 1987 to 2018, and we follow similar procedures as above to construct 3-digit
NAICS level TFP each year to investigate its interaction with the knowledge diffusion matrix we
construct in Section ??.
D State Space Estimation of Innovation Network Dynamics
D.1 Derivation of Maximum Likelihood Estimators
The likelihood function
?(Δa0:) , -0:) |) = ?(Δa0, -0)
) −1∏
C=0
?(ΔaC+1, -C+1 |Δa0:C ,Δ-0:C ) (D.1)
Note that ?(ΔaC+1, -C+1 |Δa0:C ,Δ-0:C ) = ?(ΔaC+1 |-C+1)?(-C+1 |-C ,ΔaC ) from our model. Thus,
! (|Δa0:) , -0:) ) = log[?(Δa0, -0)] +
) −1∑
C=0
[log(?(ΔaC+1 |-C+1)) + log(?(-C+1 |-C ,ΔaC ))] (D.2)
Note that
log(?(ΔaC+1 |-C+1)) = −0.5log(2c) +0.5log( |−1 |) −
1
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(D.4)
We take expectation of the log of likelihood conditional on the observable variables, and replace
1. E[-C |Δa0:) ] = -C |)
2. E[-C -′C |Δa0:) ] = -C |) -′C |) + VC |)
3. E[-C -′C+1 |Δa0:) ] = -C |) -
′
C+1 |) + RC [VC+1 |) + (-C+1 |) − -C+1 |C )-
′
C+1 |) ]
In our simplified case, we have restriction that  = f2O,D = f
2





= 0⇒ f2 =
1
 () +1))A (E(
)∑
C=0
(ΔaCΔa′C −ΔaC -′C − -CΔa′C + -C -′C )) |Δa0:) ) (D.5)
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D.2 Estimation with Gradient methods
Since Equations D.6, D.7, D.8 are nonlinear functions of parameters of interest, we follow Canova
(2011) (Section 6.3) to use gradient methods for estimation.
Denote i0 = f−2 , iD = f
−2
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[(,̃0C )8 (,̃0C )8] (D.15)
We use the second order method - Newton Raposon Method as in Canova (2011) to find the
optimum,the step size can be obtain by − 5 ′′/ 5 ′, we have:
The step size of update for i0
Δi0 = i0 −
i20
 () +1)E))A (
)∑
C=0
(ΔaCΔa′C −ΔaC -′C − -CΔa′C + -C -′C )) (D.16)
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The step size of update for iD
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(D.19)
D.3 Proof of Convergence of the EM Algorithm
Proof. a. -C+1 |C = E[-C+1 |Δa0:C ] = G-C |C +]ΔaC since E[&DC |Δa0:C ] = 0.
b. Note that VC+1 |C = V(-C+1 |Δa0:C ) = V(G-C + &DC |Δa0:C ). Thus, we have
VC+1 |C = GVC |C G
′+D
c. ΔaC+1 |C = E[ΔaC+1 |Δa0:C ] = E(-C+1 |Δa0:C ) = -C+1 |C since E[& C+1 |Δa0:C ] = 0.
d. LC+1 |C = V(ΔaC+1 |Δa0:C ) = V(ΔuC+1 |Δa0:C ) + = VC+1 |C +
e. VC+1 |C+1 =V(-C+1 |Δa0:C+1) =V(-C+1 |Δa0:C , vC+1), with vC+1 = aC+1−ΔaC+1 |C , using the prop-
erty of joint normal of -C+1 and vC+1, we have
V(-C+1 |Δa0:C , vC+1) = V(-C+1 |Δa0:C ) −>E(-C+1, vC+1 |Δa0:C )L−1C+1 |C>E(-C+1, vC+1 |Δa0:C )
′
Note that
>E(-C+1, vC+1 |Δa0:C ) = >E(-C+1,aC+1 |Δa0:C ) = VC+1 |C




f. -C+1 |C+1 = E[-C+1 |Δa0:C+1] = E[-C+1 |Δa0:C , vC+1] = -C+1 |C + >E(-C+1, vC+1 |Δa0:C )L−1C+1 |CvC+1,
therefore,
-C+1 |C+1 = -C+1 |C + VC+1 |CL−1C+1 |CvC+1
g. `C |) =E[`C |Δa0:) ] =E[`C |Δa0:C , vC+1:) ] since vC+1:) are independent of each and independent
of Δa0:C , therefore, we have
-C |) = -C |C−1 +
∑
9≥C
>E(-t , v 9 |Δa0:C−1)V(v 9 |Δa0:C−1)−1v 9
We further analyze the results for >E(&ut , v 9 |Δa0:C−1). We first write the one-step forecast
error
vC+1 = ΔaC+1−ΔaC+1 |C = -C+1− -C+1 |C + & C+1 (D.20)
and
-C+1− -C+1 |C = G(-C − -C |C ) + &DC
= G(-C − -C |C−1) − GQCvC + &DC
= RC (-C − -C |C−1) − GQC& C + &DC
(D.21)
with RC = G− GQC . Now we derive a formula for
>E(-t , v 9 |Δa0:C−1) = E[-C (- 9 − - 9 | 9−1 + & 9 ) ′ |Δa0:C−1]
= E[-C (- 9 − - 9 | 9−1) ′ |Δa0:C−1]
(D.22)
Moreover,
>E(-t , vC |Δa0:C−1) = VC |C−1
>E(-t , v 9 |Δa0:C−1) = VC |C−1RC ...R 9−1,∀ 9 > C
(D.23)
Thus, we have
-C |) = -C |C−1 +
∑
9≥C
VC |C−1RC ...R 9−1L
−1
9 v 9 (D.24)
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From this, we can easily get a recursive formula
-C |) − -C |C = VC |C G′V−1C+1 |C (-C+1 |) − -C+1 |C ) (D.25)
These results are the same as the standard state-space model with small modification Anderson
and Moore (2012). Also, note that RC = G− GQC = G− GVt |t−1L−1C = VC |C G′V−1C+1 |C

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Appendix for Chapter 2
E Online Appendix for “The Network Effects of Agency Conflicts” by
Vohra, Xing and Zhu.
E.1 Model #1
In this subsection, we provide some condition to allow us to select a consistent solution when there
are multiple or the uniqueness of solution to Model #1. Recall, G8 = 08 [`(f8) + 18 +f8I8] for all 8.
Lemma E.1. If 88 ≤ 0.5,∀8 ∈ # and |6′ | < 1, the set of solutions to (2.8) for each realized G =
(G1, G2, ..., G# ) are ordered. In particular, there is a maximum solution + ′ such that + ′8 ≥ +8 ,∀8 ∈ # .
In our case, 88 = 0, thus, we can always select a maximal + for each realized G = (G1, G2, .., G# ).
Proof. Recall that +8 = +̃8 − 6(+̃8) and |6′ | < 1. Therefore, +8 is strictly increasing in +̃8 . By the




8 9+ 9 + G8
⇒ (1−88)+̃8 +886(+̃8) =
∑
9≠8
8 9+ 9 + G8
As |6′ | < 1, (1−88)+̃8 +886(+̃8) is strictly increasing in +̃8 . Hence, +̃8 is strictly increasing
in
∑
9≠88 9+8 . The monotonicity of +8 with respect to +̃8 implies that +8 strictly increases with∑
9≠88 9+ 9 .

Therefore, our analysis of model #1 is executed with respect to the maximum solution.
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We describe other conditions that lead to uniqueness for model #1. Recall +8 = +̃8 − 6(+̃8) and
set ℎ−1(+̃) = +̃8 −6(+̃8). Therefore,
ℎ(+8) = +̃8⇒ ℎ(+8) −
∑
9
8 9+ 9 − G8 = 0 ∀8.
We use the implicit function theorem to justify the uniqueness of the solution for each G. Set
8 (+) = ℎ(+8) −
∑
98 9+ 9 − G8 for all 8 and let  = (1, 2, ..., # ) ′. Then, we are interested in the
uniqueness of a solution to  (+) = 0. Define an operator ) as follows:
) ◦+ =  (+) ++.
Then,  (+) = 0 is equivalent to ) ◦+ = + or equivalently )−1 ◦+ = + . Note that ∇ (+) =
diag(ℎ′(+1), ..., ℎ′(+# )) − and ∇2 (+) = diag(ℎ′′(+1), ..., ℎ′′(+# )).
• Consider the limited liability case, 6′ ≥ 0⇒ ℎ′ ≥ 1. Uniqueness follows because )−1 is a
contraction mapping if ℎ′
8
≥ 1.
• For the default cost case, 6′ ≤ 0⇒ ℎ′ ≤ 1. )−1 is a contraction mapping if ℎ′ is bounded from
below by a sufficiently large number but strictly smaller than 1.
E.2 Existence of Interior Equilibria
Existence of an equilibrium is immediate since the payoff functions are smooth and concave while
the set of actions of each agent is convex and compact. However, it is possible that the equilibrium
occurs at a corner. Here, we provide a condition under which an interior equilibrium profile exists.
We also provide a sufficient condition to guarantee uniqueness of this interior equilibrium. Denote
f̄ is the upper of f.
Proposition E.1. Under 2.2.12.2.2 and the smoothness of objective function, a sufficient condition
to guarantee the existence of an interior equilibrium profile is














9 38 90 9 [`(f9) + 1 9]
.















implying any profile (f1,f2, ...,f=) with some f8 = 0 can not be an equilibrium. Thus, the equilib-
rium is interior.
. 
E.3 Proof of Theorem 2.4.1
Proof. Differentiating both sides of `′(f4
8





























+ m 5 (8)
m1:
. (E.3)





















= 0 938 9 , yields
m 5 (8)
m1 9
= 0 938 9
 [6′′(+̃8) (I8 + `′(f8))]
1− [6′(+̃8)]
.
For the quadratic case, this produces:
m 5 (8)
m1 9




























 [6′′(+̃8) (I8 + `′(f8)) (`( 9) + 1 9 +f9 I 9)]
1− [6′(+̃8)]
.
For the quadratic case, we have
m 5 (8)
m0 9
= 38 9 [6′′(+̃8)]
 [(I8 + `′(f8)) (`(f9) + 1 9 +f9 I 9)]
1− [6′(+̃8)]
= 38 9 [6′′(+̃8)]






















Using m [+̃8 ]
mf 9
= 0 938 9 [`′(f9) + I 9] and `′(f8) = 6
′ (+̃8)I8
1−6 (+̃8)




= 0 938 9




For quadratic functions, this reduces to
m 5 (8)
mf9
= 0 938 9 [6′′(+̃8)]
`′(f8)`′(f9) + X8 9
1− [6′(+̃8)]
. (E.6)
From the definition of 8 9 we have
8 9 =
0 9 [6′′(+̃8)]
(`′′(f8) − 588) (1− [6′(+̃8)])
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[`′′(f8) − 588] (1− [6′(+̃8)])
`′(f8).




`′(f8)`′(f9) + X8 9
`′(f8)2 +1












E.4 Deflation of Double Count
In this appendix, we show our main results in section 2.5.1 still hold when we deflate the double
count. There are two ways to avoid the effect of value inflation arise from network structure. One is
to set
6(+̃8) = +̃8 (_− ^+̃8/20̃8) (E.7)
with 0̃8 =
∑
9 38 90 9 , another is to set
6(+̃8) = +̃8 (_− ̂88^+̃8/208) (E.8)
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with ̂88 = 1−
∑
9 98 as in Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014).Both help cancel out the effect of value
inflation from network structure. Our main results are robust to these alternatives.
Let us first consider the setup E.7, under this case, the first order condition can be written as




(1−_)∑ 9 0 938 9 + ^∑ 9 38 90 9 [`(f49 ) + 1] , (E.9)
To emphasize the role of network structure, let us assume 01 = ... = 0# = 0 to shut down the
heterogeneity of firm size. Then we have




(1−_)∑ 9 38 9 + ^∑ 9 38 9 [`(f49 ) + 1] , (E.10)








For the setup E.8, the first order condition can be written as




(1−_)∑ 9 +^∑ 9 ̂8838 90 9 [`(f49 ) + 1] , (E.12)
Here, we consider the case that 01 = 02 = .. = 0. Denote 3̂8 9 = ̂8838 9 , the net exposure of firm 8 to 9 ,








Since equation E.11 and E.13 share similar property to the E.4 which fully captures the results in
section 2.5.1, our results are robust to cases E.7 and E.8.
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